CC&R Amendments & Common Elements | Kalway Reasonable-Expectations Test | CV2020-008665
In this Maricopa County Superior Court case, an apartment owner at Regency House argued that his association could not alter the parking spaces identified on the community’s recorded plat — including spaces P-237 through P-246, among them his assigned space P-238 — without the 75% owner vote that Section 24 of the CC&Rs requires for amendments. The court initially held the board’s general use and maintenance powers made the question one for a jury, but on reconsideration it applied Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC and held the 2019 alterations were substantial and unforeseen changes a homeowner could not reasonably expect, granting the owner summary judgment.
Last updated July 1, 2026. Case: Michael Lyon v. Regency House Association, et al., Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-008665.
Scope note: This page covers Michael Lyon v. Regency House Association, et al. (Maricopa County Superior Court No. CV2020-008665) as a public Arizona superior-court HOA case guide. It is built from the court’s own filed minute entries, including the April 15, 2022 under-advisement ruling and the September 6, 2022 ruling on reconsideration that granted the plaintiff summary judgment; the complete set of collected minute entries is available in the source-document index below. Currency caveat: the last collected minute entries show a Notice of Settlement filed October 21, 2022 and the case placed on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after January 25, 2023, with all pending motions deemed moot — the collected entries do not include the final dismissal order or any settlement terms. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties and are not precedent. This page is educational and is not legal advice.
The takeaway
On reconsideration, the superior court granted the homeowner summary judgment. Applying the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022) — which the court acknowledged it had been unaware of when it originally denied the motion — the court held that the association’s 2019 alteration of the parking garage was a substantial and unforeseen change to parking spaces specifically identified on the recorded plat, which the CC&Rs incorporated by reference. The board’s general authority to “maintain, repair, replace, administer and operate the Property” under Section 4.2 did not extend to that completed alteration, especially where no homeowner vote was taken; changing the recorded plat required the Section 24 amendment process — an instrument signed by owners of at least 75% of the total ownership of the common elements and all institutional first mortgagees. The court also noted the plaintiff’s undisputed measurements showing three new spaces were illegal under the City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance, observing that illegal parking spaces are not something a homeowner could reasonably expect.
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- Michael Lyon (Plaintiff)
Owner at Regency House who was assigned parking space P-238 when he purchased his apartment in 2009; he challenged the September 2019 alteration of the community’s parking garage and won summary judgment on reconsideration. - Rachel Ellen Phillips (Counsel)
Counsel for Plaintiff Michael Lyon in the early phase of the case; she argued the December 4, 2020 hearing on the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss. (Her surname appears as both “Phillips” and “Philips” in the minute entries.) - Damien R. Meyer (Counsel)
Counsel of record for Plaintiff Michael Lyon in the later phase of the case; he argued the March 25, 2022 hearing on the motion for partial summary judgment. (His surname appears as both “Meyer” and “Myer” in the minute entries.)
Respondent Side
- Regency House Association (Defendant)
The community association governed by the Regency House CC&Rs and Bylaws; in September 2019 the community’s parking garage was altered with new parking spaces and loading zones. The minute entries caption the defendants collectively as “Regency House Association, et al.” - A A M, L.L.C. (Defendant)
Co-defendant named in the case-party records, where it is listed as self-represented (“Pro Per”). The minute entries do not describe its role; they refer to the defendants collectively as “Regency House Association, et al.” - Augustus H. Shaw IV (Counsel)
Counsel for the defendants throughout the collected minute entries; he argued both the December 2020 motion-to-dismiss hearing and the March 2022 summary-judgment hearing.
Neutral Parties
- Joan M. Sinclair (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge who issued the April 15, 2022 under-advisement ruling denying partial summary judgment and the September 6, 2022 ruling granting reconsideration and summary judgment for the plaintiff. - Andrew J. Russell (Judge)
Judicial officer (signing as Commissioner) who presided over the December 4, 2020 argument on the partial motion to dismiss, dismissed the gross-negligence count, referred the parties to a settlement conference, and denied the defendants’ 2021 motion for reconsideration. - Daniel J. Kiley (Judge)
Maricopa County Superior Court judge assigned early in the case; he set the December 2020 telephonic oral argument on the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss.
What happened
Regency House is a community governed by recorded covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) under which the owners share ownership of common elements that include the parking garage and parking areas (Section 1.7). The plat recorded with the CC&Rs was incorporated into them by reference (Section 1.20) and specifically identified the individual parking spaces in the first and second basement plans as they existed in April 1979. Michael Lyon was assigned parking space P-238 when he purchased his apartment in 2009. In September 2019, the parking garage was altered with new parking spaces and loading zones. Lyon sued Regency House Association and a co-defendant in 2020, asserting claims that included breach of contract (Count 1), gross negligence (Count IV), and injunctive relief and/or specific performance (Count 6).
The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss. After a virtual oral argument on December 4, 2020, Commissioner Andrew J. Russell granted the motion as to the gross-negligence count against all defendants and denied it as to every remaining count. The court then referred the parties to a mandatory settlement conference through its Alternative Dispute Resolution office. In June 2021 the defendants sought expedited reconsideration of the motion-to-dismiss ruling; Judge Joan M. Sinclair ordered briefing, noting “the confusion relative to the order in the minute entry filed on December 7, 2020 and the change in judicial officers,” and Commissioner Russell denied the motion on July 23, 2021.
In October 2021 Lyon moved for partial summary judgment on his breach-of-contract and injunctive-relief/specific-performance counts. His theory was that the parking spaces identified on the recorded plat could not be altered without following Section 24 of the CC&Rs, which requires any change, modification, or rescission of the Declaration to be made by a recorded instrument signed by owners of at least 75% of the total ownership of the common elements and by all institutional first mortgagees. After oral argument on March 25, 2022, Judge Sinclair denied the motion in an April 15, 2022 under-advisement ruling. Although the court observed that “[a]t first blush, it appears that the parking spaces cannot be altered without following the Section 24 requirements,” it pointed to the board’s authority over the “use” of parking under Sections 6, 7, and 21.9 of the CC&Rs and its power under the Bylaws to adopt rules and to provide for maintenance, repair, and replacement of the common elements, and concluded a reasonable juror could find no breach — so summary judgment was inappropriate.
Lyon moved for reconsideration on June 7, 2022, supported by exhibits and a declaration of Paul Bakalis. In its September 6, 2022 ruling, the court explained that it had been “unfortunately unaware” of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022), when it decided the original motion. In Kalway, the Arizona Supreme Court held that even a procedurally proper majority-vote amendment fails if the original declaration did not give homeowners sufficient notice of the change, because “allowing substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments would alter the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed.” The inquiry turns on the objective, reasonable expectations of homeowners based on the declaration in effect when they purchased.
Applying Kalway, the court found that no vote of 75% of the owners had been taken under Section 24; that the recorded plat — incorporated into the Declaration — specifically identified the parking spaces as they originally existed; and that “[a]dding parking spots within the already cramped parking structure was not contemplated within the CC&Rs.” Lyon’s spot and the other owners’ spots from P-237 to P-246 were disproportionally affected. The board’s general authority under Section 4.2 to “maintain, repair, replace, administer and operate the Property” did not extend to the completed alteration of the parking areas, because those changes were substantial and unforeseen — especially with no homeowners’ vote. The court added that the defendants did not dispute Lyon’s measurements showing the three parking spaces behind P-237 to P-246 were illegal under City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance 702(B)(2)(a), and that “[i]llegal parking spaces are not something that a homeowner could reasonably expect.” It granted reconsideration, vacated the April ruling, granted Lyon’s motion for summary judgment, and directed him to file a proposed order by September 30, 2022.
The case then resolved by agreement. The court received a Notice of Settlement filed October 21, 2022, and on October 25, 2022 it placed the matter on the dismissal calendar for dismissal of all remaining claims and parties on or after January 25, 2023 — unless a judgment, stipulation of dismissal, or extension intervened — and deemed all pending motions moot. The collected minute entries end there; they do not show the final dismissal order or the settlement’s terms.
Procedural timeline
Complete uploaded source-document index
This index is generated from every public-facing source file currently present in assets/court_case_downloads/michael-lyon-v-regency-house-association/raw/: 12 PDFs. Files are ordered by the date/sequence embedded in the normalized filename; AI-generated review materials are labeled separately and should not be treated as court filings.
Oral Argument Set
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Oral Argument Set
Type: Court/source PDF
Uploaded source file in the case record; read it in sequence with the surrounding filings to follow the procedure.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Under Advisement Ruling
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Under Advisement Ruling
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
Minute Entry
Type: Court order/minute entry
Court or agency order; this is usually the document that tells readers what changed next.
FAQ
What was this lawsuit about?
Whether the Regency House Association could alter the community’s parking garage — adding new parking spaces and loading zones in September 2019 — without following the CC&Rs’ amendment process. The parking garage and parking areas are common elements under Section 1.7 of the CC&Rs, and the recorded plat, incorporated into the CC&Rs by Section 1.20, specifically identified the individual parking spaces as they existed in April 1979. Section 24 requires any change to the Declaration to be approved by owners of at least 75% of the total ownership of the common elements and all institutional first mortgagees. No such vote was taken before the 2019 alterations.
Why did the court deny summary judgment and then grant it five months later?
Because of a controlling Arizona Supreme Court decision that the court had not considered when it first ruled. In April 2022 the court held that the board’s authority over the “use” of parking (CC&Rs Sections 6, 7, and 21.9) and its Bylaws powers over rules and maintenance meant a reasonable juror could find no breach, so the dispute had to go to trial. Lyon then moved for reconsideration under Rule 7.1(e) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, and the court acknowledged it had been “unfortunately unaware” of Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022), when it made the original ruling. Measured against Kalway, the court concluded its prior ruling was inconsistent with that decision, vacated it, and granted summary judgment for Lyon.
What is the Kalway decision and why did it control?
Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC is a 2022 Arizona Supreme Court decision that the superior court quoted as raising “issues of statewide importance regarding the scope of an HOA’s authority to amend CC&Rs.” It holds that changes imposed on homeowners are tested against the reasonable expectations of owners based on the declaration in effect when they purchased — an objective inquiry — because “allowing substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments would alter the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed.” Here, the court found that adding parking spots to the already cramped structure was not contemplated by the CC&Rs, that spaces P-237 through P-246 were disproportionally affected, and that the board’s general maintain-and-operate authority could not carry a substantial, unforeseen alteration made without any homeowner vote.
Did it matter that the new parking spaces were allegedly illegal?
Yes, as a supporting point. Lyon submitted measurements — through the declaration of Paul Bakalis — showing that the three parking spaces added behind spaces P-237 to P-246 were illegal under City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance 702(B)(2)(a), and the defendants did not dispute those measurements. The court observed that “[i]llegal parking spaces are not something that a homeowner could reasonably expect,” reinforcing its conclusion under Kalway’s reasonable-expectations framework.
How did the case end?
The homeowner won the dispositive ruling, and the parties then settled. The September 6, 2022 ruling granted Lyon summary judgment on the counts he moved on and directed him to file a proposed order by September 30, 2022. A Notice of Settlement was filed October 21, 2022, and the court placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal of all remaining claims and parties on or after January 25, 2023, deeming all pending motions moot. The collected minute entries do not include the final dismissal or any settlement terms. Earlier in the case, the court had also dismissed Lyon’s gross-negligence count.
Is this ruling binding on other Arizona HOA disputes?
No. Superior-court rulings bind only the parties to the case and are not precedent. The binding precedent here is Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC itself, which the Arizona Supreme Court decided in 2022. This case is still useful reading because it shows a trial court applying Kalway’s reasonable-expectations test to a board’s physical alteration of common elements — and shows that a board’s general use, maintenance, and operation powers are not a substitute for the declaration’s formal amendment process when the change is substantial and unforeseen.
Case Dossier
This generated dossier mirrors the structured data surfaced on the OAH/ADRE case pages. It is added from the curated court-case record and the custom page source package, while the hand-authored analysis below remains intact.
Case Summary
| Case ID / citation | CV2020-008665 (Maricopa County Superior Court) |
|---|---|
| Court / tribunal | Superior Court |
| Decision / key date | September 6, 2022 |
| Judge / panel | Hon. Joan M. Sinclair, Hon. Andrew J. Russell, Hon. Daniel J. Kiley |
| Parties | Michael Lyon (Plaintiff, apartment owner assigned parking space P-238) v. Regency House Association and A A M, L.L.C. (Defendants) |
| Topics | cc-and-rsamendmentsboard-governanceprocedure |
| Outcome / holding | On reconsideration under Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, the superior court granted the homeowner summary judgment, holding that the association’s 2019 alteration of the parking garage — adding spaces and loading zones that disproportionally affected spots P-237 to P-246 — was a substantial and unforeseen change to parking spaces specifically identified on the recorded plat, which the board’s general authority to maintain, repair, replace, administer, and operate the property could not authorize without the 75% owner vote required by Section 24 of the CC&Rs. |
| Primary public source | View source opinion/order |
Parties, Court, and Research Coverage
| Uploaded source package | 12 PDFs |
|---|---|
| Step-by-step docket roadmap | 12 roadmap entries |
| Video overview | No video embed currently configured |
| Study / briefing material | 1 section |
| FAQ / homeowner questions | 6 questions |
| Curated download aliases | 1 download link |
Key Issues & Findings
A Regency House apartment owner, assigned parking space P-238 when he purchased in 2009, sued his association after the community’s parking garage was altered in September 2019 with new parking spaces and loading zones. He argued that the parking spaces identified on the recorded plat — incorporated into the CC&Rs — could not be changed without the Section 24 amendment process, which requires a recorded instrument signed by owners of at least 75% of the total ownership of the common elements and all institutional first mortgagees. In December 2020 the court dismissed his gross-negligence count but let the rest of the case proceed. In April 2022 the court denied his motion for partial summary judgment on the breach-of-contract and injunctive-relief counts, reasoning that the board’s use and maintenance authority meant a reasonable juror could find no breach. On the owner’s motion for reconsideration, the court applied the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022) — which it said it had been unaware of when deciding the original motion — vacated its April ruling, and on September 6, 2022 granted the owner summary judgment. The parties then settled, and in October 2022 the case was placed on the dismissal calendar with all pending motions deemed moot.
The court’s April 2022 under-advisement ruling initially treated the question as one for a jury. It acknowledged that “[a]t first blush, it appears that the parking spaces cannot be altered without following the Section 24 requirements,” since the recorded plat identifying each space was incorporated into the Declaration by Section 1.20. But it weighed the board’s countervailing powers — each owner’s right to use the common elements is “subject to and governed by” the governing documents (Section 6), parking spaces “may be assigned, rented or otherwise used in such a manner as the Board may prescribe” (Section 7), parking is subject to board rules (Section 21.9), and the Bylaws let the board adopt rules and provide for maintenance, repair, and replacement of the common elements (Bylaws Section 11) — and concluded a reasonable juror could find no breach of contract, so it denied the owner’s motion for partial summary judgment.
On the owner’s Rule 7.1(e) motion for reconsideration, the court confronted Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 523 (2022), which it said it had been “unfortunately unaware” of when deciding the original motion. Kalway tests changes against homeowners’ objective, reasonable expectations based on the declaration in effect at purchase, because “allowing substantial, unforeseen, and unlimited amendments would alter the nature of the covenants to which the homeowners originally agreed.” Measured against that framework, the court found its earlier ruling could not stand: no 75% owner vote was taken under Section 24; the plat specifically identified the parking spaces as they originally existed; adding spots “within the already cramped parking structure was not contemplated within the CC&Rs”; and the owners of spots P-237 to P-246 were disproportionally affected. The board’s general Section 4.2 authority to “maintain, repair, replace, administer and operate the Property” did not reach a completed alteration that was substantial and unforeseen, especially with no homeowners’ vote.
The court bolstered the conclusion with the owner’s undisputed measurements — supported by the declaration of Paul Bakalis — showing the three parking spaces added behind P-237 to P-246 were illegal under City of Phoenix Zoning Ordinance 702(B)(2)(a): “Illegal parking spaces are not something that a homeowner could reasonably expect.” It granted reconsideration, vacated the April ruling, and granted the owner’s motion for summary judgment. A Notice of Settlement followed within weeks, and the court placed the case on the dismissal calendar for dismissal on or after January 25, 2023, deeming all pending motions moot.
This case shows the Arizona Supreme Court’s Kalway decision working in real time at the trial-court level. The superior court had already denied the homeowner summary judgment on conventional contract-interpretation grounds; once Kalway’s reasonable-expectations framework was brought to its attention, the same record produced the opposite result — the court expressly determined that its prior ruling was inconsistent with Kalway and reversed itself on a Rule 7.1(e) motion for reconsideration.
For associations, the ruling illustrates a hard boundary on board power over common elements: general authority to maintain, repair, replace, administer, and operate the property does not authorize substantial, unforeseen physical alterations to features specifically identified in the recorded plat and declaration. If a change of that kind is not put to the owners under the declaration’s amendment provision — here, a 75% vote plus all institutional first mortgagees — a court may find the board acted beyond its authority. For homeowners, the case shows the value of concrete, undisputed evidence (the plaintiff’s zoning-ordinance measurements went unchallenged) and of persistence: the winning argument arrived on reconsideration. As a superior-court decision it binds only the parties, and the case ultimately ended in a settlement rather than a final litigated judgment.