Community Documents & Amenity Rules | Community Barn Program | CV2013-014446
In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, plaintiffs Steven and Janet Piper litigated against their equestrian-ranch community association over the community barn. The court held — even though the governing document was “inartfully drafted” — that its plain meaning was clear: a person who decides to keep a horse in the community barn agrees to participate in the barn’s program. Summary judgment was granted to the association on all four of the plaintiffs’ counts, the association’s uncontested counterclaim motion was granted, and the case ended in a settlement.
Last updated July 2, 2026. Case: Steven Piper, et al. v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association, Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-014446.
Scope note: This page covers Steven Piper, et al. v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2013-014446) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling that granted the association summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. The minute entries do not restate the parties’ pleadings in detail, so the description of the underlying claims here is limited to what the court’s own rulings say. Currency caveat: the last collected entries show a Notice of Settlement received May 12, 2015 and the case placed on the dismissal calendar for June 16, 2015, with a plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration still in briefing — the collected record ends there, and the final stipulated dismissal or judgment does not appear in it. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.
The takeaway
The superior court granted the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association summary judgment on all four counts of the Pipers’ complaint. Based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel, the court found that if a person decides to keep a horse in the community barn, they agree to participate in the barn’s program — and that while the governing document “may be inartfully drafted, the plain meaning is clear. If you choose to board a horse you agree to the barn’s programs.” The Pipers’ own cross-motion for summary judgment had already been denied from the bench. Weeks later, the association’s separate summary-judgment motion on its counterclaim was granted as uncontested after the Pipers filed no response, and the parties then settled.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- Steven Piper (Plaintiff / Counterdefendant)
First-named plaintiff (the caption reads “Steven Piper, et al.”) and counterdefendant on the association’s counterclaim. - Janet Piper (Plaintiff / Counterdefendant)
Plaintiff and counterdefendant who filed an affidavit in September 2014 supporting the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment. - J. Roger Wood (Counsel)
Counsel of record for the Pipers throughout the collected minute entries; appeared for the plaintiffs at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.
Respondent Side
- Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association (Defendant / Counterclaimant)
Community association for the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch community. It won summary judgment on all four of the plaintiffs’ counts and, separately, an uncontested summary judgment on its counterclaim before the case settled. - Augustus H. Shaw IV (Counsel)
Counsel of record for the association throughout the collected minute entries; appeared at the February 20, 2015 oral argument. - Lydia Linsmeier (Counsel)
Counsel appearing for the association at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.
Neutral Parties
- James T. Blomo (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who presided from mid-2014 onward, heard the February 2015 oral argument, and issued the March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling and the April 29, 2015 counterclaim ruling. - Michael J. Herrod (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the February 4, 2014 ruling denying the Pipers’ motion to dismiss the counterclaim and ordering the association to state its claim more definitely. - James Morrow (Commissioner)
Court commissioner designated to hear Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings after an application for entry of default on the counterclaim was filed in August 2014; the collected minute entries contain no default ruling.
What happened
Steven and Janet Piper sued the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2013, and the association filed a counterclaim. The collected minute entries do not restate the pleadings in detail, but the court’s dispositive ruling shows what the fight was about: the community barn, and whether a person who keeps a horse there is bound to participate in the barn’s program under the community’s governing document.
The first ruling came on the counterclaim. The Pipers moved in January 2014 to dismiss it for failure to state a claim. On February 4, 2014, Judge Michael J. Herrod denied the motion without oral argument but ordered the association to file an amended pleading stating its claim more definitely. In August 2014 an application for entry of default on the counterclaim was filed against the Pipers; the assigned division took no action on it and routed any Rule 55(b) default-judgment proceedings to Commissioner James Morrow. No default ruling appears in the collected minute entries.
The case then moved to dueling summary-judgment motions before Judge James T. Blomo. The association filed a verified motion for summary judgment on August 6, 2014, followed by a request for summary disposition under Rule 7.1. The Pipers responded on September 14, 2014 and cross-moved for summary judgment, supported by Janet Piper’s affidavit. The association moved to strike the Pipers’ response; the court denied that motion on September 22, 2014. Briefing closed in late October 2014, and oral argument — originally set for January 30, 2015 — was reset to February 20, 2015.
At the February 20, 2015 argument, J. Roger Wood appeared for the Pipers and Augustus H. Shaw IV and Lydia Linsmeier appeared for the association. After hearing argument, the court denied the Pipers’ cross-motion from the bench and took the association’s motion under advisement. On March 2, 2015, Judge Blomo issued the under-advisement ruling granting the association’s verified motion. Applying the Rule 56 standard, the court found — based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel — that “if a person decides to keep a horse in the community barn they agree to participate in the barn’s program,” that “[w]hile the document may be inartfully drafted, the plain meaning is clear,” and that there were no material facts in dispute as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The counterclaim was resolved next. The association, as counterclaimant, filed its own motion for summary judgment on March 17, 2015. The Pipers filed no response, and on April 29, 2015 the court granted the motion under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1, finding it “uncontested, supported by the facts and appropriate.”
The endgame was brief. The Pipers filed a motion for reconsideration and a request to extend the summary-judgment briefing schedule, and on May 11, 2015 the court ordered the association to respond within ten days. The next day, May 12, 2015, the court received a Notice of Settlement and placed the case on the dismissal calendar for June 16, 2015 — unless a stipulated judgment or stipulation for dismissal was submitted by that date, all remaining claims and parties would be dismissed. The collected minute entries end there.
Procedural timeline
Complete uploaded source-document index
This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/steven-piper-v-will-rogers-equestrian-ranch-community-association/raw/: 10 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.
Ruling
Type: Court order/minute entry
Ruling denying Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim for Failure to State a Claim.
Default Judgment
Type: Decision or judgment
Shows the filer trying to move the case forward because the opposing party had not timely appeared.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Oral Argument Set
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Oral Argument Set
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Under Advisement Ruling
Type: Court order/minute entry
Under-advisement ruling granting Defendant’s Verified Motion for Summary Judgment.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
FAQ
What was this case about?
The minute entries do not restate the complaint or counterclaim in detail, but the court’s March 2, 2015 ruling shows the dispute centered on the community barn at Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch. The decisive question was whether a person who keeps a horse in the community barn is bound to participate in the barn’s program under the community’s governing document. The court found the answer was yes: “If you choose to board a horse you agree to the barn’s programs.”
Who won?
The association won every dispositive ruling in the collected record. The court denied the Pipers’ cross-motion for summary judgment from the bench on February 20, 2015, granted the association’s verified motion for summary judgment on all four of the Pipers’ counts on March 2, 2015, and granted the association’s uncontested summary-judgment motion on its counterclaim on April 29, 2015. The parties then settled before a final dismissal appears in the collected entries.
Why did the court rule for the association even though it called the document “inartfully drafted”?
Because imperfect drafting is not the same as ambiguity. The court found that, based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel, the document’s plain meaning was clear — choosing to board a horse in the community barn means agreeing to participate in the barn’s program — and that there were no material facts in dispute on Counts 1 through 4. Under Rule 56, that combination entitles the moving party to judgment without a trial.
What happened with the association’s counterclaim?
Early on, the Pipers moved to dismiss it for failure to state a claim; the court denied that motion in February 2014 but ordered the association to replead its claim more definitely. In March 2015, after winning summary judgment on the Pipers’ claims, the association moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim. The Pipers filed no response, and under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1 the court granted the motion as uncontested, finding it supported by the facts and appropriate. The minute entries do not describe the counterclaim’s substance.
What is an under-advisement ruling?
When an Arizona superior-court judge takes a motion “under advisement” after briefing or argument, the later written decision is filed as an under-advisement ruling in the court’s minute entries. The March 2, 2015 ruling in this case is one: after the February 20, 2015 oral argument, the court issued a written decision setting out the Rule 56 summary-judgment standard, its findings about the community barn document, and its order granting the association’s motion. These rulings are public records available through the Clerk of the Superior Court.
Is this decision binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?
No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent, and this case ended in a settlement rather than an appellate decision. It is still useful reading: it shows a court enforcing the plain meaning of a community document despite drafting flaws, and it illustrates the procedural cost of leaving a summary-judgment motion unanswered — an unopposed motion can be granted as uncontested under Rule 7.1 and Rule 56(e)(4).
Case Dossier
This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | CV2013-014446 (Maricopa County Superior Court) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Superior Court |
| Decision / key date | March 2, 2015 |
| Judge / panel | Hon. James T. Blomo, Hon. Michael J. Herrod |
| Parties | Steven Piper and Janet Piper (Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants) v. Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association (Defendant/Counterclaimant) |
| Topics | cc-and-rscovenantsprocedure |
| Outcome / holding | The superior court granted the association’s verified motion for summary judgment on all four of the plaintiffs’ counts, finding that a person who decides to keep a horse in the community barn agrees to participate in the barn’s program — the governing document, though “inartfully drafted,” had a clear plain meaning — and that no material facts were in dispute; the court separately granted the association’s unopposed motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim as uncontested under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | 10 PDFs |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 11 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 1 download link |
Key Issues & Findings
Steven and Janet Piper sued the Will Rogers Equestrian Ranch Community Association in Maricopa County Superior Court in 2013, and the association counterclaimed. The minute entries do not restate the pleadings, but the court’s rulings show the dispute centered on the community barn and whether a person who keeps a horse there is bound to participate in the barn’s program. After the Pipers’ motion to dismiss the counterclaim was denied in February 2014 (with the association ordered to replead more definitely), the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Following a February 20, 2015 oral argument at which the Pipers’ cross-motion was denied from the bench, the court issued a March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling granting the association summary judgment on all four counts, finding that anyone who chooses to board a horse in the community barn agrees to the barn’s programs and that the governing document’s plain meaning was clear despite inartful drafting. In April 2015 the court granted the association’s uncontested summary-judgment motion on its counterclaim, and in May 2015 — with a plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration in briefing — the parties filed a Notice of Settlement and the case was set on the dismissal calendar.
In the March 2, 2015 under-advisement ruling, the court began with the Rule 56(c) standard: summary judgment is available only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, evidence and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the interests of justice are ordinarily best served by a trial on the merits. The court cited United Bank of Arizona v. Allyn, Gold Insurance Company v. Grishom, City of Tucson v. Sanderson, and Comacho v. Gardner for these propositions before turning to the merits.
Applying that standard, the court found — based on the pleadings, affidavits, statements, and argument of counsel — that if a person decides to keep a horse in the community barn, they agree to participate in the barn’s program. The court acknowledged the governing document “may be inartfully drafted” but held “the plain meaning is clear. If you choose to board a horse you agree to the barn’s programs.” Because there were no material facts in dispute as to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4, the association’s verified motion for summary judgment was granted; the Pipers’ competing cross-motion had already been denied from the bench at the February 20, 2015 oral argument.
The counterclaim was resolved on procedural grounds. The association filed a summary-judgment motion on the counterclaim on March 17, 2015 and the Pipers filed no response. On April 29, 2015 the court found the motion “uncontested, supported by the facts and appropriate” under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1 and granted it. The Pipers then moved for reconsideration and to extend the summary-judgment briefing schedule, and the court ordered a response — but the next day, May 12, 2015, a Notice of Settlement arrived and the court set the case for dismissal on June 16, 2015 unless a stipulated judgment or stipulation for dismissal was filed. The collected minute entries end at that point.
This case is a compact illustration of how Arizona courts treat imperfectly drafted community documents: inartful drafting does not create ambiguity if the plain meaning is clear. The court enforced the community barn document as written — choosing to board a horse in the community barn meant agreeing to the barn’s program — and that single interpretive finding disposed of all four of the homeowners’ counts at summary judgment.
It also carries two procedural lessons for HOA litigants. First, an unanswered summary-judgment motion is dangerous: the association’s counterclaim motion was granted as uncontested under Rule 56(e)(4) and Rule 7.1 when no response was filed. Second, superior-court cases often end without an appellate answer — here the parties settled while a reconsideration motion was in briefing, so the rulings bind only these parties and set no precedent for other Arizona communities.