Case Summary
| Case ID | 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG |
|---|---|
| Agency | ADRE |
| Tribunal | OAH |
| Decision Date | 2018-09-25 |
| Administrative Law Judge | Tammy L. Eigenheer |
| Outcome | loss |
| Filing Fees Refunded | $0.00 |
| Civil Penalties | $0.00 |
Parties & Counsel
| Petitioner | Thomas P. Satterlee | Counsel | — |
|---|---|---|---|
| Respondent | Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner's Association | Counsel | James A. Robles |
Alleged Violations
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
Outcome Summary
The petition was dismissed with prejudice due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Respondent Property Owner's Association was not found to be a 'planned community' under the applicable Arizona statute.
Why this result: The ALJ determined that the Respondent HOA did not meet the definition of a 'planned community' because its maintenance of landscaping did not constitute maintaining 'roadways' as required by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).
Key Issues & Findings
Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Planned Community Status
The Respondent moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing it was not a planned community as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4) because it did not maintain 'roadways'. Petitioner argued that maintaining landscaping around the entrance sign satisfied the 'covenant to maintain roadways' requirement by defining 'roadway' as the entire 'right-of-way'. The ALJ found that 'roadway' means the part of the road intended for vehicles, not the entire right-of-way, and thus jurisdiction was lacking.
Orders: Petitioner’s petition is dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute.
Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No
Disposition: respondent_win
- A.R.S. § 33-1802
- Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
- Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
- Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
Analytics Highlights
- A.R.S. § 33-1802
- Ariz. Bd. of Regents for & on Behalf of Univ. of Ariz. v. State ex rel. State of Ariz. Pub. Safety Ret. Fund Manager Adm’r, 160 Ariz. 150, 156 (App. 1989)
- Swichtenberg v. Jack Brimer, 171 Ariz. 77, 828 P.2d 1218 (App. 1991)
- Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 95 (App. 2011)
- Callender v. Transpacific Hotel Corp., 179 Ariz. 557, 561 (App. 1993)
- Sunrise Desert Vistas v. Salas, 1 CA-CV 14-052 (Ct. App. 2016)
Video Overview
Audio Overview
Decision Documents
18F-H1817022-REL-RHG Decision – 661827.pdf
Jurisdictional Analysis in Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA
Executive Summary
This document outlines the legal analysis and final decision in case number 18F-H1817022-REL, wherein the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) dismissed a petition filed by Thomas P. Satterlee against the Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association. The dismissal was based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The central issue was whether the Respondent association qualified as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). This determination hinged entirely on the interpretation of the phrase “covenant to maintain roadways.” The Petitioner argued that the association’s maintenance of landscaping at the community’s entrance constituted roadway maintenance, asserting a broad definition of “roadway” that encompassed the entire right-of-way, supported by the modern civil engineering concept of “Complete Streets.”
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected this argument, concluding that the plain meaning of “roadway” refers specifically to the portion of a road used by vehicles. The ALJ noted that the state legislature used the specific term “roadway” in a 2014 statutory amendment, even though the broader “Complete Streets” concept was already well-established, indicating a deliberate choice of the narrower term. Ultimately, because the association’s activities did not include maintaining roadways, it was not deemed a “planned community,” and therefore, the OAH and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The petition was dismissed with prejudice.
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Case Overview and Procedural History
The matter of Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (Case No. 18F-H1817022-REL) was adjudicated by the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The core of the dispute was a dispositive motion concerning the OAH’s subject matter jurisdiction over the Respondent association.
• January 26, 2018: The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the association was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4).
• March 15, 2018: Following oral arguments, the ALJ issued an initial decision finding that the OAH lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.
• April 10, 2018: The Petitioner filed a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) Dispute Rehearing Request with the Arizona Department of Real Estate.
• May 3, 2018: The Commissioner granted the Petitioner’s request for a rehearing.
• September 5, 2018: A new round of oral arguments was held, focusing again on the dispositive jurisdictional issue.
• September 25, 2018: The ALJ issued a final decision, once again dismissing the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Central Jurisdictional Question
The jurisdiction of the Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate in this matter was entirely dependent on whether the Respondent association met the statutory definition of a “planned community.” A lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable issue that voids any administrative decisions made without it.
The pivotal question was whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping around the walls and sign at the community entrance constituted a “covenant to maintain roadways,” which is a key criterion in the statute.
Statutory Framework: A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
The relevant statute, A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), defines a “planned community” as:
“…a real estate development that includes real estate owned and operated by or real estate on which an easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways is held by a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association of owners…”
A 2014 amendment to this statute added the language regarding an “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways.” Before this amendment, an association had to own real property to be considered a planned community.
Arguments of the Parties
The dispute centered on the interpretation of the single word “roadways” within the statute.
Petitioner’s Position (Thomas P. Satterlee)
The Petitioner argued for a broad and expansive interpretation of “roadway,” asserting that it should include the entire right-of-way.
• Core Argument: The developer built walls and an entrance sign, and the Respondent’s subsequent maintenance of the surrounding landscaping constitutes a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
• “Complete Streets” Concept: The Petitioner presented extensive documentation to argue that the modern civil engineering approach of “Complete Streets” supports his interpretation. This concept treats the entire transportation corridor—including sidewalks, bicycle lanes, transit stops, and landscaping—as an integrated system for all users.
• Equivalency of Terms: The Petitioner claimed that “roadway” is the “new word for ‘street'” and that the “roadway” encompasses the entire width of the “right-of-way.”
• Evidence Presented: The Petitioner submitted numerous documents to support his claim, including:
◦ A letter from the Pima County Director of Transportation confirming the association’s maintenance of landscaping.
◦ Excerpts from the Pima County Roadway Design Manual (RDM).
◦ Pima County Board of Supervisors policies on landscaping in the right-of-way.
◦ Website printouts from the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, and other entities defining “Complete Streets.”
◦ Pima County Code of Ordinances related to roadway projects.
Respondent’s Position (Green Valley Country Club Vistas II POA)
The Respondent advocated for a strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the statute.
• Core Argument: The maintenance of landscaping does not constitute the maintenance of a “roadway.”
• Legislative Intent: The Respondent argued that the Arizona legislature deliberately chose the specific term “roadway” when it amended the statute in 2014. By that time, the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known. Had the legislature intended a broader scope, it could have used terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” but it did not.
• Conclusion: Because the association does not have a covenant to maintain roadways, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “planned community,” and therefore the state agencies lack jurisdiction.
Administrative Law Judge’s Analysis and Decision
The ALJ’s decision was grounded in principles of statutory construction, focusing on the plain meaning of the legislative language.
The ALJ began with the legal principle that when construing statutes, a court must first look to the language of the statute and give the words their plain meaning, presuming the legislature expressed its meaning as clearly as possible.
To determine the plain meaning, the ALJ consulted numerous dictionary definitions of “roadway” and “street.”
Source
Definition of “Roadway”
English Oxford Living Dict.
“The part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement or verge.”
Merriam-Webster
“the part of a street reserved for vehicles.”
Dictionary.com
“The part of a road over which vehicles travel; road.”
Cambridge Dictionary
“the part of the road on which vehicles drive.”
American Heritage Dictionary
“A road, especially the part over which vehicles travel.”
Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries
“a road or the part of a road used by vehicles.”
The ALJ concluded that the consistent, plain meaning of “roadway” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.
The ALJ found the Petitioner’s evidence regarding the “Complete Streets” concept to be irrelevant to the statutory interpretation. The decision noted that because the legislature amended the statute after this concept was widely adopted but chose to use the narrower term “roadway,” it signaled a clear intent not to encompass the entire right-of-way. The ALJ stated:
“Had the legislature intended to include associations such as Respondent in the definition of ‘planned community’ in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), it could have used the term ‘right-of-way’ or ‘Complete Streets’.”
The ALJ highlighted that several documents submitted by the Petitioner actually undermined his argument by explicitly distinguishing between “roadway” and “right-of-way.”
• Pima County Code 10.56.020: This ordinance defines minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.”
• Pima County RDM: The design manual specified different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’).
• Pima County RDM Statement: Another document stated that the “[i]nstallation of landscaping shall begin not later than six months after the formal completion date of the roadway project.”
These examples demonstrated that, even within the Petitioner’s own evidence, “roadway” and “landscaping” within the “right-of-way” are treated as distinct elements.
Final Order and Implications
Based on the analysis, the ALJ reached a definitive conclusion on the jurisdictional question.
• Finding: The association’s maintenance of the area around the entrance walls and sign does not render it a “planned community” because this activity is not maintenance of “roadways” as understood by the statute’s plain meaning.
• Order: The petition was dismissed with prejudice on September 25, 2018.
• Legal Consequence: The Office of Administrative Hearings and the Arizona Department of Real Estate lack subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.
• Further Recourse: The decision explicitly states that the Petitioner remains free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.
Study Guide: Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association
This guide reviews the administrative law case Thomas P. Satterlee v. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association (No. 18F-H1817022-REL-RHG). The central issue is whether the Respondent association qualifies as a “planned community” under Arizona law, which would grant jurisdiction to the Arizona Department of Real Estate and the Office of Administrative Hearings. The case hinges on the statutory definition of “roadway” and whether the association’s maintenance of landscaping falls under a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
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Short-Answer Quiz
Answer the following questions in 2-3 complete sentences based on the provided source document.
1. What was the Respondent’s primary argument for filing a Motion to Dismiss?
2. How did the Petitioner, Thomas P. Satterlee, initially argue that the Respondent qualified as a “planned community”?
3. What was the key piece of evidence presented by the Petitioner from the Pima County Director of Transportation during the rehearing?
4. What is the “Complete Streets” concept, and how did the Petitioner attempt to use it in his argument?
5. According to the Respondent, how did the Arizona legislature’s choice of words in the 2014 statutory amendment undermine the Petitioner’s argument?
6. How did the Administrative Law Judge use dictionary definitions to analyze the term “roadway”?
7. What piece of Pima County code did the judge cite to show that “roadway” and “right-of-way” are distinct terms?
8. Why did the Administrative Law Judge ultimately find the “Complete Streets” argument to be irrelevant to the case?
9. What is the legal principle regarding subject matter jurisdiction as stated in the Conclusions of Law?
10. What was the final order in this case, and what option did it leave available to the Petitioner?
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Answer Key
1. The Respondent argued that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition. This was because the Respondent was not a “planned community” as defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), since it did not own real estate or have a covenant to maintain roadways.
2. The Petitioner initially argued that the Respondent had a “covenant to maintain roadways” because the developer built walls and a sign at the community entrance, and the Respondent had maintained the landscaping around the sign. He contended that the term “roadway” in the statute included “roadway systems,” which would encompass the landscaped entrance land.
3. During the rehearing, the Petitioner presented a letter from Ana M. Olivares, PE, Director of Pima County Transportation. The letter stated that the Respondent had been maintaining the landscaping at the corners of La Canada Drive and La Canoa since its installation and would continue to do so until the county found funds to take over maintenance.
4. The “Complete Streets” concept is an approach to designing roadways and rights-of-way to be safe and accessible for all users, including pedestrians, bicyclists, and motorists. The Petitioner argued that this modern engineering approach effectively equates the term “roadway” with the entire “right-of-way,” which would include the landscaped areas maintained by the Respondent.
5. The Respondent argued that the “Complete Streets” concept was well-known by 2014 when the statute was amended. However, the Arizona legislature specifically chose to use the term “roadway,” not “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets,” implying a narrower, more specific meaning was intended.
6. The Administrative Law Judge consulted multiple dictionaries (English Oxford, Merriam-Webster, Dictionary.com, etc.) to establish the plain meaning of “roadway.” These definitions consistently described a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicle travel, distinct from adjacent areas like sidewalks or landscaping.
7. The judge cited Pima County Code of Ordinances 10.56.020, which defined minor projects to include “[c]hanges or improvements to the right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway.” This language explicitly treats the “right-of-way” and “roadway” as separate and distinct areas, contradicting the Petitioner’s claim.
8. The judge found the “Complete Streets” argument irrelevant because the statute in question was amended after the widespread adoption of the concept, yet the legislature chose to use the term “roadway.” The judge reasoned that if the legislature had intended to include the broader scope of a “right-of-way,” it would have used that specific term or referenced “Complete Streets.”
9. The Conclusions of Law state that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties and must be addressed. Administrative decisions that go beyond an agency’s statutory power are considered void, as jurisdiction is defined by statutes, not by the parties involved.
10. The final order was that the Petitioner’s petition be dismissed with prejudice because the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioner remained free to file an action in a court of competent jurisdiction as specified by the Respondent’s community documents.
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Essay Questions
Answer the following questions in a detailed essay format. No answers are provided.
1. Analyze the Petitioner’s legal strategy, focusing on the evolution of his arguments from the initial hearing to the rehearing. Discuss the strengths and weaknesses of using the “Complete Streets” concept as the central pillar of his case for establishing jurisdiction.
2. Examine the Administrative Law Judge’s method of statutory interpretation in this case. How did the judge apply the principles of “plain meaning” and legislative intent when analyzing the definition of “planned community” in A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)?
3. Discuss the legal and practical distinction between “roadway” and “right-of-way” as presented in the case documents. Explain how this distinction was pivotal to the judge’s final decision on subject matter jurisdiction.
4. Evaluate the significance of the 2014 amendment to A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). How did this change in statutory language, which added “easement to maintain roadways or a covenant to maintain roadways,” create the central point of contention in this dispute?
5. Based on the judge’s Conclusions of Law, explain the legal concept of subject matter jurisdiction and why it cannot be waived or conferred by the parties involved. How does this principle protect the integrity of the administrative and judicial process?
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Glossary of Key Terms
Definition from Source Context
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
An official who presides over administrative hearings, makes findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issues decisions and orders, such as the dismissal of a petition.
A.R.S. § 33-1802(4)
The Arizona Revised Statute that defines a “planned community.” The statute specifies that a planned community includes real estate development where a nonprofit association owns/operates real estate or holds an easement or covenant to maintain roadways for the purpose of managing, maintaining, or improving the property.
Complete Streets
An approach to planning, designing, and operating roadways and rights-of-way with all users in mind (pedestrians, bicyclists, motorists, etc.) to make the transportation network safer and more efficient. The concept includes elements like sidewalks, bike lanes, and transit stops.
Covenant
A formal agreement or promise. In this case, a “covenant to maintain roadways” is a condition that, if met by a homeowner’s association, could classify it as a “planned community” under Arizona law.
Jurisdiction
The official power to make legal decisions and judgments. In this case, the central issue was whether the Office of Administrative Hearings had jurisdiction over the dispute.
Petitioner
The party who brings a petition or action before a court or administrative body. In this case, the Petitioner is Thomas P. Satterlee.
Planned Community
As defined by A.R.S. § 33-1802(4), a real estate development with real estate owned/operated by, or having an easement/covenant to maintain roadways held by, an association of owners who are mandatory members and pay assessments.
Respondent
The party against whom a petition is filed or an appeal is brought. In this case, the Respondent is Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association.
Right-of-Way
The strip of land over which a public road is built. As shown in Pima County policy diagrams, this can include travel lanes, medians, shoulders, bike lanes, sidewalks, and landscaping areas. The court found this to be a broader term than “roadway.”
Roadway
Based on multiple dictionary definitions cited by the judge, the part of a road intended for vehicles, in contrast to the pavement, verge, or sidewalk. The judge concluded its “plain meaning” is the portion of a road upon which vehicles travel.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The authority of a court or administrative body to hear cases of a particular type or cases relating to a specific subject matter. The decision states this type of jurisdiction cannot be waived and is determined by statute, not the parties.
This Homeowner’s Case Collapsed Over One Word — Here’s Why It Matters
Dealing with a Homeowner’s Association (HOA) can sometimes feel like navigating a maze of rules and regulations. But what happens when a dispute isn’t about a rule, but about the definition of a single, common word? In the Arizona case of Satterlee vs. Green Valley Country Club Vistas II Property Owner’s Association, a major legal conflict hinged on one seemingly simple question: What, exactly, is a “roadway”?
The answer would determine whether a state agency had the power to hear the case at all. The judge’s decision provides a masterclass in how the law interprets language, revealing practical lessons about why a single word can make or break an entire legal argument.
1. A Legal Battle Can Hinge on a Dictionary Definition
The core issue of the case was jurisdiction—whether the Arizona Department of Real Estate had the authority to hear the dispute. For the department to have jurisdiction, the HOA had to qualify as a “planned community” under Arizona statute A.R.S. § 33-1802(4). A key part of that definition required the HOA to have a “covenant to maintain roadways.”
This is where the entire case pivoted.
The Homeowner’s Argument: The petitioner, Mr. Satterlee, argued that the HOA’s responsibility to maintain the walls, sign, and surrounding landscaping at the community entrance fulfilled this requirement. He contended that “roadway” should be interpreted broadly as a “roadway system,” which would include the entire right-of-way, landscaping and all.
The HOA’s Argument: The respondent HOA argued for a much narrower definition. They stated that a “roadway” is only the part of the road used for vehicle traffic. Since maintaining walls and landscaping is not maintaining a roadway, they argued they were not a “planned community” under the law, and therefore the state had no jurisdiction.
The entire legal question of whether the case could even proceed came down to the plain meaning of this one word.
2. Judges Don’t Guess — They Have a Method for Meaning
When a legal dispute depends on the meaning of a word in a law, judges don’t simply pick the definition they prefer. Legal interpretation follows a clear principle: start with the “plain meaning” of the words the legislature chose to use. This wasn’t just a casual search; it was a methodical application of the “plain meaning rule,” a cornerstone of statutory interpretation where judges prioritize the common, ordinary meaning of words over specialized or re-imagined definitions.
To determine the plain meaning of “roadway,” the Administrative Law Judge in this case conducted a thorough review of its common definition by consulting numerous dictionaries:
• English Oxford Living Dictionaries
• Merriam-Webster
• Dictionary.com
• Cambridge Dictionary
• American Heritage Dictionary
• Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries
The collective conclusion was overwhelming. The dictionaries consistently defined a “roadway” as the part of a road intended for vehicles, explicitly contrasting it with sidewalks, shoulders, or adjacent landscaping. This methodical approach demonstrated that the common, established meaning of the word supported the HOA’s narrow interpretation, not the homeowner’s broad one.
3. Your Own Evidence Can Be Used Against You
In a classic case of legal irony, the very evidence the homeowner presented to support his case became the primary tool the judge used to dismantle it. The homeowner submitted several official documents from Pima County, but these exhibits ended up undermining his own argument.
The judge pointed to several instances where the homeowner’s own evidence made a clear distinction between a “roadway” and the surrounding area:
• A Pima County ordinance referred to the “right-of-way area outside the shoulder of an existing roadway,” treating the two as separate things. The judge noted that the petitioner tried to argue that the “shoulder of an existing roadway” referred not to the paved edge for vehicles, but to the landscaped areas beyond it—an interpretation that defies common understanding and the county’s own official language.
• County planning documents used different drawing scales for “Roadway Plans” (1” = 40’) and “Landscape Plans” (1” = 20’), showing they are considered distinct components.
• Another county rule stated that the “installation of landscaping” must begin after the formal completion of the “roadway project.”
The judge concluded that these documents demonstrated that in official use, “roadway” and “right-of-way” are treated as different concepts. The very evidence intended to support the homeowner’s case ended up directly contradicting it.
4. Modern Concepts Don’t Automatically Change Old Laws
The homeowner’s central supporting idea was the “Complete Streets” approach—a modern civil engineering concept that views streets as integrated systems for all users, including cars, bicyclists, and pedestrians. He argued this modern understanding should apply to the word “roadway.”
The judge rejected this argument based on a crucial point of legal reasoning: legislative intent.
The judge noted that the “Complete Streets” concept was already well-known in 2014 when the Arizona legislature amended the statute in question. The legislature could have used broader terms like “right-of-way” or “Complete Streets” but deliberately chose not to. Instead, they specifically chose the narrower, more traditional term “roadway.” The judge inferred that this was a deliberate choice, and the court’s job was to interpret the word the legislature actually used, not one it could have used.
The judge even noted that the sheer volume of evidence the homeowner presented to redefine “roadway” was itself proof that his interpretation was not the “plain meaning”—if it were, such extensive explanation wouldn’t be necessary.
To illustrate the point with a simple, real-world example of plain meaning, the judge wrote:
One would be hard pressed to interpret that phrase [“don’t play in the street”] as a warning not to play on the sidewalk or landscaping area bordering a paved thoroughfare.
Conclusion: In Law, Precision Is Everything
The overarching lesson from this case is that in legal interpretation, every word matters. Whether it’s the dictionary definition of “roadway,” the precise language in county ordinances, or the specific terms chosen by lawmakers, the plain, established meaning of words carries immense weight.
Ultimately, the homeowner’s petition was dismissed. Because the HOA’s duty to maintain landscaping did not qualify as a “covenant to maintain roadways,” it was not a “planned community” under the statute. As a result, the state agency lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
This case shows how the specific words chosen by lawmakers years ago can have major consequences today. What common words might we be using every day that have a completely different and critical meaning in a legal context?
Case Participants
Petitioner Side
- Thomas P. Satterlee (petitioner)
Respondent Side
- James A. Robles (attorney)
Perry, Childers, Hanlon & Hudson, PLC
Neutral Parties
- Tammy L. Eigenheer (ALJ)
- Judy Lowe (Commissioner)
Arizona Department of Real Estate - Felicia Del sol (staff)
Clerk/Distribution staff
Other Participants
- Ana M. Olivares (Director)
Pima County Transportation
Provided documentation/letter regarding landscaping maintenance
