Randall White v. Quail Creek Villas Association Inc

Case Summary

Case ID 23F-H004-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2022-12-29
Administrative Law Judge Jenna Clark
Outcome loss
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Randall White Counsel
Respondent Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. Counsel Carolyn Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842; Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. Bylaws Art. III Sec. 2

Outcome Summary

The ALJ denied the petition because the Petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent violated community documents or statutes. The ALJ noted that Petitioner lacked the authority to request the inspection on behalf of the HOA, and one primary statute cited (ARS § 10-3842) was inapplicable/outside jurisdiction.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to meet the burden of proof regarding the alleged statutory and community document violations. The ALJ found Petitioner lacked the authority to act for the Association, and the inspection had not yet commenced when directed to stop.

Key Issues & Findings

Alleged interference with wildfire risk assessment

Petitioner alleged Respondent stopped the Green Valley Fire Department's in-progress wildfire risk assessment, interfering with the assessment and failing to act in good faith or in the best interests of the Corporation.

Orders: Petitioner's petition was denied. All pending post-hearing motions were denied as moot.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. Bylaws Art. III Sec. 2

Analytics Highlights

Topics: HOA dispute, wildfire risk, homeowner authority, jurisdiction, planned community
Additional Citations:

  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2102
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-2199.05
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1802
  • ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805
  • Quail Creek Villas Association Inc. Bylaws Art. III Sec. 2
  • ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R2-19-119

Video Overview

Audio Overview

https://open.spotify.com/episode/5mGhwonFTvuMYwkSno8Fwh

Decision Documents

23F-H004-REL Decision – 1002376.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:50:26 (40.8 KB)

23F-H004-REL Decision – 1002517.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:50:29 (5.8 KB)

23F-H004-REL Decision – 1014952.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:50:33 (45.6 KB)

23F-H004-REL Decision – 1020817.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:50:36 (55.1 KB)

23F-H004-REL Decision – 1022445.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:50:39 (170.8 KB)

Questions

Question

Can an individual homeowner authorize vendors or government agencies to perform inspections on HOA common property?

Short Answer

No. Unless explicitly granted permission by the governing documents, an individual homeowner does not have the authority to act on behalf of the Association.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that a homeowner cannot unilaterally request services, such as a fire inspection, for the entire subdivision. The authority to manage association affairs and property generally resides with the Board of Directors.

Alj Quote

Here, the record reflects that Petitioner did not have the authority or permission to act on behalf of the Association to request that GVFD perform a wild fire inspection in and for the Quail Creek Villas subdivision.

Legal Basis

Association Bylaws Art. III, Section 2; ARS 33-1802

Topic Tags

  • Homeowner Authority
  • Common Area Inspections
  • Board Powers

Question

Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The Petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The person bringing the complaint must prove their case. The HOA does not inherently have to disprove the allegations; the homeowner must first provide sufficient evidence that a violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.

Legal Basis

Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearing Procedures

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction over the standards of conduct for corporate officers (ARS Title 10)?

Short Answer

No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to specific real estate and planned community statutes.

Detailed Answer

Allegations regarding the general corporate conduct of officers under Title 10 (Corporations and Associations) generally fall outside the scope of the administrative hearing process provided by the Department of Real Estate.

Alj Quote

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, Corporations and Association – Standards of Conduct for Officers, is outside the jurisdiction of the Department and inapplicable to this matter.

Legal Basis

Jurisdictional Limits

Topic Tags

  • Jurisdiction
  • Corporate Law
  • Officer Conduct

Question

What is the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard used in these hearings?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is 'more probably true than not'.

Detailed Answer

This is the standard of proof required in civil and administrative hearings. It is a lower standard than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' used in criminal cases. It essentially means the evidence must tip the scale slightly in favor of the petitioner.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Evidence

Question

If I accidentally email my evidence to the wrong email address for the HOA's attorney, will it still be admitted?

Short Answer

Likely not. The responsibility for properly serving evidence lies with the person sending it.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that if a petitioner misspells the opposing counsel's email address, resulting in the evidence not being received, the petitioner is responsible for that error, and the evidence may be excluded.

Alj Quote

Thus, Petitioner bore the onus of any mishandling/compromise of his proposed hearing exhibits.

Legal Basis

Procedural Rules

Topic Tags

  • Evidence
  • Procedure
  • Mistakes

Question

Can I cite general statutes or non-existent statutes in my petition?

Short Answer

No, you must cite specific, valid statutes. Citing non-existent codes weakens the case.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the petitioner cited statutes that did not exist (e.g., ARS 33-9). While the judge may try to interpret the intent based on evidence, relying on invalid statutes makes it difficult to sustain the burden of proof.

Alj Quote

The conundrum of Petitioner’s confusing reliance on statutes that do not exist and/or are outside the jurisdiction of the Department is solved, in large part, based on the substantive evidence of record.

Legal Basis

Statutory Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Legal Research
  • Petition Drafting

Question

What is the deadline for requesting a rehearing if I disagree with the decision?

Short Answer

30 days from the date the order is served.

Detailed Answer

If a party wishes to contest the ALJ's decision, they must file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this ORDER upon the parties.

Legal Basis

ARS 41-1092.09

Topic Tags

  • Appeals
  • Deadlines

Case

Docket No
23F-H004-REL
Case Title
Randall White vs. Quail Creek Villas Association Inc.
Decision Date
2022-12-29
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Questions

Question

Can an individual homeowner authorize vendors or government agencies to perform inspections on HOA common property?

Short Answer

No. Unless explicitly granted permission by the governing documents, an individual homeowner does not have the authority to act on behalf of the Association.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ determined that a homeowner cannot unilaterally request services, such as a fire inspection, for the entire subdivision. The authority to manage association affairs and property generally resides with the Board of Directors.

Alj Quote

Here, the record reflects that Petitioner did not have the authority or permission to act on behalf of the Association to request that GVFD perform a wild fire inspection in and for the Quail Creek Villas subdivision.

Legal Basis

Association Bylaws Art. III, Section 2; ARS 33-1802

Topic Tags

  • Homeowner Authority
  • Common Area Inspections
  • Board Powers

Question

Who is responsible for proving that a violation occurred in an administrative hearing?

Short Answer

The Petitioner (the homeowner filing the complaint) bears the burden of proof.

Detailed Answer

The person bringing the complaint must prove their case. The HOA does not inherently have to disprove the allegations; the homeowner must first provide sufficient evidence that a violation occurred.

Alj Quote

In this proceeding, Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violated ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1805.

Legal Basis

Arizona Administrative Code R2-19-119

Topic Tags

  • Burden of Proof
  • Hearing Procedures

Question

Does the Department of Real Estate have jurisdiction over the standards of conduct for corporate officers (ARS Title 10)?

Short Answer

No. The Department's jurisdiction is limited to specific real estate and planned community statutes.

Detailed Answer

Allegations regarding the general corporate conduct of officers under Title 10 (Corporations and Associations) generally fall outside the scope of the administrative hearing process provided by the Department of Real Estate.

Alj Quote

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3842, Corporations and Association – Standards of Conduct for Officers, is outside the jurisdiction of the Department and inapplicable to this matter.

Legal Basis

Jurisdictional Limits

Topic Tags

  • Jurisdiction
  • Corporate Law
  • Officer Conduct

Question

What is the 'preponderance of the evidence' standard used in these hearings?

Short Answer

It means the evidence shows the claim is 'more probably true than not'.

Detailed Answer

This is the standard of proof required in civil and administrative hearings. It is a lower standard than 'beyond a reasonable doubt' used in criminal cases. It essentially means the evidence must tip the scale slightly in favor of the petitioner.

Alj Quote

A preponderance of the evidence is such proof as convinces the trier of fact that the contention is more probably true than not.

Legal Basis

Morris K. Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence

Topic Tags

  • Legal Standards
  • Evidence

Question

If I accidentally email my evidence to the wrong email address for the HOA's attorney, will it still be admitted?

Short Answer

Likely not. The responsibility for properly serving evidence lies with the person sending it.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ ruled that if a petitioner misspells the opposing counsel's email address, resulting in the evidence not being received, the petitioner is responsible for that error, and the evidence may be excluded.

Alj Quote

Thus, Petitioner bore the onus of any mishandling/compromise of his proposed hearing exhibits.

Legal Basis

Procedural Rules

Topic Tags

  • Evidence
  • Procedure
  • Mistakes

Question

Can I cite general statutes or non-existent statutes in my petition?

Short Answer

No, you must cite specific, valid statutes. Citing non-existent codes weakens the case.

Detailed Answer

The ALJ noted that the petitioner cited statutes that did not exist (e.g., ARS 33-9). While the judge may try to interpret the intent based on evidence, relying on invalid statutes makes it difficult to sustain the burden of proof.

Alj Quote

The conundrum of Petitioner’s confusing reliance on statutes that do not exist and/or are outside the jurisdiction of the Department is solved, in large part, based on the substantive evidence of record.

Legal Basis

Statutory Interpretation

Topic Tags

  • Legal Research
  • Petition Drafting

Question

What is the deadline for requesting a rehearing if I disagree with the decision?

Short Answer

30 days from the date the order is served.

Detailed Answer

If a party wishes to contest the ALJ's decision, they must file a request for a rehearing with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days.

Alj Quote

Pursuant to ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1092.09, a request for rehearing in this matter must be filed with the Commissioner of the Arizona Department of Real Estate within 30 days of the service of this ORDER upon the parties.

Legal Basis

ARS 41-1092.09

Topic Tags

  • Appeals
  • Deadlines

Case

Docket No
23F-H004-REL
Case Title
Randall White vs. Quail Creek Villas Association Inc.
Decision Date
2022-12-29
Alj Name
Jenna Clark
Tribunal
OAH
Agency
ADRE

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Randall White (petitioner)
    Quail Creek Villas homeowner
    Appeared on his own behalf.

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn B. Goldschmidt (HOA attorney)
    Goldschmidt | Shupe LLC
    Counsel for Respondent.
  • Lori Wuollet (community manager)
    CAD Community Management
    Witness for Respondent; also known as Lori Don Wlette or Gloria Wlette.
  • John Messner (board member)
    Quail Creek Villas Association Inc.
    Vice President and witness for Respondent.
  • Robert Jelen (board member)
    Quail Creek Villas Association Inc.
    President and witness for Respondent; sometimes referred to as Bob Kellen.
  • Max Tittle (board member)
    Quail Creek Villas Association Inc.
    Also referred to as Max Tibble or Matt Tittle.
  • Diane (board member)
    Quail Creek Villas Association Inc.
    Mentioned by Petitioner as a board member.

Neutral Parties

  • Jenna Clark (ALJ)
    OAH
    Presided over the hearing and issued the decision.
  • Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
    OAH
    Signed minute entries (Sept 27, 2022) and order regarding virtual appearance (Nov 28, 2022).
  • John O'Campo (fire inspector)
    Green Valley Fire Department
    Contacted by Petitioner regarding wildfire assessment.
  • Roger Thompson (fire inspector)
    Green Valley Fire Department
    Parallel to John O'Campo; communicated with Petitioner and Respondent's board member.
  • Corey Guerin (inspector)
    AZ Dept Forestry & Fire Management
    Performed the Firewise assessment on November 3, 2022.
  • Miranda Alvarez (Legal Secretary)
    OAH
    Signed transmission lists.
  • c. serrano (Staff)
    OAH
    Clerical staff involved in document transmission.

Other Participants

  • Louis Dettorre (Commissioner)
    ADRE
    Recipient of official transmissions.
  • AHansen (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of official transmissions.
  • vnunez (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of official transmissions.
  • djones (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of official transmissions.
  • labril (ADRE Staff)
    ADRE
    Recipient of official transmissions.

Colonia Del Rey Homeowners Association v. Gregory Czekaj

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918040-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-07-08
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome false
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gregory L. Czekaj Counsel Gary Wolf
Respondent Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc. Counsel Carolyn Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
Bylaws Sections 6.1, 7.1, 9.2

Outcome Summary

Petitioner failed to prove HOA violated records, voting, or notice statutes. HOA failed to prove Petitioner violated Bylaws by misrepresenting himself as an officer.

Why this result: Petitioner's interpretations of statutes regarding notice and voting were incorrect, and HOA complied with records requests. HOA lacked evidence for its claim against Petitioner.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide records

Petitioner alleged HOA failed to provide requested organizational, business, corporate, and financial records.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Invalid fee increase due to proxy vote

Petitioner alleged a $5 fee increase was invalid because a proxy vote was used in violation of statutes and rules.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Failure to provide ten-day meeting notice

Petitioner alleged HOA failed to give ten-day notice for a meeting to vote on Bylaws amendments.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Petitioner exceeded rights as member

HOA alleged Petitioner misrepresented himself as an officer to obtain insurance and tax information.

Orders: The HOA did not prevail. HOA bears its filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Decision Documents

19F-H1919054-REL Decision – 720897.pdf

Uploaded 2026-02-11T06:34:36 (224.6 KB)

**Case Summary: Czekaj v. Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.**
**Case Nos:** 19F-H1918040-REL & 19F-H1919054-REL
**Forum:** Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
**Date:** July 8, 2019

**Overview**
This administrative hearing addressed four consolidated complaints involving a nine-unit homeowners association (HOA) in Tucson, Arizona. Three complaints were filed by homeowner Gregory L. Czekaj (Petitioner) regarding records access, fee increases, and meeting notices. One cross-complaint was filed by the HOA alleging the Petitioner exceeded his authority as a member.

**Complaint One: Access to Records**
* **Issue:** Petitioner alleged the HOA failed to provide requested financial and organizational records in violation of A.R.S. § 33-1805.
* **Key Facts:** Petitioner submitted multiple requests in 2018. The HOA requested he narrow "burdensome" requests, provided electronic documents, and hosted a physical records review session in November 2018. Petitioner argued the HOA "withheld" documents.
* **Decision:** The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the **HOA**. The evidence showed the HOA timely provided records or opportunities for review. The ALJ noted that once the Petitioner acknowledged receipt of documents, the HOA correctly deemed the request satisfied until new requests were made.

**Complaint Two: Validity of Fee Increase**
* **Issue:** Petitioner argued a May 2017 $5.00 assessment increase was invalid because it relied on a proxy vote, which he claimed violated A.R.S. § 33-1812(A).
* **Key Facts:** The initial meeting minutes contained errors regarding vote counts and requirements. However, amended minutes and testimony clarified that the final tally was 5 "YES" and 1 "NO," excluding the disputed proxy.
* **Legal Analysis:** The HOA’s CC&Rs require approval by two-thirds of the *votes cast*, provided a quorum is present. With six members present (constituting a quorum), the 5-1 vote satisfied the two-thirds requirement without utilizing the proxy.
* **Decision:** The ALJ ruled in favor of the **HOA**. The fee increase was validly approved based on the votes of members present.

**Complaint Three: Meeting Notice Timeliness**
* **Issue:** Petitioner claimed the HOA violated A.R.S. § 33-1804(B) regarding a November 2018 meeting to amend Bylaws. He argued the Bylaws were invalid because he *received* the notice less than ten days before the meeting.
* **Legal Analysis:** The statute requires the HOA to "cause notice to be hand-delivered or sent prepaid by mail" not fewer than ten days in advance. The statute expressly states that failure of a member to receive actual notice does not invalidate the meeting.
* **Decision:** The ALJ ruled in favor of the **HOA**. Evidence proved the HOA mailed notices on November 5, thirteen days prior to the November 18 meeting, satisfying the statutory requirement [

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Gregory L. Czekaj (petitioner)
    Homeowner
    Appeared on his own behalf; also Respondent in consolidated counter-claim
  • Gary Wolf (petitioner's attorney)
    Contacted HOA attorney regarding records request

Respondent Side

  • Marybeth Andree (HOA President)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Represented the HOA; testified at hearing
  • Carolyn Goldschmidt (HOA attorney)
    Responded to Petitioner's attorney regarding records
  • Sarah Hitch (proxy holder)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Member who cast a proxy vote for Ed Freeman
  • Phil Oliver (board member)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Provided email clarification regarding the vote; wrote letter regarding irregularities
  • Susan Sotelo (HOA secretary)
    Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc.
    Mailed the ballots for the meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Kay Abramsohn (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge presiding over the hearing
  • Mr. Tick (witness)
    State Farm (implied)
    HOA insurance agent; testified regarding Petitioner's request for policy
  • Ed Freeman (tenant)
    Tenant living in Oregon; subject of proxy vote dispute
  • Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
    Arizona Department of Real Estate
    Recipient of the transmitted order

Gregory L Czekaj v. Colonia Del Rey HOA(ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID 19F-H1918040-REL
Agency ADRE
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2019-07-08
Administrative Law Judge Kay Abramsohn
Outcome false
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Gregory L. Czekaj Counsel Gary Wolf
Respondent Colonia Del Rey HOA, Inc. Counsel Carolyn Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1812(A)
A.R.S. § 33-1804(B)
Bylaws Sections 6.1, 7.1, 9.2

Outcome Summary

Petitioner failed to prove HOA violated records, voting, or notice statutes. HOA failed to prove Petitioner violated Bylaws by misrepresenting himself as an officer.

Why this result: Petitioner's interpretations of statutes regarding notice and voting were incorrect, and HOA complied with records requests. HOA lacked evidence for its claim against Petitioner.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide records

Petitioner alleged HOA failed to provide requested organizational, business, corporate, and financial records.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Invalid fee increase due to proxy vote

Petitioner alleged a $5 fee increase was invalid because a proxy vote was used in violation of statutes and rules.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Failure to provide ten-day meeting notice

Petitioner alleged HOA failed to give ten-day notice for a meeting to vote on Bylaws amendments.

Orders: The HOA was deemed the prevailing party. Petitioner bears his filing fees.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Petitioner exceeded rights as member

HOA alleged Petitioner misrepresented himself as an officer to obtain insurance and tax information.

Orders: The HOA did not prevail. HOA bears its filing fee.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_win

Monahan, John F. and Patricia E. -v- Sycamore Hills Homeowners Association, Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H088008-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-05-22
Administrative Law Judge Michael G. Wales
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner John F. and Patricia E. Monahan Counsel
Respondent Sycamore Hills Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Carolyn Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

Design Guidelines Section II.I, II.M, II.N, II.B.2
CC&Rs Article IX, Section 5; Article III, Section 8a
CC&Rs Article IX, Section 6, Section 26; Design Guidelines II.C
Bylaws Articles V and IX
A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed in its entirety. Claims regarding harassment, barking dogs, and committees were found to be moot, outside jurisdiction, or lacking standing. The Open Meeting Law claim was dismissed because the Board was entitled to meet in executive session to discuss threatened litigation.

Why this result: Petitioners' claims were either moot (compliance achieved/events passed), outside the tribunal's jurisdiction (harassment), lacked standing (enforcement against others), or unfounded (executive session was legal).

Key Issues & Findings

Count 1: Harassment regarding pool pump and utility trailer

Petitioners alleged the HOA harassed them by requiring screening of pool equipment and moving a trailer while not enforcing these rules against others.

Orders: Dismissed as moot because Petitioners complied prior to filing, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction regarding harassment/selective enforcement claims.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 5
  • 26
  • 33
  • 34

Count 2: Barking Dogs

Petitioners alleged the HOA failed to enforce animal noise restrictions against a specific neighbor.

Orders: Dismissed as moot.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 5
  • 35
  • 36

Count 3: RV Parking

Petitioners alleged the HOA was not imposing sufficient fines or action against two lot owners keeping RVs on their lots.

Orders: Dismissed for lack of standing.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 6
  • 37

Count 4: Nominating and Architectural Committees

Petitioners alleged the Board failed to appoint required committees prior to the annual meeting.

Orders: Dismissed as moot.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 6
  • 39
  • 40

Count 5: Open Meeting Law

Petitioners alleged the Board violated open meeting laws by discussing and voting on construction requests in a closed session.

Orders: Dismissed.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • 7
  • 44
  • 45

Decision Documents

08F-H088008-BFS Decision – 191406.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:22:40 (153.4 KB)





Briefing Doc – 08F-H088008-BFS


Administrative Law Judge Decision: Monahan v. Sycamore Hills Homeowners Association, Inc.

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative law decision in Case No. 08F-H088008-BFS, involving John and Patricia Monahan (Petitioners) and the Sycamore Hills Homeowners Association, Inc. (Respondent). The Petitioners alleged multiple violations of the Association’s governing documents and Arizona state statutes, specifically concerning harassment, nuisance control, parking enforcement, committee formation, and open meeting laws.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Michael G. Wales dismissed the petition in its entirety. The ruling was primarily based on three factors:

1. Lack of Jurisdiction and Standing: The tribunal lacks authority to adjudicate claims of “harassment” or “selective enforcement” and cannot hear disputes between neighbors where the Association is not a primary party.

2. Mootness: Several issues were resolved or corrected prior to the hearing, leaving no active controversy for the court to remedy.

3. Legal Justification for Executive Sessions: The Association demonstrated that its closed-door meetings were legally permissible under Arizona law to discuss pending or contemplated litigation.

——————————————————————————–

Detailed Analysis of Claims and Evidence

Count 1: Harassment and Selective Enforcement

The Petitioners alleged that the Association targeted them regarding pool pump screening and a utility trailer while failing to enforce the same rules against other residents.

Evidence and Testimony: The Petitioners received notices to screen pool equipment and move a utility trailer. They complied with these requests. However, Petitioner John Monahan testified that other homes continued to have exposed trash receptacles and mechanical equipment.

Respondent Defense: Property manager Sandy Sandoval testified to conducting regular monthly inspections. Board President Paul Swan noted that some minor issues, like trash can placement, were left to the “honor system” as they were deemed trivial.

Legal Conclusion: The ALJ dismissed this count on two grounds:

Jurisdiction: The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) is limited to Title 33, Chapter 16 of the Arizona Revised Statutes. It does not have the authority to hear claims of harassment or selective enforcement; such matters belong in Superior Court.

Mootness: Because the Petitioners complied with the Association’s requests before filing the complaint, no active dispute remained.

Count 2: Barking Dogs (Nuisance Control)

Petitioners alleged the Association failed to take appropriate action against the owner of Lot 37 regarding constant barking dogs, in violation of the CC&Rs.

Evidence and Testimony: Patricia Monahan testified that the Board failed to investigate her complaints. Board President Paul Swan testified that he personally monitored the location on six occasions and did not hear barking. A warning letter was drafted but withheld because the meeting where it was authorized had not been properly noticed.

Resolution: Mrs. Monahan attended a Pima County Animal Noise Control hearing where the owners of Lot 37 were fined. She testified the barking had since stopped.

Legal Conclusion: The issue was dismissed as moot. The nuisance had ceased, and the Petitioners found an alternative forum (Pima County) for resolution.

Count 3: RV Parking Enforcement

Petitioners argued that the Association was not imposing sufficient fines ($50 per month) against two lot owners who kept Recreational Vehicles (RVs) on their properties.

Evidence and Testimony: A 2007 resolution prohibited RV parking for more than 48 hours. The Board had begun fining two owners $50 monthly. John Monahan argued this amount was lower than local storage fees, rendering the fine ineffective.

Legal Conclusion: The ALJ ruled that Petitioners lacked standing. Under A.R.S. §41-2198.01(B), the department does not have jurisdiction over disputes between owners to which the Association is not a party. A claim regarding “lax enforcement” against a third party is legally considered a dispute between owners, not a direct dispute with the Association that the OAH can adjudicate.

Count 4: Committee Formation

Petitioners claimed the Association violated its Bylaws by failing to appoint a Nominating Committee and an Architectural Control Committee (ACC).

Evidence and Testimony:

ACC: The Board temporarily acted as the ACC after previous members resigned due to “upheaval” and “difficult personalities” in the community. By the time of the hearing, a new ACC had been appointed.

Nominating Committee: The property manager testified that she sought volunteers via mail and email, but no one volunteered due to the toxic environment created by certain residents.

Legal Conclusion: The ACC claim was dismissed as moot because a committee was currently in place. The Nominating Committee claim was dismissed because the election had already occurred, and evidence showed the Association made a good-faith effort to form the committee despite a lack of volunteers.

Count 5: Violation of Open Meeting Law

Petitioners alleged the Board held a private meeting to override an ACC decision regarding detached garages on Lots 36 and 56.

Legal Standard (A.R.S. §33-1804): Board meetings must be open to members, but they may be closed (executive session) for specific reasons, including legal advice from an attorney or matters regarding pending/contemplated litigation.

Evidence and Testimony: Paul Swan testified that the Board met in executive session because they had received letters from an attorney threatening litigation if the garage requests were not approved. He further testified that the final decision to approve was made by the ACC, not the Board in executive session.

Legal Conclusion: The ALJ found the executive session was legal under A.R.S. §33-1804 as it pertained to contemplated litigation. No violation of the Open Meeting Law occurred.

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Final Legal Findings and Orders

Jurisdictional Limitations

The decision emphasizes the narrow scope of the Office of Administrative Hearings. The tribunal is only authorized to ensure compliance with specific statutes and the planned community’s documents as they apply to the Petitioner. It cannot:

• Rule on the reasonableness of an Association’s decisions regarding other owners.

• Share concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court on matters of harassment or arbitrary enforcement.

Attorney’s Fees and Filing Costs

Attorney’s Fees: Although the Association prevailed, the ALJ denied their request for attorney’s fees. Under Arizona law (Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc.), an administrative proceeding is not considered an “action” that triggers fee-shifting statutes like A.R.S. §12-341.01.

Filing Fees: As the Petitioners were not the prevailing party, they were not entitled to reimbursement for filing fees.

Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge ordered the dismissal of the petition in its entirety and denied the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees. This order constitutes the final administrative decision.






Study Guide – 08F-H088008-BFS


Study Guide: Monahan v. Sycamore Hills Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case John F. and Patricia E. Monahan v. Sycamore Hills Homeowners Association, Inc. (No. 08F-H088008-BFS). It examines the legal disputes regarding planned community governance, jurisdictional boundaries of administrative hearings, and the application of Arizona Revised Statutes.

——————————————————————————–

Part I: Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2–3 sentences based on the source context.

1. What were the specific allegations made by the Petitioners in Count 1 of their petition?

2. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclude that the tribunal lacked the authority to hear claims of “selective enforcement”?

3. According to the Findings of Fact, how did the Association address the Petitioners’ violation regarding their utility trailer?

4. What was the Petitioners’ primary grievance in Count 3 regarding the Association’s handling of RV parking violations?

5. How did the Board of Directors justify its decision to temporarily act as the Architectural Control Committee (ACC)?

6. What was the outcome of the Pima County Animal Noise Control hearing mentioned in Count 2?

7. What evidence did the Association provide to explain why a nominating committee had not been formed prior to the 2007 annual meeting?

8. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804, what is the “Open Meeting Law” requirement for board deliberations?

9. Why did the ALJ determine that the October 30, 2007, executive session did not violate the Open Meeting Law?

10. On what legal basis did the ALJ deny the Respondent Association’s request for attorney’s fees?

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Part II: Answer Key

1. Count 1 Allegations: The Petitioners alleged harassment and selective enforcement, specifically that the Association required them to enclose their pool pump and move a utility trailer while failing to hold other lot owners to the same Design Guidelines. They argued the Association violated Section II.I, II.M/N, and II.B.2 of the Community’s governing documents.

2. Jurisdiction over Selective Enforcement: The ALJ ruled that the Office of Administrative Hearings is limited by A.R.S. § 41-2198 to adjudicating specific violations of Title 33 and community documents. Claims of selective enforcement or “disputes between owners” where the association is not a direct party are outside this jurisdiction and are reserved for the Superior Court.

3. Resolution of Utility Trailer Issue: The Petitioners received a written notice on August 3, 2007, to store their trailer in a garage or behind the home so it was not visible from the street. They complied with the request and faxed proof of compliance to the Association by August 12, 2007, which later rendered the claim moot.

4. RV Parking Fines: The Petitioners argued that the $50 monthly fine imposed on owners of lots 35 and 60 was insufficient to change behavior. They claimed the fine was lower than external RV storage fees, effectively allowing owners to ignore the Association’s 2007 resolution against long-term RV parking.

5. Board Acting as ACC: Board President Paul Swan testified that the Board was forced to step in as the ACC after all members except John Monahan resigned in September 2007. The ALJ found that no governing document prohibited the Board from temporarily fulfilling these duties until new members were appointed.

6. Animal Noise Control Outcome: Patricia Monahan attended a hearing on April 21, 2008, where Pima County Animal Noise Control fined the owners of Lot 37 and warned them of additional penalties for future violations. Following this hearing, she testified that the dogs had stopped barking.

7. Lack of Nominating Committee: The Property Manager testified that obtaining volunteers for committees was “difficult, if not impossible” due to “difficult personalities” creating upheaval within the community. The ALJ accepted that these challenges rendered the creation of a nominating committee implausible at that time.

8. Open Meeting Law Requirements: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) mandates that all meetings of the association and board of directors must be open to all members or their designated representatives. Members must be allowed to attend and speak before the board takes formal action on an issue.

9. Legality of Executive Session: The ALJ found the closed session was legal because it was held to discuss “pending or contemplated litigation” after receiving threat letters from an attorney representing the owners of lots 36 and 56. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1) and (2), legal advice and litigation strategy are valid reasons to close a meeting.

10. Denial of Attorney’s Fees: The ALJ cited Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., stating that an administrative proceeding is not considered an “action” under A.R.S. §§ 33-1807(H) or 12-341.01. Therefore, even though the Association prevailed, attorney’s fees could not be awarded in this forum.

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Part III: Essay Questions

1. The Limits of Administrative Jurisdiction: Analyze the distinction between the jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Superior Court as outlined in the decision. Why is the distinction between a “dispute between owners” and a “dispute with the Association” critical for standing?

2. Mootness in Administrative Adjudication: Evaluate how the concept of “mootness” applied to the various counts in this case (specifically Counts 1, 2, and 4). How does voluntary compliance by either party affect the ALJ’s ability to provide a remedy?

3. Governance Challenges in Planned Communities: Using the testimony regarding the Nominating and Architectural Committees, discuss the practical difficulties an HOA faces when community conflict discourages volunteerism. How should the law balance strict adherence to bylaws with the reality of limited community participation?

4. Transparency vs. Confidentiality: Discuss the balance of the Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804). Under what circumstances does the need for a Board to seek legal counsel or discuss litigation outweigh the members’ right to observe deliberations?

5. The Preponderance of the Evidence: Explain the burden of proof required in this administrative hearing. How did the ALJ define “preponderance of the evidence,” and how did the Petitioners’ evidence fail to meet this standard in Count 5?

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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law): An Arizona statute requiring that meetings of a homeowners association board be open to all members, with specific, narrow exceptions for closed “executive” sessions.

A.R.S. § 41-2198: The statute granting the Office of Administrative Hearings the authority to adjudicate disputes regarding planned community documents and Title 33, Chapter 16 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.

Architectural Control Committee (ACC): A committee appointed by the Association to oversee and approve or deny requests for exterior improvements or structures on lots within the community.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements): The recorded legal documents that establish the rules and regulations for a planned community and are binding on all property owners.

Executive Session: A portion of a board meeting that is closed to the general membership to discuss sensitive matters such as legal advice, litigation, or personal member information.

Jurisdiction: The legal authority of a court or administrative tribunal to hear and decide a specific type of case or dispute.

Moot: A legal status where a dispute is no longer active or relevant because the issues have been resolved or the circumstances have changed, leaving no remedy for the court to provide.

Planned Community: A real estate development where individual lot owners are mandatory members of an association and are subject to specific governing documents and dues.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in civil and administrative cases, meaning the evidence shows that a claim is “more probably true than not.”

Standing: The legal right of a party to bring a claim, requiring that the party is directly affected by the issue and that the tribunal has the authority to hear that specific person’s grievance.






Blog Post – 08F-H088008-BFS


Study Guide: Monahan v. Sycamore Hills Homeowners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case John F. and Patricia E. Monahan v. Sycamore Hills Homeowners Association, Inc. (No. 08F-H088008-BFS). It examines the legal disputes regarding planned community governance, jurisdictional boundaries of administrative hearings, and the application of Arizona Revised Statutes.

——————————————————————————–

Part I: Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in 2–3 sentences based on the source context.

1. What were the specific allegations made by the Petitioners in Count 1 of their petition?

2. Why did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclude that the tribunal lacked the authority to hear claims of “selective enforcement”?

3. According to the Findings of Fact, how did the Association address the Petitioners’ violation regarding their utility trailer?

4. What was the Petitioners’ primary grievance in Count 3 regarding the Association’s handling of RV parking violations?

5. How did the Board of Directors justify its decision to temporarily act as the Architectural Control Committee (ACC)?

6. What was the outcome of the Pima County Animal Noise Control hearing mentioned in Count 2?

7. What evidence did the Association provide to explain why a nominating committee had not been formed prior to the 2007 annual meeting?

8. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804, what is the “Open Meeting Law” requirement for board deliberations?

9. Why did the ALJ determine that the October 30, 2007, executive session did not violate the Open Meeting Law?

10. On what legal basis did the ALJ deny the Respondent Association’s request for attorney’s fees?

——————————————————————————–

Part II: Answer Key

1. Count 1 Allegations: The Petitioners alleged harassment and selective enforcement, specifically that the Association required them to enclose their pool pump and move a utility trailer while failing to hold other lot owners to the same Design Guidelines. They argued the Association violated Section II.I, II.M/N, and II.B.2 of the Community’s governing documents.

2. Jurisdiction over Selective Enforcement: The ALJ ruled that the Office of Administrative Hearings is limited by A.R.S. § 41-2198 to adjudicating specific violations of Title 33 and community documents. Claims of selective enforcement or “disputes between owners” where the association is not a direct party are outside this jurisdiction and are reserved for the Superior Court.

3. Resolution of Utility Trailer Issue: The Petitioners received a written notice on August 3, 2007, to store their trailer in a garage or behind the home so it was not visible from the street. They complied with the request and faxed proof of compliance to the Association by August 12, 2007, which later rendered the claim moot.

4. RV Parking Fines: The Petitioners argued that the $50 monthly fine imposed on owners of lots 35 and 60 was insufficient to change behavior. They claimed the fine was lower than external RV storage fees, effectively allowing owners to ignore the Association’s 2007 resolution against long-term RV parking.

5. Board Acting as ACC: Board President Paul Swan testified that the Board was forced to step in as the ACC after all members except John Monahan resigned in September 2007. The ALJ found that no governing document prohibited the Board from temporarily fulfilling these duties until new members were appointed.

6. Animal Noise Control Outcome: Patricia Monahan attended a hearing on April 21, 2008, where Pima County Animal Noise Control fined the owners of Lot 37 and warned them of additional penalties for future violations. Following this hearing, she testified that the dogs had stopped barking.

7. Lack of Nominating Committee: The Property Manager testified that obtaining volunteers for committees was “difficult, if not impossible” due to “difficult personalities” creating upheaval within the community. The ALJ accepted that these challenges rendered the creation of a nominating committee implausible at that time.

8. Open Meeting Law Requirements: A.R.S. § 33-1804(A) mandates that all meetings of the association and board of directors must be open to all members or their designated representatives. Members must be allowed to attend and speak before the board takes formal action on an issue.

9. Legality of Executive Session: The ALJ found the closed session was legal because it was held to discuss “pending or contemplated litigation” after receiving threat letters from an attorney representing the owners of lots 36 and 56. Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(1) and (2), legal advice and litigation strategy are valid reasons to close a meeting.

10. Denial of Attorney’s Fees: The ALJ cited Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., stating that an administrative proceeding is not considered an “action” under A.R.S. §§ 33-1807(H) or 12-341.01. Therefore, even though the Association prevailed, attorney’s fees could not be awarded in this forum.

——————————————————————————–

Part III: Essay Questions

1. The Limits of Administrative Jurisdiction: Analyze the distinction between the jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Superior Court as outlined in the decision. Why is the distinction between a “dispute between owners” and a “dispute with the Association” critical for standing?

2. Mootness in Administrative Adjudication: Evaluate how the concept of “mootness” applied to the various counts in this case (specifically Counts 1, 2, and 4). How does voluntary compliance by either party affect the ALJ’s ability to provide a remedy?

3. Governance Challenges in Planned Communities: Using the testimony regarding the Nominating and Architectural Committees, discuss the practical difficulties an HOA faces when community conflict discourages volunteerism. How should the law balance strict adherence to bylaws with the reality of limited community participation?

4. Transparency vs. Confidentiality: Discuss the balance of the Open Meeting Law (A.R.S. § 33-1804). Under what circumstances does the need for a Board to seek legal counsel or discuss litigation outweigh the members’ right to observe deliberations?

5. The Preponderance of the Evidence: Explain the burden of proof required in this administrative hearing. How did the ALJ define “preponderance of the evidence,” and how did the Petitioners’ evidence fail to meet this standard in Count 5?

——————————————————————————–

Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law): An Arizona statute requiring that meetings of a homeowners association board be open to all members, with specific, narrow exceptions for closed “executive” sessions.

A.R.S. § 41-2198: The statute granting the Office of Administrative Hearings the authority to adjudicate disputes regarding planned community documents and Title 33, Chapter 16 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.

Architectural Control Committee (ACC): A committee appointed by the Association to oversee and approve or deny requests for exterior improvements or structures on lots within the community.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, and Easements): The recorded legal documents that establish the rules and regulations for a planned community and are binding on all property owners.

Executive Session: A portion of a board meeting that is closed to the general membership to discuss sensitive matters such as legal advice, litigation, or personal member information.

Jurisdiction: The legal authority of a court or administrative tribunal to hear and decide a specific type of case or dispute.

Moot: A legal status where a dispute is no longer active or relevant because the issues have been resolved or the circumstances have changed, leaving no remedy for the court to provide.

Planned Community: A real estate development where individual lot owners are mandatory members of an association and are subject to specific governing documents and dues.

Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard of proof in civil and administrative cases, meaning the evidence shows that a claim is “more probably true than not.”

Standing: The legal right of a party to bring a claim, requiring that the party is directly affected by the issue and that the tribunal has the authority to hear that specific person’s grievance.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • John F. Monahan (Petitioner)
    Lot owner
    Appeared personally; former ACC member
  • Patricia E. Monahan (Petitioner)
    Lot owner
    Appeared personally

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn Goldschmidt (Respondent Attorney)
    Goldschmidt Law Firm
  • Sandy Sandoval (Property Manager)
    Witness
  • Paul Swan (Board President)
    Sycamore Hills Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Witness

Neutral Parties

  • Michael G. Wales (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    On service list
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    On service list

Other Participants

  • Steven Sandoval (Attorney)
    Attorney for non-party owners of lots 36 and 56; threatened litigation

Frey, Laura -v- Tucson Estates Property Owners Association, Inc

Case Summary

Case ID 07F-H067028-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2007-06-18
Administrative Law Judge Michael K. Carroll
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Laura Frey Counsel
Respondent Tucson Estates Property Owners Association, Inc. Counsel Carolyn Goldschmidt

Alleged Violations

Declarations Section 8.3.1
A.R.S. §41-2198.01B; TEPOA Bylaws Article V
Neighbor built fence blocking view/value without approval

Outcome Summary

The Petition was denied in its entirety. The ALJ ruled that the Petitioner's gazebo/arbor constituted a 'structure' in violation of the 10-foot setback requirement. The HOA's enforcement actions, including fines and suspension of privileges, were found to follow proper procedures and governing documents. The claim regarding a neighbor's fence was dismissed as the fence was approved.

Why this result: The ALJ determined that the ordinary meaning of 'structure' included the gazebo/arbor, and the Declarations' non-waiver clause precluded the defense of inconsistent enforcement. The HOA demonstrated compliance with notice and hearing procedures.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of setback requirements regarding structure (gazebo/arbor)

Petitioner placed a gazebo (later an arbor) within the 10-foot side setback. Petitioner argued it was 'lawn furniture' or an 'accessory' and not a 'structure', and that the HOA had waived enforcement by allowing other violations.

Orders: The gazebo/arbor is deemed a structure under the ordinary meaning of the term and violates the setback. The HOA's non-waiver clause prevents the defense of selective enforcement.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • Burke v. Voicestream Wireless Corp.II
  • Horton v. Mitchell

Procedural safeguards and imposition of sanctions

Petitioner alleged the HOA charged for nonexistent offenses, failed to respond/inform of contest methods, and improperly suspended voting and recreational privileges.

Orders: The ALJ found the HOA followed comprehensive procedural safeguards and that fines and suspensions were authorized by the Bylaws.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Neighbor's fence construction

Petitioner alleged her neighbor built a fence without Board approval that impacted her property value.

Orders: Denied. Evidence established the neighbor had obtained approval.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Decision Documents

07F-H067028-BFS Decision – 170235.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:20:20 (118.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 07F-H067028-BFS


Briefing on Frey v. Tucson Estates Property Owners Association, Inc. (No. 07F-H067028-BFS)

Executive Summary

This briefing summarizes the administrative law decision regarding a dispute between homeowner Laura Frey (Petitioner) and the Tucson Estates Property Owners Association, Inc. (TEPOA or Respondent). The core of the conflict involved the placement of a gazebo—and later an arbor—within a ten-foot side lot setback, which the Respondent deemed a violation of the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Association, concluding that:

• A gazebo or arbor constitutes a “structure” under the ordinary dictionary definition and the specific language of the CC&Rs.

• The Association’s failure to enforce similar violations in the past did not constitute a waiver of its right to enforce the rules, due to an explicit “No Precedent” clause.

• The Association followed proper procedural safeguards before imposing fines and suspending the Petitioner’s membership privileges.

• The Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence for claims regarding inconsistent enforcement or unauthorized neighbor constructions.

Background of the Dispute

On February 20, 2007, Laura Frey filed a petition alleging six violations of planned community documents and state statutes by TEPOA. The conflict originated in late 2005 or early 2006 when the Petitioner placed a portable gazebo in her side yard within ten feet of the property line.

Procedural Timeline

March 28, 2006: First Notice of Violation issued regarding the ten-foot setback (Section 8.3.1 of the Declarations).

May 16, 2006: Second Notice of Violation issued.

June 21, 2006: A Special Hearing was held where Petitioner argued the gazebo was “lawn furniture,” not a structure. The panel disagreed.

August 23, 2006: A second Special Hearing (which Petitioner did not attend) resulted in a fine of $10 per day starting September 1, 2006.

January 2007: Petitioner informed the Association the gazebo had been destroyed by a tree limb but acknowledged using its “skeleton” to construct an arbor in the same setback area.

February 6, 2007: Petitioner’s recreational facility privileges were revoked due to a “seriously delinquent” account.

Analysis of Legal Themes and Evidence

1. Definition and Interpretation of “Structure”

The primary legal question was whether a gazebo or arbor falls under the restrictions of Section 8.3.1, which mandates a 10-foot setback for “all permanent or temporary structures.”

Ordinary Meaning: Following the precedent in Horton v. Mitchell, the ALJ determined that because the Declarations did not provide a specific definition, the term “structure” must take its ordinary meaning: “something constructed.”

Contextual Evidence: Section 8.1 of the Declarations includes “accessory,” “TV/radio antenna,” and “similar device” under the umbrella of structures requiring approval. The ALJ reasoned that if a TV antenna is a structure, a gazebo or arbor certainly is.

Inclusivity of Language: Petitioner argued that the mention of “overhanging awnings, parking covers or eaves” in Section 8.3.1 suggested the rule was limited to those items. The ALJ found this language was inclusive, not exclusive, and that the phrase “all permanent or temporary structures” would be superfluous if the list were exhaustive.

2. Consistency of Enforcement and Waiver

The Petitioner argued that TEPOA’s failure to challenge other setback violations in the community constituted a waiver of their right to enforce the rule against her.

“No Precedent” Clause: Section 11 of the Declarations explicitly states that failure to enforce restrictions “shall in no event be deemed a waiver of the right to do so thereafter.”

Board Resolution: On October 12, 2004, the Board adopted a resolution acknowledging prior non-conforming structures and declaring that any new requests or changes must fully conform to current CC&Rs to ensure consistent enforcement moving forward.

Legal Precedent: The ALJ cited Burke v. Voicestream Wireless Corp. II, which held that non-waiver provisions in community restrictions are controlling even if previous violations went unchallenged.

3. Procedural Integrity and Association Sanctions

The Petitioner alleged she was charged for a “nonexistent offense” and denied the ability to contest the situation. The ALJ found the evidence refuted these claims:

Action

Authorization

Finding

Imposition of Fines

Bylaws Art. V, Sec. 5B (6)(b)

Authorized and properly noticed.

Suspension of Facilities

Bylaws Art. V, Sec. 3A (3)

Authorized due to delinquent account.

Suspension of Voting

Bylaws Art. VIII, Sec. 5C

Authorized for members not current on assessments.

Hearing Procedures

Bylaws Art. V, Sec. 5 B, C, D

Association followed a “comprehensive procedural scheme.”

Petitioner’s Allegations and Judicial Conclusions

The ALJ addressed the six specific allegations as follows:

1. Fines for “Nonexistent Offense”: Denied. The gazebo/arbor was a structure and the violation was real.

2. Failure to Respond/Inform: Denied. The Association followed extensive procedural steps and provided multiple notices.

3. Disallowance of Community Property: Denied. The suspension was a sanctioned response to the Petitioner’s delinquent account.

4. Denial of Voting Rights: Denied. The Bylaws require accounts to be current to vote; the issue was also deemed moot as rights were later restored.

5. Inconsistent Enforcement: Denied. The “No Precedent” clause and the 2004 Resolution protected the Association’s right to enforce the CC&Rs.

6. Neighbor’s Fence: Denied. Evidence showed the neighbor had obtained proper Association approval for the construction.

Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the Respondent (TEPOA) acted within its rights and followed all governing documents and state statutes. The petition filed by Laura Frey was denied in its entirety. This decision was designated as the final administrative action.






Study Guide – 07F-H067028-BFS


Study Guide: Laura Frey v. Tucson Estates Property Owners Association, Inc.

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case Laura Frey v. Tucson Estates Property Owners Association, Inc. (No. 07F-H067028-BFS). It examines the legal definitions of “structures” within planned communities, the procedural requirements for enforcing Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), and the validity of non-waiver clauses in community documents.

Part 1: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided source text.

1. What was the primary violation alleged by the Tucson Estates Property Owners Association (TEPOA) against Laura Frey?

2. How did Petitioner Laura Frey justify the presence of the gazebo in her side yard setback?

3. What was the significance of the Board’s October 12, 2004, Resolution regarding setbacks?

4. How did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determine the definition of a “structure” in the absence of a specific definition in the Declarations?

5. What specific items does Section 8.3.1 of the Declarations list as being included in the ten-foot setback requirement?

6. Why was the Petitioner’s “arbor” also considered a violation of the Declarations?

7. How did the ALJ address the Petitioner’s claim that TEPOA had waived its right to enforcement by failing to act against other similar violations?

8. What were the specific sanctions imposed on the Petitioner for the continuing violation?

9. What procedural evidence did TEPOA provide to demonstrate they had informed the Petitioner of the August 23, 2007, hearing?

10. What was the finding regarding the Petitioner’s allegation that her neighbor built an unapproved fence?

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Part 2: Answer Key

1. TEPOA Violation: The Association alleged that the Petitioner violated Section 8.3.1 of the Declarations by placing a structure (a gazebo) within the ten-foot side lot setback. The Association issued multiple notices requesting the removal of the structure to bring the property into compliance.

2. Petitioner’s Justification: Frey argued that the gazebo did not meet the definition of a “structure” prohibited by the Declarations, instead equating it to “lawn furniture.” She later contended that the remnants of the gazebo, which she fashioned into an “arbor” for vines, should not be classified as a prohibited structure.

3. 2004 Resolution: The Board adopted this resolution to acknowledge existing non-conforming structures and to establish a consistent method for future enforcement. It mandated that any request to replace or change a non-compliant structure would only be approved if the new structure fully conformed to current CC&Rs.

4. Defining “Structure”: Following the precedent set in Horton v. Mitchell, the ALJ applied the “ordinary meaning” of the word, which is “something constructed.” Because the Declarations did not provide a limiting definition, the gazebo and arbor were found to fall under this broad dictionary definition.

5. Section 8.3.1 Inclusions: This section specifies that the setback applies to all permanent or temporary structures, including mobile homes. It explicitly includes “overhanging awnings, parking covers or eaves” to clarify that items protruding into the airspace are also restricted.

6. Arbor Violation: The ALJ determined that the arbor, constructed from the “skeleton” of the destroyed gazebo, was still “something constructed.” Therefore, it met the ordinary definition of a structure and remained in violation of the side lot setback.

7. Waiver Claim: The ALJ cited Section 11 of the Declarations, a “non-waiver” clause, which states that failure to enforce a restriction does not waive the right to do so in the future. Legal precedent in Burke v. Voicestream Wireless Corp. II supported the idea that such clauses are controlling regardless of previous unchallenged violations.

8. Sanctions Imposed: The Petitioner was assessed a fine of $10 per day starting September 1, 2006. Additionally, her rights to vote in Association elections and her privileges to use common area recreational facilities were suspended.

9. Procedural Evidence: TEPOA sent a “Call to Hearing” letter via both first-class and certified mail. While the certified letter was returned as “unclaimed,” the first-class mail was not returned, and the Association followed the procedural steps outlined in its Bylaws.

10. Neighbor’s Fence: The ALJ dismissed this allegation because evidence presented at the hearing established that the neighbor had actually obtained board approval for the fence. This contradicted the Petitioner’s claim that the fence was built without Association oversight.

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Part 3: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the Source Context to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts.

1. The Interpretation of Language: Analyze how the ALJ used the Horton v. Mitchell analysis to interpret the term “structure.” Discuss the importance of “ordinary meaning” versus “specific language” in the interpretation of community governing documents.

2. The Non-Waiver Doctrine: Evaluate the legal weight of Section 11 of the TEPOA Declarations. Why is a non-waiver clause critical for a homeowners’ association’s ability to maintain community standards over long periods?

3. Due Process in Planned Communities: Examine the procedural steps TEPOA took before imposing fines and suspending privileges. Based on the Bylaws mentioned in the text, what constitutes a “comprehensive procedural scheme” for protecting homeowner rights?

4. Consistency in Enforcement: Compare the Petitioner’s argument regarding “inconsistent enforcement” with the Board’s 2004 Resolution. How does a Board balance the acknowledgment of past non-compliance with the need for future strict adherence to CC&Rs?

5. Authority of the Association: Discuss the extent of an Association’s power to restrict the use of private lots as described in Section 8 of the Declarations. How do items like “accessories” or “TV antennas” impact the legal understanding of what an owner can “commence, erect, or maintain”?

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Part 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judicial officer who presides over hearings and makes decisions regarding disputes involving state agency actions or statutes.

Arrears

The state of being behind in payments; in this case, the Petitioner’s failure to pay Association assessments or fines.

Bylaws

The internal rules and regulations that govern the administration of an association, including hearing procedures and voting rights.

CC&Rs (Declarations)

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the legal documents that establish the rules for land use and behavior within a planned community.

Common Area

Facilities and property owned by the Association for the use of all members, such as recreational facilities.

Non-Waiver Clause

A provision in a contract or declaration stating that the failure to enforce a rule in one instance does not prevent the enforcement of that rule in the future.

Petitioner

The party who files a petition or brings a legal case against another; in this case, Laura Frey.

Respondent

The party against whom a legal petition is filed; in this case, the Tucson Estates Property Owners Association (TEPOA).

Setback

A specific distance from a property line (e.g., front or side) where structures are prohibited from being placed.

Structure

Legally interpreted in this context as “something constructed,” encompassing items ranging from gazebos and arbors to cellular towers and roads.

Superfluous

Unnecessary or redundant; used by the ALJ to describe how the phrase “all permanent or temporary structures” would be viewed if the setback list were considered exclusive.

Unclaimed

A status for certified mail that was not collected by the recipient, though it does not necessarily invalidate the attempt at notice if other methods were used.






Blog Post – 07F-H067028-BFS


When Your Gazebo Becomes a ‘Structure’: Hard Lessons from a Legal Battle in the Backyard

1. Introduction: The High Cost of a Backyard Sanctuary

For many homeowners, the dream of a private sanctuary begins with a simple addition: a portable gazebo for shade or a vine-covered arbor for aesthetics. These items often feel like “lawn furniture”—temporary, movable, and far removed from the world of building permits and architectural committees. However, as the case of Laura Frey vs. Tucson Estates Property Owners Association (TEPOA) demonstrates, the gap between a piece of furniture and a prohibited “structure” can lead to a punishing administrative adjudication and thousands of dollars in fines.

The dispute began when Laura Frey placed a portable gazebo in her side yard. After a tree limb crushed the gazebo in May 2006, she attempted to adapt by repurposing the metal “skeleton” into a vine-covered arbor. What Frey viewed as a creative solution to a natural accident, the Association viewed as a persistent violation of its setback rules. This multi-month escalation serves as a definitive cautionary tale regarding the legal definitions that govern our backyards.

2. Takeaway 1: Your Gazebo is a “Structure” (Even if You Call It Furniture)

The central conflict in Frey v. TEPOA hinged on whether a portable gazebo—or the arbor built from its remains—constituted a “structure” under the community’s Declarations. Frey argued that because the item was portable and akin to “lawn furniture,” it should be exempt from Section 8.3.1, which mandates a 10-foot setback from side property lines.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this distinction, focusing on the act of assembly rather than the portability of the materials. Under Section 8.1 of the TEPOA Declarations, the “broad net” of regulation includes a wide-ranging list: buildings, additions, fences, accessories, walls, paving, and even TV antennas or “similar devices.”

The Construction Standard In the eyes of the law, the “nature” of the item (portable or permanent) is secondary to the fact that it was “constructed” or “erected.” If a homeowner must assemble it, the HOA can likely regulate it.

By this standard, if an accessory as minor as a TV antenna is legally classified as a structure, a metal gazebo frame—regardless of its “skeleton” status—is undeniably subject to setback requirements.

3. Takeaway 2: The “But My Neighbor Did It Too” Defense is Dead

Homeowners frequently rely on the defense of inconsistent enforcement, arguing that because the HOA ignored similar violations by neighbors, they have waived the right to enforce the rule now. Frey raised this exact point (Allegation 5), noting other setback violations in the subdivision.

This argument was defeated by the Non-Waiver Doctrine, codified in Section 11 of the TEPOA Declarations. This clause is a powerful legal shield for associations, ensuring that past leniency does not result in a permanent loss of enforcement power.

The 2004 Policy Pivot Crucially, the TEPOA Board had prepared for this challenge years earlier. On October 12, 2004, the Board adopted a formal Resolution acknowledging past laxity regarding setbacks and declaring that, effective immediately, all new or replacement structures must fully conform to the CC&Rs. This proactive policy change effectively “reset” the enforcement clock.

4. Takeaway 3: The Power of the Dictionary in Court

When community documents fail to define a specific term, courts look to the “ordinary meaning.” In this case, the ALJ utilized the Burke v. Voicestream Wireless Corp. II and Horton v. Mitchell precedents to bridge the gap between common parlance and legal obligation.

The court’s logic regarding Section 8.3.1 involved a critical lesson in statutory construction: the “Inclusive vs. Exclusive” rule. Frey argued that because the section specifically listed “awnings, parking covers or eaves,” it excluded gazebos.

The ALJ countered that the list was inclusive, not exclusive. To interpret the list as exclusive would make the preceding phrase—”all permanent or temporary structures”—entirely superfluous.

The takeaway is chilling for the DIY-inclined homeowner: if your CC&Rs don’t define it, the dictionary will. In previous cases, the “ordinary meaning” of a structure has been broad enough to encompass everything from a gravel road to a fifty-foot cellular tower.

5. Takeaway 4: HOAs Can Take More Than Just Your Money

While many homeowners worry about the financial toll of fines—which in this case amounted to $10 per day beginning in September 2006—the Association’s power extends to the revocation of fundamental community rights.

When Frey’s account became “seriously delinquent” due to unpaid fines, the Board moved beyond monetary penalties. A simple setback dispute over an arbor resulted in a total loss of community standing:

Suspension of Voting Rights: The Petitioner was precluded from participating in Board elections in November 2006.

Revocation of Common Area Privileges: The homeowner was barred from using community recreational facilities.

Notably, these rights were only restored after the formal Petition was filed in early 2007. This escalation demonstrates that architectural non-compliance can strip a resident of their “membership in good standing,” effectively making them a stranger in their own community.

6. Takeaway 5: Notice is a One-Way Street (The Certified Mail Trap)

A pivotal procedural moment occurred on August 7, 2006, when the Association sent a “Call to Hearing” notice for a special session on August 23. The notice was sent via both first-class and certified mail. Frey claimed she never received the notice because the certified letter was returned “unclaimed.”

The court ruled the notice was legally sufficient. Because the first-class version was not returned, the law presumes delivery. This highlights a dangerous “one-way street” in administrative hearings: avoiding a certified letter does not stop the clock. If the HOA follows its mailing protocols, the hearing proceeds, the fines are levied, and the homeowner’s absence is treated as a missed opportunity to defend their case.

Conclusion: The Fine Print is the Final Word

The legal saga of the Tucson Estates gazebo underscores a vital reality of community governance: your personal perception of your property is subordinate to the written word of the CC&Rs and the “ordinary meaning” found in a dictionary. Whether it is a portable gazebo, a repurposed “skeleton” of a frame, or a simple trellis, the act of construction brings you under the jurisdiction of the Association.

Before you add that “temporary” accessory to your yard, ask yourself: do you know if your HOA—or the local judge—would call it a structure? In the world of HOAs, the fine print is always the final word.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Laura Frey (petitioner)
    Tucson Estates
    Homeowner; appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Carolyn Goldschmidt (attorney)
    Goldschmidt Law Firm
    Attorney for Respondent (TEPOA)

Neutral Parties

  • Michael K. Carroll (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Recipient of transmitted order
  • Joyce Kesterman (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Recipient of transmitted order