Wojtowicz, Lawrence M. -v- Voyager at Juniper Ridge RV Resort and Country Club

Case Summary

Case ID 07F-H067002-BFS
Agency Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2007-02-21
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Wojtowicz Counsel
Respondent Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association Counsel Tanis A. Duncan

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Petitioner admitted the dispute was not against the HOA but against the Developer/LLC regarding the validity of CC&R amendments and control of amenities. The tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction over disputes concerning the design/construction/sale/ownership involving the developer. The HOA's request for attorney's fees was denied because the CC&Rs did not explicitly provide for fee awards in administrative proceedings.

Why this result: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the dispute was against the Developer/Declarant regarding validity of amendments, not the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Board Constitution and Validity of CC&R Amendments

Petitioner alleged the HOA Board was not properly constituted and that 2003/2006 amendments to the CC&Rs were invalid because the original 1985 CC&Rs specified a 30-year term. Petitioner sought to return common areas to their 2003 condition.

Orders: Complaint dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

07F-H067002-BFS Decision – 162561.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:16:58 (172.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 07F-H067002-BFS


Case Briefing: Wojtowicz v. Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association (No. 07F-H067002-BFS)

Executive Summary

On February 5, 2007, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the State of Arizona issued a decision regarding a dispute brought by Petitioner Lawrence M. Wojtowicz against the Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association (the “HOA”). The Petitioner sought to invalidate the 2003 and 2006 amendments to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), arguing that the original 1985 governing documents precluded such changes until a 30-year term had expired.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional grounds, concluding that the Petitioner’s grievances were directed at the actions of the developer/declarant (Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC) rather than the HOA itself. Furthermore, the ALJ denied the HOA’s application for attorney’s fees, ruling that administrative proceedings do not qualify as “actions” under Arizona law for the purpose of fee recovery, despite provisions within the CC&Rs.

Background of the Planned Community and Governing Documents

The Original 1985 CC&Rs

Voyager at Juniper Ridge RV Resort and Country Club is a planned community comprising 529 lots. The original CC&Rs were recorded on September 24, 1985, by the developer, Global Development. Key provisions included:

Duration: The CC&Rs were to run with the land for an initial term of 30 years, after which they would automatically extend for 10-year periods.

Amendments: Amendments required an instrument signed by owners representing at least two-thirds of the outstanding votes.

Attorney’s Fees: Section 11.3 stipulated that in any “action arising out of or in connection with this Declaration,” the prevailing party would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs.

Ownership Succession

Between 1985 and 2003, ownership shifted due to slow sales and the bankruptcy of the Baptist Foundation, which had acquired unsold lots and development rights. In April 2003, Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC (the “LLC”), managed by N.E. Isaacson, purchased 228 lots and the Declarant’s rights at auction.

Evolution of CC&R Amendments

Following the acquisition, the LLC recorded significant changes to the governing documents to facilitate community revitalization and expansion.

Amendment Type

Key Changes

Approval Level

July 9, 2003

Amended and Restated Declaration

Established two classes of membership (Class A for owners, Class B for Declarant with 10 votes per lot); defined board composition.

72% of record owners

Nov 5, 2003

First Amendment

Further modifications to the restated declaration.

Not specified

Feb 21, 2006

Additional Amendment

Allowed a “Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement” with White Mountain Lake Vistas HOA.

87% of record owners

During this period, the LLC reportedly invested approximately $600,000 in common area repairs (including tennis and bocce ball courts) and $300,000 in lot development.

The Petitioner’s Challenge

Legal Basis of the Dispute

Petitioner Lawrence M. Wojtowicz, who purchased a lot in 2004 and briefly served on the HOA Board, challenged the validity of the 2003 and 2006 amendments. His arguments, supported by legal counsel, centered on the following:

1. Term Restrictions: Citing Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, the Petitioner argued that the CC&Rs could only be amended upon the expiration of the initial term in September 2015.

2. Successor Rights: He contended that the LLC was not a proper successor to the original Declarant, Global Development.

3. Invalidity of Governance: He argued that because the amendments were unlawful, the current HOA Board was improperly constituted and its actions were null and void.

Requested Relief

The Petitioner sought a ruling requiring the LLC to return the common area amenities to their April 2003 condition and requested reimbursement for $10,891.45 in legal expenses plus filing fees.

Administrative Findings and Dismissal

The ALJ granted the HOA’s motion to dismiss the complaint based on several legal and jurisdictional factors:

Lack of Jurisdiction

Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B), the Department of Building, Fire and Life Safety lacks jurisdiction over:

• Disputes between owners where the association is not a party.

• Disputes between an owner and a person or entity engaged in the business of constructing or selling property within a planned community.

The ALJ determined that the Petitioner’s dispute was fundamentally with the LLC and Mr. Isaacson regarding their status as Declarants and their right to amend documents. Since the Petitioner admitted his dispute was not against the HOA itself, the matter fell outside the administrative forum’s authority.

Inappropriate Forum for Declaratory Relief

The ALJ noted that the relief sought—the invalidation of amendments affecting all residents and the physical restoration of common areas—was more appropriate for a declaratory judgment action in superior court. Such an action would allow for the joinder of all potentially affected property owners, which is not possible in an administrative proceeding.

Adjudication of Attorney’s Fees

The HOA filed an application for attorney’s fees based on Section 11.3 of the CC&Rs. The ALJ denied this application, citing established Arizona case law (Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc.):

Definition of “Action”: An administrative agency is not characterized as a “court,” and therefore an administrative proceeding does not constitute an “action” for the purposes of statutory fee recovery (A.R.S. § 12-341.01).

Original Intent: The ALJ found no evidence that the original 1985 Declarant or subsequent voters intended for the fee-shifting provision to apply to administrative tribunals that did not exist at the time of the original recording.

Strict Interpretation: Because the language of the CC&Rs mirrored statutory language typically applied to court actions, the ALJ inferred it should be interpreted consistently with those statutes, which exclude administrative proceedings.

Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

1. The Petitioner’s complaint against Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners Association was dismissed.

2. The Respondent HOA’s application for attorney’s fees was denied.






Study Guide – 07F-H067002-BFS


Study Guide: Lawrence M. Wojtowicz v. Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case involving Lawrence M. Wojtowicz and the Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association. It explores the history of the planned community’s governing documents, the nature of the legal dispute, and the final decision regarding jurisdiction and attorney’s fees.

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Part I: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided administrative decision.

1. What were the requirements for amending the original 1985 Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

2. How did the 2003 amendments change the voting structure within the planned community?

3. What was the primary legal argument Petitioner Lawrence M. Wojtowicz used to challenge the 2003 CC&R amendments?

4. Why did the HOA President, Sue Fuller, initially request that the Department of Building, Fire and Life Safety dismiss the petition?

5. What specific improvements did Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC (the LLC) make to the community after the 2003 auction?

6. According to the Conclusions of Law, what is the definition of a “preponderance of the evidence”?

7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determine that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction?

8. What was the outcome of the HOA’s application for attorney’s fees?

9. How did the case Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc. influence the ALJ’s decision regarding legal costs?

10. What alternative legal path did the ALJ suggest for the Petitioner to seek relief against the LLC and Mr. Isaacson?

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Part II: Answer Key

1. Amendment Requirements: The 1985 CC&Rs stated that the provisions would bind the land for 30 years and then automatically extend for 10-year periods. Any amendments during this time required a recorded instrument signed by owners holding at least two-thirds of the outstanding votes.

2. Voting Structure Changes: The 2003 amendments established two classes of membership: Class A for regular owners (one vote per lot) and Class B for the Declarant (ten votes per lot). Class B membership was designed to cease only when the Declarant no longer owned any portion of the property.

3. Petitioner’s Legal Argument: Citing Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, Wojtowicz argued that the CC&Rs could only be amended at the expiration of the initial term in 2015, making the 2003 changes ineffective. He also challenged whether the LLC was a legitimate successor to the original Declarant, Global Development.

4. HOA Motion to Dismiss: President Sue Fuller argued that the Department lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was clearly between the Petitioner and the LLC/N.E. Isaacson, rather than the Association itself. Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B), the Department does not have the authority to hear disputes between owners and developers regarding the sale or construction of property.

5. Community Improvements: Following the 2003 auction, the LLC invested more than $600,000 to repair and develop common facilities, including the construction of tennis and bocce ball courts. Additionally, approximately $300,000 was spent to complete the development of remaining lots for marketing.

6. Preponderance of the Evidence: This legal standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It represents the superior evidentiary weight or “greater weight of the evidence” that inclines an impartial mind toward one side of an issue.

7. Jurisdictional Determination: The ALJ found that the dispute concerned the validity of the amendments and the actions of the developer/declarant rather than the application of the CC&Rs by the HOA. Because the statutes exclude disputes between owners and those engaged in the business of constructing or selling property within a community, the OAH had no authority to rule.

8. Attorney’s Fees Outcome: The ALJ denied the HOA’s application for attorney’s fees. The judge concluded that administrative proceedings do not qualify as “actions” under the relevant statutes or the specific language of the community’s CC&Rs.

9. Influence of Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc.: This case established that an administrative agency is not a court and therefore its proceedings are not “actions” for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. The ALJ applied this precedent to determine that the HOA was not entitled to recover fees despite being the prevailing party.

10. Suggested Alternative Relief: The ALJ noted that the Petitioner could seek a declaratory judgment in superior court. This venue would allow for the joinder of all potentially affected property owners in the planned community, which is necessary for a dispute affecting the rights of all residents.

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Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the source context to develop detailed responses to the following prompts.

1. The Role of the Declarant: Analyze the transition of Declarant rights from Global Development to Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC. Discuss the significance of these rights in the context of the 2003 amendments and the Petitioner’s challenge to the “unbroken chain” of assignment.

2. Jurisdictional Boundaries of the OAH: Evaluate why the Administrative Law Judge determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings was an improper venue for this specific dispute. Compare the statutory limitations of A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B)(1) and (2) with the Petitioner’s stated “Prayers to the Court.”

3. Contractual Interpretation of “Action”: Discuss the HOA’s argument that the 1985 CC&Rs intended “action” to include administrative proceedings. Contrast this with the ALJ’s reasoning regarding the timeline of the Semple decision and the subsequent amendments to the CC&Rs.

4. The Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners Precedent: Detail how the Scholten case served as the foundation for the Petitioner’s complaint. Explain the LLC’s counter-argument regarding why this case should not be considered controlling authority for the Juniper Ridge community.

5. Equitable Defenses and Property Value: Based on the correspondence from Attorney Rollman, examine the potential consequences of invalidating the 2003 CC&R amendments. Discuss the “equitable defenses” raised regarding the LLC’s financial investments and the potential impact on community property values.

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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

The Arizona Revised Statute that allows property owners in a planned community to petition for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or state statutes.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding officer who conducts hearings and issues decisions for administrative agencies; in this case, Diane Mihalsky.

Amended and Restated Declaration

A legal document recorded in 2003 that modified the original 1985 CC&Rs, including changes to voting rights and board composition.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules and operations of a planned community.

Class B Membership

A specific category of membership reserved for the Declarant, granting ten votes for each lot owned, effectively maintaining control over the association.

Common Areas

The shared facilities and land within a planned community, such as tennis courts and bocce ball courts, managed by the HOA.

Declarant

The entity (originally Global Development, later Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC) that established the community and holds specific rights to develop and manage it.

Declaratory Judgment

A legal determination by a court that resolves legal uncertainty for the litigants without necessarily awarding damages or ordering specific action.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The agency responsible for conducting independent administrative hearings for the state of Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding or petition; in this case, Lawrence M. Wojtowicz.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in civil and administrative cases, meaning that the evidence shows a fact is more likely true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or legal action is filed; in this case, the Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association.

Successor in Interest

A party that takes over the rights and obligations of another party through a legal transfer, such as the purchase of lots and Declarant rights.






Blog Post – 07F-H067002-BFS


Case Summary: Wojtowicz v. Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association Case No: 07F-H067002-BFS Forum: Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona) Date: February 21, 2007

Key Facts and Proceedings Petitioner Lawrence M. Wojtowicz filed a complaint against the Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association (HOA) regarding the validity of amendments made to the community’s Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs)12. The original CC&Rs, recorded in 1985, contained a provision stating they would bind the land for a term of 30 years3. In 2003, a successor developer, Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC (the LLC), acquired the remaining lots and recorded amendments to the CC&Rs which, among other changes, altered voting rights and board composition4….

The Petitioner challenged these amendments, arguing that under the legal precedent Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, the CC&Rs could not be amended until the initial 30-year term expired in 201528. He sought to invalidate the amendments and restore the community to its 2003 condition9. The dispute was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings10.

Main Issues and Arguments The primary issues concerned subject matter jurisdiction and the award of attorney’s fees.

1. Motion to Dismiss (Jurisdiction): The HOA and the LLC moved to dismiss the case. They argued that the Department of Building, Fire and Life Safety and the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was essentially between an owner and a developer regarding the validity of community documents, rather than a violation of existing documents by the HOA1112.

2. Attorney’s Fees: The HOA requested attorney’s fees based on Section 11.3 of the CC&Rs, which allowed the prevailing party to recover fees in any “action arising out of or in connection with this Declaration”1314.

Final Decision and Legal Analysis Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky issued a decision dismissing the complaint and denying the application for attorney’s fees15.

Dismissal on Jurisdiction: The ALJ granted the motion to dismiss16. During the hearing, the Petitioner admitted his dispute was not actually against the Respondent HOA16. The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s allegations centered on the LLC’s (the developer’s) wrongful amendment of the CC&Rs12. Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B), the administrative body lacks jurisdiction over disputes between owners and developers regarding the design, construction, or sale of property within a planned community1217. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s remedy lay in filing a declaratory judgment action in Superior Court, where all affected parties could be joined17.

Denial of Attorney’s Fees: The ALJ denied the HOA’s request for fees15. Citing Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., the ALJ determined that an administrative agency is not a court, and an administrative proceeding does not constitute an “action” under A.R.S. § 12-341.0118. The Judge reasoned that because the CC&Rs borrowed language from the statute, the drafters likely intended the fee provision to apply only to court actions, not administrative hearings19. The HOA failed to provide evidence that the amendments made after Semple was decided intended to expand fee liability to administrative forums20.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lawrence M. Wojtowicz (Petitioner)
    Homeowner
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Dan G. Curtis (attorney)
    Provided legal opinion/expenses incurred by Petitioner
  • Michael J. Brown (attorney)
    Brown and Brown Law Offices, P.C.
    Hired by Petitioner to challenge 2003 amendments
  • Douglas E. Brown (attorney)
    Brown and Brown Law Offices, P.C.
    Hired by Petitioner to challenge 2003 amendments

Respondent Side

  • Tanis A. Duncan (attorney)
    Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association
  • N.E. Isaacson (managing member)
    Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC
    Developer; LLC moved to intervene
  • Sue Fuller (HOA President)
    Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association
    Attended hearing
  • Richard M. Rollman (attorney)
    Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC
    Gabroy, Rollman, & Bossé, P.C.; represented intervening LLC
  • Michael Botwin (attorney)
    Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC
    Represented intervening LLC
  • Mr. Fuller (witness)
    Homeowner
    Husband of Sue Fuller; attended hearing

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Agency Director
  • Joyce Kesterman (agency staff)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Agency contact

Other Participants

  • Clifton R. Jessup, Jr. (attorney)
    Patton Boggs, LLP
    Recipient of letter from Dan Curtis in 2003

Wojtowicz, Lawrence M. -v- Voyager at Juniper Ridge RV Resort and Country Club

Case Summary

Case ID 07F-H067002-BFS
Agency Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2007-02-21
Administrative Law Judge Diane Mihalsky
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lawrence M. Wojtowicz Counsel
Respondent Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association Counsel Tanis A. Duncan

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the Petitioner's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Petitioner admitted the dispute was not against the HOA but against the Developer/LLC regarding the validity of CC&R amendments and control of amenities. The tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction over disputes concerning the design/construction/sale/ownership involving the developer. The HOA's request for attorney's fees was denied because the CC&Rs did not explicitly provide for fee awards in administrative proceedings.

Why this result: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the dispute was against the Developer/Declarant regarding validity of amendments, not the HOA.

Key Issues & Findings

Board Constitution and Validity of CC&R Amendments

Petitioner alleged the HOA Board was not properly constituted and that 2003/2006 amendments to the CC&Rs were invalid because the original 1985 CC&Rs specified a 30-year term. Petitioner sought to return common areas to their 2003 condition.

Orders: Complaint dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

07F-H067002-BFS Decision – 162561.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:16:56 (172.7 KB)





Briefing Doc – 07F-H067002-BFS


Case Briefing: Wojtowicz v. Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association (No. 07F-H067002-BFS)

Executive Summary

On February 5, 2007, the Office of Administrative Hearings for the State of Arizona issued a decision regarding a dispute brought by Petitioner Lawrence M. Wojtowicz against the Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association (the “HOA”). The Petitioner sought to invalidate the 2003 and 2006 amendments to the community’s Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs), arguing that the original 1985 governing documents precluded such changes until a 30-year term had expired.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the complaint on jurisdictional grounds, concluding that the Petitioner’s grievances were directed at the actions of the developer/declarant (Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC) rather than the HOA itself. Furthermore, the ALJ denied the HOA’s application for attorney’s fees, ruling that administrative proceedings do not qualify as “actions” under Arizona law for the purpose of fee recovery, despite provisions within the CC&Rs.

Background of the Planned Community and Governing Documents

The Original 1985 CC&Rs

Voyager at Juniper Ridge RV Resort and Country Club is a planned community comprising 529 lots. The original CC&Rs were recorded on September 24, 1985, by the developer, Global Development. Key provisions included:

Duration: The CC&Rs were to run with the land for an initial term of 30 years, after which they would automatically extend for 10-year periods.

Amendments: Amendments required an instrument signed by owners representing at least two-thirds of the outstanding votes.

Attorney’s Fees: Section 11.3 stipulated that in any “action arising out of or in connection with this Declaration,” the prevailing party would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs.

Ownership Succession

Between 1985 and 2003, ownership shifted due to slow sales and the bankruptcy of the Baptist Foundation, which had acquired unsold lots and development rights. In April 2003, Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC (the “LLC”), managed by N.E. Isaacson, purchased 228 lots and the Declarant’s rights at auction.

Evolution of CC&R Amendments

Following the acquisition, the LLC recorded significant changes to the governing documents to facilitate community revitalization and expansion.

Amendment Type

Key Changes

Approval Level

July 9, 2003

Amended and Restated Declaration

Established two classes of membership (Class A for owners, Class B for Declarant with 10 votes per lot); defined board composition.

72% of record owners

Nov 5, 2003

First Amendment

Further modifications to the restated declaration.

Not specified

Feb 21, 2006

Additional Amendment

Allowed a “Joint Use and Maintenance Agreement” with White Mountain Lake Vistas HOA.

87% of record owners

During this period, the LLC reportedly invested approximately $600,000 in common area repairs (including tennis and bocce ball courts) and $300,000 in lot development.

The Petitioner’s Challenge

Legal Basis of the Dispute

Petitioner Lawrence M. Wojtowicz, who purchased a lot in 2004 and briefly served on the HOA Board, challenged the validity of the 2003 and 2006 amendments. His arguments, supported by legal counsel, centered on the following:

1. Term Restrictions: Citing Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, the Petitioner argued that the CC&Rs could only be amended upon the expiration of the initial term in September 2015.

2. Successor Rights: He contended that the LLC was not a proper successor to the original Declarant, Global Development.

3. Invalidity of Governance: He argued that because the amendments were unlawful, the current HOA Board was improperly constituted and its actions were null and void.

Requested Relief

The Petitioner sought a ruling requiring the LLC to return the common area amenities to their April 2003 condition and requested reimbursement for $10,891.45 in legal expenses plus filing fees.

Administrative Findings and Dismissal

The ALJ granted the HOA’s motion to dismiss the complaint based on several legal and jurisdictional factors:

Lack of Jurisdiction

Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B), the Department of Building, Fire and Life Safety lacks jurisdiction over:

• Disputes between owners where the association is not a party.

• Disputes between an owner and a person or entity engaged in the business of constructing or selling property within a planned community.

The ALJ determined that the Petitioner’s dispute was fundamentally with the LLC and Mr. Isaacson regarding their status as Declarants and their right to amend documents. Since the Petitioner admitted his dispute was not against the HOA itself, the matter fell outside the administrative forum’s authority.

Inappropriate Forum for Declaratory Relief

The ALJ noted that the relief sought—the invalidation of amendments affecting all residents and the physical restoration of common areas—was more appropriate for a declaratory judgment action in superior court. Such an action would allow for the joinder of all potentially affected property owners, which is not possible in an administrative proceeding.

Adjudication of Attorney’s Fees

The HOA filed an application for attorney’s fees based on Section 11.3 of the CC&Rs. The ALJ denied this application, citing established Arizona case law (Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc.):

Definition of “Action”: An administrative agency is not characterized as a “court,” and therefore an administrative proceeding does not constitute an “action” for the purposes of statutory fee recovery (A.R.S. § 12-341.01).

Original Intent: The ALJ found no evidence that the original 1985 Declarant or subsequent voters intended for the fee-shifting provision to apply to administrative tribunals that did not exist at the time of the original recording.

Strict Interpretation: Because the language of the CC&Rs mirrored statutory language typically applied to court actions, the ALJ inferred it should be interpreted consistently with those statutes, which exclude administrative proceedings.

Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge ordered the following:

1. The Petitioner’s complaint against Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners Association was dismissed.

2. The Respondent HOA’s application for attorney’s fees was denied.






Study Guide – 07F-H067002-BFS


Study Guide: Lawrence M. Wojtowicz v. Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case involving Lawrence M. Wojtowicz and the Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association. It explores the history of the planned community’s governing documents, the nature of the legal dispute, and the final decision regarding jurisdiction and attorney’s fees.

——————————————————————————–

Part I: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided administrative decision.

1. What were the requirements for amending the original 1985 Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs)?

2. How did the 2003 amendments change the voting structure within the planned community?

3. What was the primary legal argument Petitioner Lawrence M. Wojtowicz used to challenge the 2003 CC&R amendments?

4. Why did the HOA President, Sue Fuller, initially request that the Department of Building, Fire and Life Safety dismiss the petition?

5. What specific improvements did Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC (the LLC) make to the community after the 2003 auction?

6. According to the Conclusions of Law, what is the definition of a “preponderance of the evidence”?

7. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determine that the Office of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction?

8. What was the outcome of the HOA’s application for attorney’s fees?

9. How did the case Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc. influence the ALJ’s decision regarding legal costs?

10. What alternative legal path did the ALJ suggest for the Petitioner to seek relief against the LLC and Mr. Isaacson?

——————————————————————————–

Part II: Answer Key

1. Amendment Requirements: The 1985 CC&Rs stated that the provisions would bind the land for 30 years and then automatically extend for 10-year periods. Any amendments during this time required a recorded instrument signed by owners holding at least two-thirds of the outstanding votes.

2. Voting Structure Changes: The 2003 amendments established two classes of membership: Class A for regular owners (one vote per lot) and Class B for the Declarant (ten votes per lot). Class B membership was designed to cease only when the Declarant no longer owned any portion of the property.

3. Petitioner’s Legal Argument: Citing Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, Wojtowicz argued that the CC&Rs could only be amended at the expiration of the initial term in 2015, making the 2003 changes ineffective. He also challenged whether the LLC was a legitimate successor to the original Declarant, Global Development.

4. HOA Motion to Dismiss: President Sue Fuller argued that the Department lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was clearly between the Petitioner and the LLC/N.E. Isaacson, rather than the Association itself. Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B), the Department does not have the authority to hear disputes between owners and developers regarding the sale or construction of property.

5. Community Improvements: Following the 2003 auction, the LLC invested more than $600,000 to repair and develop common facilities, including the construction of tennis and bocce ball courts. Additionally, approximately $300,000 was spent to complete the development of remaining lots for marketing.

6. Preponderance of the Evidence: This legal standard is defined as proof that convinces the trier of fact that a contention is more probably true than not. It represents the superior evidentiary weight or “greater weight of the evidence” that inclines an impartial mind toward one side of an issue.

7. Jurisdictional Determination: The ALJ found that the dispute concerned the validity of the amendments and the actions of the developer/declarant rather than the application of the CC&Rs by the HOA. Because the statutes exclude disputes between owners and those engaged in the business of constructing or selling property within a community, the OAH had no authority to rule.

8. Attorney’s Fees Outcome: The ALJ denied the HOA’s application for attorney’s fees. The judge concluded that administrative proceedings do not qualify as “actions” under the relevant statutes or the specific language of the community’s CC&Rs.

9. Influence of Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc.: This case established that an administrative agency is not a court and therefore its proceedings are not “actions” for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. The ALJ applied this precedent to determine that the HOA was not entitled to recover fees despite being the prevailing party.

10. Suggested Alternative Relief: The ALJ noted that the Petitioner could seek a declaratory judgment in superior court. This venue would allow for the joinder of all potentially affected property owners in the planned community, which is necessary for a dispute affecting the rights of all residents.

——————————————————————————–

Part III: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the source context to develop detailed responses to the following prompts.

1. The Role of the Declarant: Analyze the transition of Declarant rights from Global Development to Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC. Discuss the significance of these rights in the context of the 2003 amendments and the Petitioner’s challenge to the “unbroken chain” of assignment.

2. Jurisdictional Boundaries of the OAH: Evaluate why the Administrative Law Judge determined that the Office of Administrative Hearings was an improper venue for this specific dispute. Compare the statutory limitations of A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B)(1) and (2) with the Petitioner’s stated “Prayers to the Court.”

3. Contractual Interpretation of “Action”: Discuss the HOA’s argument that the 1985 CC&Rs intended “action” to include administrative proceedings. Contrast this with the ALJ’s reasoning regarding the timeline of the Semple decision and the subsequent amendments to the CC&Rs.

4. The Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners Precedent: Detail how the Scholten case served as the foundation for the Petitioner’s complaint. Explain the LLC’s counter-argument regarding why this case should not be considered controlling authority for the Juniper Ridge community.

5. Equitable Defenses and Property Value: Based on the correspondence from Attorney Rollman, examine the potential consequences of invalidating the 2003 CC&R amendments. Discuss the “equitable defenses” raised regarding the LLC’s financial investments and the potential impact on community property values.

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Part IV: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

The Arizona Revised Statute that allows property owners in a planned community to petition for a hearing concerning violations of community documents or state statutes.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding officer who conducts hearings and issues decisions for administrative agencies; in this case, Diane Mihalsky.

Amended and Restated Declaration

A legal document recorded in 2003 that modified the original 1985 CC&Rs, including changes to voting rights and board composition.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules and operations of a planned community.

Class B Membership

A specific category of membership reserved for the Declarant, granting ten votes for each lot owned, effectively maintaining control over the association.

Common Areas

The shared facilities and land within a planned community, such as tennis courts and bocce ball courts, managed by the HOA.

Declarant

The entity (originally Global Development, later Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC) that established the community and holds specific rights to develop and manage it.

Declaratory Judgment

A legal determination by a court that resolves legal uncertainty for the litigants without necessarily awarding damages or ordering specific action.

Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)

The agency responsible for conducting independent administrative hearings for the state of Arizona.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal proceeding or petition; in this case, Lawrence M. Wojtowicz.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in civil and administrative cases, meaning that the evidence shows a fact is more likely true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or legal action is filed; in this case, the Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association.

Successor in Interest

A party that takes over the rights and obligations of another party through a legal transfer, such as the purchase of lots and Declarant rights.






Blog Post – 07F-H067002-BFS


Case Summary: Wojtowicz v. Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association Case No: 07F-H067002-BFS Forum: Office of Administrative Hearings (Arizona) Date: February 21, 2007

Key Facts and Proceedings Petitioner Lawrence M. Wojtowicz filed a complaint against the Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association (HOA) regarding the validity of amendments made to the community’s Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs)12. The original CC&Rs, recorded in 1985, contained a provision stating they would bind the land for a term of 30 years3. In 2003, a successor developer, Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC (the LLC), acquired the remaining lots and recorded amendments to the CC&Rs which, among other changes, altered voting rights and board composition4….

The Petitioner challenged these amendments, arguing that under the legal precedent Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, the CC&Rs could not be amended until the initial 30-year term expired in 201528. He sought to invalidate the amendments and restore the community to its 2003 condition9. The dispute was referred to the Office of Administrative Hearings10.

Main Issues and Arguments The primary issues concerned subject matter jurisdiction and the award of attorney’s fees.

1. Motion to Dismiss (Jurisdiction): The HOA and the LLC moved to dismiss the case. They argued that the Department of Building, Fire and Life Safety and the OAH lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was essentially between an owner and a developer regarding the validity of community documents, rather than a violation of existing documents by the HOA1112.

2. Attorney’s Fees: The HOA requested attorney’s fees based on Section 11.3 of the CC&Rs, which allowed the prevailing party to recover fees in any “action arising out of or in connection with this Declaration”1314.

Final Decision and Legal Analysis Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Diane Mihalsky issued a decision dismissing the complaint and denying the application for attorney’s fees15.

Dismissal on Jurisdiction: The ALJ granted the motion to dismiss16. During the hearing, the Petitioner admitted his dispute was not actually against the Respondent HOA16. The ALJ found that the Petitioner’s allegations centered on the LLC’s (the developer’s) wrongful amendment of the CC&Rs12. Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B), the administrative body lacks jurisdiction over disputes between owners and developers regarding the design, construction, or sale of property within a planned community1217. The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner’s remedy lay in filing a declaratory judgment action in Superior Court, where all affected parties could be joined17.

Denial of Attorney’s Fees: The ALJ denied the HOA’s request for fees15. Citing Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., the ALJ determined that an administrative agency is not a court, and an administrative proceeding does not constitute an “action” under A.R.S. § 12-341.0118. The Judge reasoned that because the CC&Rs borrowed language from the statute, the drafters likely intended the fee provision to apply only to court actions, not administrative hearings19. The HOA failed to provide evidence that the amendments made after Semple was decided intended to expand fee liability to administrative forums20.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lawrence M. Wojtowicz (Petitioner)
    Homeowner
    Appeared on his own behalf
  • Dan G. Curtis (attorney)
    Provided legal opinion/expenses incurred by Petitioner
  • Michael J. Brown (attorney)
    Brown and Brown Law Offices, P.C.
    Hired by Petitioner to challenge 2003 amendments
  • Douglas E. Brown (attorney)
    Brown and Brown Law Offices, P.C.
    Hired by Petitioner to challenge 2003 amendments

Respondent Side

  • Tanis A. Duncan (attorney)
    Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association
  • N.E. Isaacson (managing member)
    Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC
    Developer; LLC moved to intervene
  • Sue Fuller (HOA President)
    Voyager at Juniper Ridge Homeowners’ Association
    Attended hearing
  • Richard M. Rollman (attorney)
    Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC
    Gabroy, Rollman, & Bossé, P.C.; represented intervening LLC
  • Michael Botwin (attorney)
    Voyager at Juniper Ridge, LLC
    Represented intervening LLC
  • Mr. Fuller (witness)
    Homeowner
    Husband of Sue Fuller; attended hearing

Neutral Parties

  • Diane Mihalsky (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Agency Director
  • Joyce Kesterman (agency staff)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Agency contact

Other Participants

  • Clifton R. Jessup, Jr. (attorney)
    Patton Boggs, LLP
    Recipient of letter from Dan Curtis in 2003

Orange Grove Mobile Estates Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 07F-H067001-BFS
Agency Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Tribunal Office of Administrative Hearings
Decision Date 2007-01-08
Administrative Law Judge Brian Brendan Tully
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner W. Douglas Stickler Counsel
Respondent Orange Grove Mobile Estates Homeowners Association Counsel Tanis A. Duncan

Alleged Violations

1987 Declaration

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge denied the petition, concluding that the 1987 Declaration's age restriction (5 years max) applied to the Petitioner's replacement home. The ALJ rejected the argument that 'accrued rights' allowed Petitioner to operate under the superseded 1971 Declaration. The HOA's denial of a hardship variance was not an abuse of discretion.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to obtain prior approval and the replacement home violated the age restrictions in the valid 1987 Declaration. The ALJ found the HOA consistently applied these rules.

Key Issues & Findings

Denial of replacement mobile home based on age restriction

Petitioner sought to replace his mobile home with one older than five years. Respondent denied the request based on the 1987 Declaration age restriction. Petitioner argued the 'rights accrued' clause in the 1987 Declaration preserved his rights under the 1971 Declaration.

Orders: Petitioner's Petition is denied.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_loss

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.02

Video Overview

Audio Overview

Decision Documents

07F-H067001-BFS Decision – 159314.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-23T17:16:49 (100.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 07F-H067001-BFS


Briefing Document: Stickler v. Orange Grove Mobile Estates Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document analyzes the administrative law decision in the matter of W. Douglas Stickler v. Orange Grove Mobile Estates Homeowners Association (No. 07F-H067001-BFS). The case centers on a dispute regarding the age restrictions for replacement mobile homes within the Orange Grove Mobile Estates (OGME) subdivision.

The Petitioner, W. Douglas Stickler, sought to replace his 30-year-old mobile home with an 11-year-old model, despite a 1987 Declaration requiring newly installed homes to be no more than five years old. The Petitioner argued that his rights under a previous 1971 Declaration—which contained no age limits—were “accrued rights” that exempted him from the newer restriction.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Respondent (the HOA), concluding that the 1987 Declaration superseded the 1971 version and that the Petitioner was subject to the five-year age limit. The ALJ further determined that the HOA did not abuse its discretion in denying a hardship variance, as it had consistently enforced the age restriction for all members.

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Regulatory Framework and Governing Declarations

The property in question (Lots 138 and 139 of Orange Grove Mobile Estates) has been subject to two primary sets of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) over time.

The 1971 Declaration

Age Limits: Contained no specific age limitations for mobile homes affixed to a homeowner’s property.

Approval Process: Required that no building or improvement (including mobile homes) be commenced or maintained until plans and specifications were approved in writing by the Trustee (then Stewart Title & Trust).

The 1987 Declaration

In 1987, a majority of lot owners approved a new Declaration that revoked and superseded the 1971 restrictions. Key provisions include:

Age Restriction: Any newly installed or replacement mobile home must not be more than five years of age at the time of installation.

Architectural Control Committee: Established a “Committee” to approve construction plans, specifications, and plot plans to ensure harmony with use restrictions.

Hardship Variances: Paragraph 4.04(c) grants the Committee “sole discretion” to provide reasonable hardship variances from restrictions, subject to county codes and zoning.

Recital Language: Stated that previous declarations were revoked “except as to… contracts made or rights accrued under the foregoing declarations.”

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Chronology of the Dispute

The conflict arose when the Petitioner attempted to replace a failing structure on his property in 2006.

Sept 12, 1995

Petitioner sought and received prior approval for a carport, demonstrating knowledge of the 1987 Declaration’s approval requirements.

June 29, 2006

Petitioner requested permission to replace his mobile home but did not disclose the age of the new unit.

July 6, 2006

The Committee notified Petitioner that the plans were not approved because the replacement home was older than five years.

July 7, 2006

Petitioner requested a hardship waiver, admitting he was unaware of the age restriction and had already paid for the replacement home.

July 12, 2006

HOA President Charles Rucker formally denied the plot plan, noting the replacement home was 11 years old.

July 29, 2006

Petitioner argued the “accrued rights” clause in the 1987 Declaration “grandfathered” his right to install a home of any age.

Dec 18, 2006

Administrative hearing held before ALJ Brian Brendan Tully.

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Analysis of Petitioner’s Claims

The Petitioner provided four primary justifications for a hardship variance and one primary legal argument regarding his right to bypass the age restriction.

Hardship Justifications

1. Financial Risk: Most of the Petitioner’s savings had already been spent on the replacement home, and they were under contract to transfer their current home, leading to potential homelessness.

2. Financial Limitation: Ongoing medical expenses and health issues prevented the purchase of a newer home that would meet the five-year requirement.

3. Structural Necessity: The existing 30-year-old home had compromised structural integrity due to water damage (main waterline replacement), electrical issues, and termite damage.

4. Aesthetics: The Petitioner claimed the exterior appearance of the 11-year-old replacement was appropriate for the neighborhood and not detrimental.

The “Accrued Rights” Argument

Petitioner opined that the 1987 Declaration’s language regarding “rights accrued” meant his right to bring in any age replacement home (as permitted in 1971) was preserved. He argued that the 1987 restrictions should only apply to homeowners who purchased property after the 1987 Declaration was recorded.

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Legal Conclusions and Judicial Reasoning

The ALJ’s decision was based on several key legal interpretations:

Supersedure: The 1987 Declaration, having been approved by a majority of homeowners, legally superseded the 1971 Declaration. The Petitioner is bound by the 1987 provisions regarding replacement homes.

Interpretation of “Accrued Rights”: The ALJ rejected the Petitioner’s interpretation of the “accrued rights” recital. The court found that “accrued rights” meant Petitioner did not have to remove his existing home when the 1987 rules took effect, but it did not grant a perpetual right to ignore future replacement standards.

Intent of the Declaration: The ALJ noted that the Petitioner’s interpretation would render the 1987 Declaration ineffective for all existing residents, which was clearly not the intent of the majority of homeowners who approved it.

Procedural Failure: The Petitioner failed to obtain Committee approval prior to purchasing the replacement home, a requirement present in both the 1971 and 1987 Declarations.

Consistency of Enforcement: The Respondent provided credible evidence that it has consistently denied permission to all homeowners seeking to replace homes with units older than five years. Therefore, the denial was not an abuse of discretion.

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Final Order

On January 8, 2007, Administrative Law Judge Brian Brendan Tully ordered that the Petitioner’s Petition be denied.

Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.02(B), this order constitutes the final administrative decision and is not subject to a request for rehearing. The matter was handled through the Office of Administrative Hearings following a referral from the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety.






Study Guide – 07F-H067001-BFS


Study Guide: Stickler v. Orange Grove Mobile Estates Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative legal case between W. Douglas Stickler and the Orange Grove Mobile Estates Homeowners Association. It explores the conflict between successive property declarations, the interpretation of “accrued rights,” and the authority of homeowners’ associations to enforce age restrictions on replacement structures.

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Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided source context.

1. Who are the primary parties involved in this administrative hearing?

2. What was the central requirement regarding mobile home age introduced in the 1987 Declaration?

3. How did the 1971 Declaration differ from the 1987 Declaration regarding mobile home age limits?

4. What role does the “Committee” play according to the 1987 Declaration?

5. What evidence was cited to prove that the Petitioner was aware of the requirements of the 1987 Declaration prior to the 2006 dispute?

6. On what grounds did W. Douglas Stickler request a hardship waiver for his replacement home?

7. What was the Petitioner’s legal argument regarding the “grandfather clause” or “accrued rights”?

8. How did the Board of Directors interpret the “rights accrued” language in the 1987 Declaration?

9. What was the Administrative Law Judge’s ruling regarding the Petitioner’s interpretation of the 1987 Declaration?

10. Why did the judge conclude that the Respondent did not abuse its discretion in denying the hardship variance?

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Answer Key

1. Parties: The Petitioner is W. Douglas Stickler, a property owner in the Orange Grove Mobile Estates. The Respondent is the Orange Grove Mobile Estates Homeowners Association, an Arizona non-profit corporation represented by counsel.

2. 1987 Age Requirement: The 1987 Declaration mandated that any newly installed or replacement mobile home must not be more than five years of age at the time of installation. It also stipulated that plans must be approved in writing by the Architectural Control Committee before any replacement occurs.

3. Comparison of Declarations: The 1971 Declaration contained no specific age limitation for mobile homes affixed to a homeowner’s property. In contrast, the 1987 Declaration, which superseded the 1971 version, introduced the strict five-year age limit for all new installations and replacements.

4. The Committee: The “Committee” refers to the Architectural Control Committee, which is responsible for approving construction plans and specifications to ensure harmony with use restrictions. It also holds the “sole discretion” to grant reasonable hardship variances from the restrictions if good cause is shown.

5. Prior Compliance: In September 1995, the Petitioner wrote to the Committee seeking permission to erect a carport before beginning work. This action demonstrated his knowledge of and compliance with the 1987 Declaration’s requirement for obtaining prior approval for property improvements.

6. Hardship Grounds: Stickler cited financial inability to afford a newer home due to medical expenses, the compromised structural integrity of his current 30-year-old home (water/termite damage), and the fact that he had already paid for the 11-year-old replacement home. He also argued that the replacement home’s appearance was appropriate for the neighborhood.

7. Accrued Rights Argument: The Petitioner argued that because the 1987 Declaration included a recital stating that prior declarations were revoked “except as to… rights accrued,” his right to install a replacement home of any age (per the 1971 rules) was preserved. He believed the new restrictions should only apply to subsequent purchasers of the property.

8. Board Interpretation: The Board’s counsel argued that “rights accrued” meant that the Petitioner was not required to remove his existing mobile home just because it was older than five years when the 1987 Declaration took effect. However, it did not grant him a permanent right to ignore the age restriction for future replacement homes.

9. ALJ Ruling on Accrued Rights: The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the “accrued rights” recital did not grant a retained right to ignore the 1987 age restrictions. The judge noted that the Petitioner’s interpretation would effectively prevent the 1987 Declaration from superseding the 1971 version for all current owners, which was not the intent of the majority of homeowners who approved it.

10. Abuse of Discretion: The judge found no abuse of discretion because the Association provided evidence that it consistently denied requests for variances regarding the five-year age limit. Therefore, the denial of Stickler’s request was a uniform application of the rules rather than an arbitrary decision.

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Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the case details to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts.

1. The Evolution of Property Restrictions: Analyze the transition from the 1971 Declaration to the 1987 Declaration. Discuss the legal implications of a majority of homeowners voting to supersede old covenants and how this affects individual “accrued rights” versus collective community standards.

2. The Burden of Compliance: Examine the Petitioner’s failure to seek approval before purchasing the replacement mobile home. How did his 1995 request for a carport influence the judge’s assessment of his “knowledge and compliance,” and why is prior approval a critical component of HOA governance?

3. Interpreting Hardship and Discretion: Discuss the criteria for a “hardship variance” as outlined in the 1987 Declaration. In your opinion, based on the text, where should a committee draw the line between personal financial difficulty and the enforcement of community age standards?

4. The Legal Definition of “Grandfathering”: Critique the Petitioner’s argument that he was “grandfathered” into the 1971 rules. Contrast his view—that the 1987 rules only apply to subsequent purchasers—with the ALJ’s view that such an interpretation would render the new Declaration ineffective.

5. Consistency in Governance: The ALJ noted that the Respondent “consistently denied” similar variance requests. Explain why consistency is a vital defense for a homeowners’ association when facing allegations of abuse of discretion or unfair treatment.

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding officer who conducts hearings and issues decisions in administrative law cases, such as those involving state agencies and homeowners’ associations.

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01

The Arizona Revised Statute under which the Petitioner filed his case with the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety.

Architectural Control Committee

The body established by the Declaration to review and approve or deny plans for buildings, improvements, or replacements within the subdivision.

Declaration of Restrictions

A legal document recorded with the county that outlines the rules, covenants, and conditions governing the use of property within a specific development.

Hardship Variance

A discretionary waiver of specific rules or restrictions granted by a governing committee when a property owner demonstrates “good cause” or significant personal difficulty.

Joint Tenants with Rights of Survivorship

A form of legal co-ownership of property where, upon the death of one owner, their interest automatically passes to the surviving owner(s).

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in this civil matter, requiring the Petitioner to prove that his claims are more likely true than not.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition is filed; in this case, the Orange Grove Mobile Estates Homeowners Association.

Supersede

To replace or take the place of an earlier set of rules or documents; the 1987 Declaration superseded the 1971 Declaration.

Trustee

In the context of the 1971 Declaration, the entity (Stewart Title & Trust) responsible for approving initial plans for the benefit of the developer.






Blog Post – 07F-H067001-BFS


The “Grandfather Clause” Trap: 4 Crucial Lessons from a Modern HOA Legal Battle

Imagine a homeowner’s nightmare: your 30-year-old residence is literally crumbling. Termites have hollowed the wood, and a main waterline break has caused extensive water damage, compromising the structural integrity of your sanctuary. For W. Douglas Stickler, a resident of Orange Grove Mobile Estates, this wasn’t a hypothetical—it was a perceived necessity. Yet, when he attempted to replace his failing home, he found himself trapped between the decay of his property and the rigid machinery of a homeowners association.

The case of Stickler v. Orange Grove Mobile Estates serves as a stark warning. It is a masterclass in how “accrued rights” are often misunderstood and how procedural negligence can strip a homeowner of their leverage. As an advocate for homeowner rights, I see this as a cautionary tale: in the world of common-interest developments, what you don’t know—or what you assume is “grandfathered in”—can leave you homeless.

Takeaway 1: “Accrued Rights” Protect What You Have, Not What You Want

A central pillar of Stickler’s legal argument was the concept of “accrued rights.” He purchased his property while a 1971 Declaration was in effect—a document that placed no age limits on mobile homes. When a 1987 Declaration was recorded, it imposed a strict five-year age limit on any replacement homes. Stickler pointed to a specific clause in the 1987 update stating that previous restrictions were revoked: “…except as to…contracts made or rights accrued under the foregoing declarations.”

Stickler argued that his right to bring in a replacement home of any age was “grandfathered” under that 1971 document. However, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) delivered a sharp clarification of the law: An accrued right protects the status quo, not a future deviation.

The judge ruled that “accrued rights” protected the home already sitting on the lot in 1987, ensuring Stickler didn’t have to remove his then-existing home. It did not grant him a permanent, transferable license to ignore new standards when bringing in a “new” structure. Most importantly, the ALJ noted in Conclusion of Law #6 that if Stickler’s interpretation were true, the 1987 rules would only apply to subsequent purchasers. This was “clearly not the intent” of the majority of homeowners who voted for the change. In an HOA, majoritarian rule can, and often does, strip away your existing expectations for future use.

Takeaway 2: The Fatal Strategy of “Buying Before Approving”

In HOA disputes, hope is not a strategy. Stickler’s most significant procedural failure was his “act first, ask later” approach. By the time he officially requested permission from the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) on June 29, 2006, he was already under contract for an 11-year-old replacement home. In his letter, he pressured the committee for a rapid response, noting he expected his Pima County permit within “7-10 days.”

This narrow window left the HOA with no room to deliberate and Stickler with no room to pivot. The ALJ highlighted a critical piece of evidence: in 1995, Stickler had successfully sought prior written approval to erect a carport. This established “actual notice.” Stickler knew the rules required prior approval; he simply chose not to follow them for the home replacement.

The lesson here is absolute: Never commit capital before you have a signed approval. The judge concluded that Stickler failed to obtain approval “prior to purchasing” as required by both the 1971 and 1987 declarations. By the time the HOA said no, Stickler’s money was already gone.

Takeaway 3: Hardship is Subjective (and Legally Fragile)

When his request was denied because the 11-year-old replacement home exceeded the five-year age limit, Stickler appealed for a “Hardship Waiver.” He cited a trifecta of personal crises: financial inability to buy a newer home due to ongoing medical expenses, the “compromised structural integrity” of his current 30-year-old home, and the threat of imminent homelessness.

In a poignant plea, Stickler wrote:

“We are between a rock and a hard place and could literally be homeless. Most of our savings has already paid for the replacement home. We are under contract for the transfer of ownership of our present home.”

While empathetic on the surface, the HOA Board and the ALJ remained unmoved. HOA President Charles Rucker pointed out the hard truth: Stickler “should have discussed the matter with the Committee prior to his purchasing” the home. The court ultimately found that the Board did not “abuse its discretion” by denying the waiver. Personal financial choices and maintenance issues do not legally obligate an association to compromise the standards the majority of the community voted to uphold.

Takeaway 4: Uniform Enforcement is the HOA’s Strongest Shield

Stickler’s case hit a brick wall because the HOA had a history of saying “no.” The court found credible evidence that the Association had “consistently denied member homeowners permission to replace their homes with homes older than five years.”

This is a vital takeaway for any homeowner looking to challenge a board. If an HOA enforces a rule inconsistently, they are vulnerable to claims of being “arbitrary and capricious.” However, if they are consistently rigid, that rigidity becomes a legally protected standard. By uniformly applying the 1987 age limit, the Board shielded itself from the charge of “abuse of discretion.” Consistency effectively turns a board’s refusal into a predictable, and therefore legally sound, application of the law.

Conclusion: The Long Shadow of the 1987 Declaration

The 1987 Declaration did more than just change the rules; it fundamentally reshaped the community’s governance, shifting power from a “Trustee” (Stewart Title & Trust) to a member-run “Committee.” It even removed certain properties from the original plat, fundamentally shifting the ground beneath the residents’ feet.

The final order was clear: the 1987 Declaration is the law of the land for Orange Grove Mobile Estates. It serves as a reminder that when you buy into a community, you are not just signing up for the rules as they exist on the day you close escrow. You are signing up for a living document that can evolve—and potentially become more restrictive—through the will of the majority.

Before you make your next move, ask yourself: Are you prepared for the rules to change tomorrow, and do you have the procedural discipline to navigate them? In the battle between a homeowner’s “Golden Years” and an HOA’s CC&Rs, the ink on the declaration almost always wins.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • W. Douglas Stickler (Petitioner)
    Homeowner
    appeared personally
  • Patricia Ronell Stickler (Joint Owner)
    Homeowner
    Petitioner's wife

Respondent Side

  • Tanis A. Duncan (Respondent Attorney)
    Law Office of Tanis A. Duncan
    Represented the Association
  • Charles Rucker (Board President)
    Orange Grove Mobile Estates Homeowners Association
    President of the association

Neutral Parties

  • Brian Brendan Tully (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Gene E. Anderson (Beneficiary)
    Stewart Title & Trust (Trustee)
    Historical context (1971 Declaration)
  • Robert Barger (Agency Director)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Director receiving copy of decision
  • Joyce Kesterman (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Receiving copy of decision