Portonova, Carol vs. Tenth Avenue Missions Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 12F-H1212013-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2012-10-02
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Carol Portonova Counsel
Respondent Tenth Avenue Missions Homeowners Association, Inc. Counsel Michael Orcutt

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A). The judge found that Petitioner failed to prove she made a request to examine or purchase copies of Association records in June 2011 or November 2011,. Consequently, the Petition was dismissed.

Why this result: Failure to prove a records request was made

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide records regarding monies received to satisfy a judgment

Petitioner alleged that the Association violated the statute by not providing records pertaining to monies the Association received to satisfy a judgment it obtained against Petitioner.

Orders: The Petition is dismissed and no action is required of Respondent.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: petitioner_lose

Decision Documents

12F-H1212013-BFS Decision – 308933.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:27:29 (69.6 KB)

12F-H1212013-BFS Decision – 313665.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:27:29 (59.0 KB)

**Case Summary: Portonova v. Tenth Avenue Missions Homeowners Association, Inc.**
**Case No. 12F-H1212013-BFS**

**Hearing Overview**
This matter was heard before Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal on September 19, 2012, at the Office of Administrative Hearings in Phoenix, Arizona. The case involved an allegation by Petitioner Carol Portonova that Respondent Tenth Avenue Missions Homeowners Association, Inc. violated Arizona law regarding access to association records.

**Key Facts and Background**
The Petitioner resided in a unit within the Tenth Avenue Missions planned community. The dispute arose after the Respondent successfully sued the Petitioner and her husband, obtaining a judgment and subsequent satisfaction of judgment. Portonova sought an accounting of the monies the Association received to satisfy this judgment, including attorney's fees, expressing a belief that the Association lacked proper records for these funds.

On June 4, 2012, Portonova filed a petition alleging the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) by failing to provide the requested records.

**Main Legal Issues and Arguments**
The central legal issue was whether the Respondent failed to comply with A.R.S. § 33-1805(A), which requires associations to make financial and other records reasonably available for examination within ten business days of a request.

* **Petitioner’s Position:** Portonova argued she had requested the records but they were not produced. She entered into evidence a letter dated May 3, 2012, addressed to Association officers, and implied during cross-examination that she had also requested records at a November 2011 homeowners meeting.
* **Respondent’s Defense:** The Association, represented by counsel, disputed that a request was ever made. Mario Capriotti, Jr. testified that he did not receive the May 3, 2012 letter and that the Petitioner did not request to examine or purchase records at the November 2011 meeting.

**Findings and Legal Analysis**
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) established that the burden of proof lay with the Petitioner to show a violation by a "preponderance of the evidence".

The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to meet this burden. Specifically, the Judge concluded that Portonova failed to prove that she or a designated representative actually made a request to the Respondent to examine or provide the records in question. Because the Petitioner could not establish that a request was made, she could not prove that the Respondent failed to provide an opportunity to examine the records.

**Outcome and Final Decision**
1. **ALJ Decision:** On October 2, 2012, the ALJ dismissed the petition, ruling that no action was required of the Respondent.
2. **Certification:** The Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety did not reject or modify the decision within the statutory review period. Consequently, on November 13, 2012, the Office of Administrative Hearings certified the ALJ’s ruling as the final administrative decision.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Carol Portonova (petitioner)
    Appeared on her own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Michael Orcutt (attorney)
    Tenth Avenue Missions Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Esq.
  • Mario Capriotti, Jr. (officer/witness)
    Tenth Avenue Missions Homeowners Association, Inc.
    Officer of the Association; testified at hearing

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Gene Palma (Agency Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
  • Cliff J. Vanell (OAH Director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Certified the decision
  • Holly Textor (staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    c/o for Gene Palma

Vise, Robert L. vs. East 12 Condo HOA

Case Summary

Case ID 12F-H1212003-BFS
Agency Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Tribunal Office of Administrative Hearings
Decision Date 2012-06-18
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Robert L. Vise Counsel
Respondent East 12 Condo HOA Counsel

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1253(H); CC&Rs Section 5(H)

Outcome Summary

The ALJ dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner failed to prove his roof was damaged. Therefore, the issue of whether insurance proceeds should be used for repair or placed in a contingency fund was moot regarding his specific claim.

Why this result: Insufficient evidence presented to prove the existence of roof damage requiring repair.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to Repair Common Elements/Misuse of Insurance Proceeds

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated the statute and CC&Rs by placing insurance proceeds into a contingency fund rather than repairing his roof, which he claimed was damaged.

Orders: The Petition is dismissed and no action is required of Respondent.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Decision Documents

12F-H1212003-BFS Decision – 295469.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:26:20 (84.9 KB)

12F-H1212003-BFS Decision – 302544.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:26:20 (57.2 KB)

**Case Title:** *Robert L. Vise v. East 12 Condo HOA*
**Case Number:** 12F-H1212003-BFS
**Forum:** Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings
**Date of Final Certification:** July 26, 2012

**Overview**
This administrative hearing addressed a dispute between a condominium unit owner (Petitioner) and the Homeowners Association (Respondent) regarding the allocation of insurance proceeds and the responsibility for roof repairs.

**Key Facts and Proceedings**
* **The Incident:** Following a storm in late 2010, the Association submitted a claim under a blanket insurance policy. The insurer paid approximately $3,374.39 for wind damage.
* **Allocation of Funds:** Because damage varied across units, the Board was unsure how to equitably distribute the proceeds. A vote of the membership was held in April 2011, resulting in an 8-to-4 decision to place the insurance proceeds into a contingency fund rather than funding specific repairs immediately.
* **Petitioner’s Claim:** The Petitioner alleged that his roof sustained damage that the Association failed to repair, violating A.R.S. § 33-1253(H) and Section 5(H) of the CC&Rs. He argued the insurance proceeds should be used for his roof repairs and sought reimbursement for filing and attorney fees.
* **Respondent’s Defense:** The Association presented testimony from Board members and a neighbor sharing the Petitioner's roof structure. They testified that the damage identified in estimates belonged to the neighbor's unit, not the Petitioner’s.

**Key Legal Arguments and Analysis**
* **Burden of Proof:** The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) established that the Petitioner bore the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Association violated state statute or the CC&Rs.
* **Evidence of Damage:** The hearing featured conflicting evidence. While the Petitioner provided photographs and contractor estimates, the Respondent provided witness testimony disputing the location of the damage.
* **Self-Repair Complication:** The Petitioner admitted to performing some repairs himself following the storm. The ALJ noted that this action may have obscured evidence, making it difficult to verify what damage, if any, existed prior to his intervention.
* **Statutory Obligations:** A.R.S. § 33-1253(H) requires associations to repair damaged common elements for which insurance is required. However, the applicability of this statute relied on the proven existence of damage.

**Final Decision and Outcome**
* **Findings:** The ALJ concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove that his roof was actually damaged or required repair. Because the existence of damage was not established, the ALJ did not need to rule on whether the placement of insurance proceeds into a contingency fund was improper.
* **Ruling:** The ALJ determined the Respondent did not violate the CC&Rs or A.R.S. § 33-1253(H).
* **Order:** The Petition was dismissed, and the Petitioner’s request for fees and relief was denied.
* **Certification:** The Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety did not modify or reject the decision within the statutory timeframe; thus, the ALJ decision was certified as the final administrative decision on July 26, 2012.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Robert L. Vise (Petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Diane Gorinac (Board Chairman)
    East 12 Condo HOA
    Appeared on behalf of Respondent
  • Donna Armstrong (Witness)
    Shares duplex unit with Petitioner
  • Lorraine Matts (Board member)
    East 12 Condo HOA
    Testified regarding damage estimates

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Gene Palma (Agency Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
  • Cliff J. Vanell (OAH Director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed Certification of Decision
  • Beth Soliere (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed in transmission attention line

Brown, William M. vs. Terravita Country Club Inc.

Case Summary

Case ID 11F-H1112007-BFS
Agency Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2012-05-08
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William M. Brown Counsel
Respondent Terravita Country Club, Inc. Counsel Joshua M. Bolen

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1805(A)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Respondent violated A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) because, although it provided the policy, it did not do so within the mandatory ten business days. The late delivery was attributed to an unintentional computer error. Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party and awarded the $550.00 filing fee, but no civil penalties were assessed against the Respondent.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to provide records (Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy) within ten business days

Petitioner requested a copy of the Respondent's Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy. Respondent failed to provide the policy within the statutory ten business day period, allegedly due to a computer error where the email became stuck in an outbox.

Orders: Respondent shall pay Petitioner his filing fee of $550.00. No civil penalty imposed as Respondent attempted to comply.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Steadman, Lorinda and John -v- Esquire Village Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 11F-H1112004-BFS
Agency Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2012-04-09
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lorinda and John Steadman Counsel J. Roger Wood
Respondent Esquire Village Homeowners Association Counsel Joseph Tadano

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 33-1808

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Petitioners, finding that the Gadsden flag is a protected flag under A.R.S. § 33-1808 as it was historically an official flag of the Marine Corps. The HOA's determination of a violation was improper, and the fines were ordered withdrawn. The HOA was ordered to refund the Petitioners' filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Restriction on flying the Gadsden flag

Petitioners challenged the HOA's assessment of fines for flying the Gadsden flag. The HOA argued the flag was not protected under A.R.S. § 33-1808. The ALJ determined that because the Gadsden flag was historically an official flag of the U.S. Marine Corps, it fell under the statutory protection for official service flags, regardless of whether it is currently used as the primary official flag.

Orders: Respondent is to take appropriate action to reflect that the flying of the Gadsden flag was not a violation and withdraw the assessment of any fees imposed. Respondent shall pay Petitioners their filing fee of $550.00.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1808
  • A.R.S. § 33-1803(D)

Decision Documents

11F-H1112004-BFS Decision – 289742.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:24:39 (89.7 KB)

11F-H1112004-BFS Decision – 292654.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:24:39 (60.2 KB)

Based on the provided sources, here is a summary of the hearing proceedings for Case No. 11F-H1112004-BFS.

**Case Overview**
* **Case Title:** *Lorinda and John Steadman v. Esquire Village Homeowners Association*
* **Date of Hearing:** March 22, 2012
* **Judge:** Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
* **Final Decision Date:** Certified May 15, 2012,

**Key Facts**
Petitioners Lorinda and John Steadman received approval in 2008 to install a flagpole in their rear yard, subject to compliance with state statutes regarding flag displays,. In late 2010, a dispute arose when the Petitioners began flying the Gadsden flag,.

In February 2011, the Respondent (Esquire Village Homeowners Association) issued two $50 fines against the Petitioners,. The Association claimed the Gadsden flag was not a protected flag under A.R.S. § 33-1808 as it existed at the time,. The Petitioners appealed these fines to the HOA Board without success before filing a petition with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety.

**Main Legal Issues**
The central issue was whether the Gadsden flag was protected under the version of A.R.S. § 33-1808 in effect prior to July 2011,. Specifically, the proceedings focused on whether the Gadsden flag qualified as "an official or replica flag of the United States army, navy, air force, marine corps".

**Key Arguments**
* **Respondent’s Position:** The Association argued that the Architectural Review Committee had the authority to regulate aesthetic improvements visible from the street,. The Board President testified that she researched military manuals and consulted informally with legislative counsel, concluding the Gadsden flag was not a "current" official flag and therefore not protected,.
* **Petitioners’ Position:** The Petitioners argued the flag was protected by statute. They presented an Arizona State Senate Issue Brief stating HOAs cannot prohibit U.S. military flags and provided evidence indicating the Gadsden flag’s historical association with the Marine Corps,.

**Legal Analysis and Findings**
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that A.R.S. § 33-1808 was determinative over the Association’s aesthetic regulations,.

In analyzing the statute, the Judge noted the text protected "an official or replica flag" of the armed forces. The Judge reasoned that the use of "an" suggested any one of a number of official flags, and the statute notably lacked the word "current". Therefore, to enjoy statutory protection, the Petitioners only needed to prove the Gadsden flag was an official flag of a branch of the armed forces *at some time*.

The ALJ found the preponderance of the evidence showed the Gadsden flag was, at some time, an official flag of the United States Marine Corps.

**Outcome and Order**
The Judge ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The decision included the following orders:
1. **Violation Dismissed:** The Respondent’s determination of

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lorinda Steadman (petitioner)
    Homeowner
  • John Steadman (petitioner)
    Homeowner
  • L. Roger Wood (attorney)
    The Law Offices of J. Roger Wood, PLLC
    Listed as 'L. Roger Wood' in appearances and 'J. Roger Wood' in service list
  • Pat Haruff (witness)
    Coalition of HomeOwners for Rights and Education
    Director of Coalition; advocate for homeowners

Respondent Side

  • Esquire Village Homeowners Association (respondent)
    Entity named as Respondent
  • Joseph Tadano (attorney)
    Farley Sletos & Choate
  • Kevin Bishop (witness)
    Renaissance Community Partners
    President of the management company
  • Julie Frost (board member)
    Esquire Village Homeowners Association
    Board President; testified at hearing

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Gene Palma (agency director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on transmission of decision
  • Cliff J. Vanell (agency director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Certified the decision
  • Beth Soliere (agency staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    ATTN recipient for transmission

Wozniak, Kathy vs. The North Slopes Property Owners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 11F-H1112001-BFS
Agency Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2011-10-28
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $0.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Kathy Wozniak Counsel
Respondent The North Slopes Property Owners Association Counsel Karen L. Karr

Alleged Violations

A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B); A.R.S. § 41-2198(3)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge granted the Respondent's First Amended Motion to Dismiss. The Petitioner lacked standing to file the petition because she did not own the lot within the subdivision at the time of filing. Additionally, the Tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the dispute was contractual in nature regarding CC&R amendments.

Why this result: Lack of standing; Lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Key Issues & Findings

Motion to Dismiss – Standing and Jurisdiction

Petitioner alleged Respondent violated the CC&Rs/contract by amending the minimum home size from 2,500 to 3,500 square feet. Respondent moved to dismiss.

Orders: The matter was dismissed because the Petitioner lacked standing (did not own the lot at the time of filing) and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over contractual disputes.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B)
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198 et seq.
  • A.R.S. § 41-2198(3)

Decision Documents

11F-H1112001-BFS Decision – 277667.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:24:22 (57.4 KB)

11F-H1112001-BFS Decision – 280461.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:24:22 (60.0 KB)

**Case Title:** *Kathy Wozniak vs. The North Slopes Property Owners Association*
**Case Number:** 11F-H1112001-BFS

**Hearing Overview and Proceedings**
On October 19, 2011, the Office of Administrative Hearings held an oral argument to address the Respondent’s First Amended Motion to Dismiss,. The dispute centered on the Petitioner's grievances regarding the Association's enforcement of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

**Key Facts and Arguments**
The Petitioner, Kathy Wozniak, alleged issues regarding the size of homes permitted within the subdivision. Specifically, she noted that the CC&Rs in place when she purchased Lot 20 allowed for a minimum home size of 2,500 square feet, but the Association subsequently amended the CC&Rs to increase the minimum requirement to 3,500 square feet,.

However, during the proceedings, the Petitioner failed to identify any specific statute or provision within the community documents that the Respondent had violated,. Instead, she argued that the Respondent had failed to adhere to a contract and did not act in good faith.

**Key Legal Issues**
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) identified two primary legal deficiencies in the Petitioner's case:

1. **Standing:** It was undisputed that the Petitioner did not own Lot 20 at the time she filed the petition with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. Consequently, she did not qualify as an "owner" under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(B) and lacked the legal standing to be a party to the administrative hearing.
2. **Subject Matter Jurisdiction:** The Tribunal found that the Petitioner's claims were contractual in nature rather than based on a violation of Title 33, Chapter 16, or planned community documents. The ALJ ruled that adjudicating contractual disputes and allegations of bad faith falls outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 41-2198(3).

**Outcome and Final Decision**
Based on the lack of standing and the lack of jurisdiction over the contractual issues raised, the ALJ granted the Respondent’s First Amended Motion to Dismiss on October 28, 2011,.

Following the decision, the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety had until December 2, 2011, to accept, reject, or modify the ruling. Because no action was taken by the Department, the ALJ's decision was certified as the final administrative decision on December 6, 2011,. The Petitioner retained the right to request a rehearing or appeal to the Superior Court,.

Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Kathy Wozniak (Petitioner)

Respondent Side

  • Karen L. Karr (Attorney)
    Bisgaard & Smith LLP; Lewis Brisbois
    Attorney for Respondent

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Cliff J. Vanell (Director)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Signed Certification of Decision
  • Gene Palma (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
  • Beth Soliere (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed in transmission details

Riem, Karl -v- Rancho Antigua Condos

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089009-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-12-19
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome yes
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Karl Riem Counsel
Respondent Rancho Antigua Condos Counsel

Alleged Violations

None

Outcome Summary

The Respondent failed to respond to the petition and a Notice of Default was entered. The Administrative Law Judge ruled the Respondent in default and designated the Petitioner as the prevailing party. However, because the Petitioner failed to cite specific statutory provisions or governing documents in the petition, the ALJ could not award substantive relief beyond the reimbursement of the $550.00 filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Default Judgment / Failure to Cite Provisions

Respondent failed to submit a response to the Petition and was held in default. However, Petitioner did not cite any provision of A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16 or any provision of any planned community or condominium document allegedly violated. Consequently, relief was limited to the filing fee.

Orders: Respondent is in default and Petitioner is the prevailing party. Respondent ordered to reimburse Petitioner's filing fee.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Decision Documents

08F-H089009-BFS Decision – 204670.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:59 (54.6 KB)





Briefing Doc – 08F-H089009-BFS


Administrative Ruling: Riem vs. Rancho Antigua Condos

Executive Summary

On December 19, 2008, Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal issued an Order of Default and Award of Filing Fee in the matter of Karl Riem vs. Rancho Antigua Condos (No. 08F-H089009-BFS). The ruling followed a Notice of Default entered on October 31, 2008, after the Respondent failed to answer the Petitioner’s allegations.

While the Respondent was found to be in default and the Petitioner was named the prevailing party, the relief granted was strictly limited to the reimbursement of the $550.00 filing fee. This limitation was due to a significant deficiency in the Petition: the failure to cite specific statutory violations or governing document breaches. Consequently, while the allegations were deemed admitted by statute, they did not provide a legal basis for substantive relief beyond the recovery of costs.

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Case Overview

The following table summarizes the administrative and legal context of the proceedings:

Category

Details

Case Number

08F-H089009-BFS

Petitioner

Karl Riem

Respondent

Rancho Antigua Condos

Presiding Official

Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal

Administrative Body

Office of Administrative Hearings (Phoenix, Arizona)

Overseeing Agency

Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety

Date of Order

December 19, 2008

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Procedural History and Findings

The Entry of Default

The matter was initiated via a Petition submitted by Karl Riem to the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. The Respondent, Rancho Antigua Condos, failed to submit a response to the Petition. Under the administrative rules governing the Department:

• On October 31, 2008, the Director of the Department entered a Notice of Default based on the Respondent’s failure to answer.

• Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D), in the event of a default, the allegations contained within a Petition can be “deemed admitted.”

Deficiencies in the Petition

Despite the Respondent’s default, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) identified critical technical omissions in the Petitioner’s filing. The Source Context notes that the Petitioner “did not cite any provision of A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16 or a provision of any planned community or condominium document that was allegedly violated by Respondent.”

Because the Petition lacked citations to specific laws (Chapters 9 or 16 of Title 33) or specific internal condominium documents, the ALJ determined that substantive relief could not be justified, even though the allegations were technically admitted through the default process.

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Final Order and Award

Based on the findings of the Office of Administrative Hearings, the following mandates were issued:

1. Prevailing Party Designation: The Respondent is officially in default, and the Petitioner, Karl Riem, is designated as the prevailing party.

2. Reimbursement of Filing Fee: The Respondent is ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for the filing fee in the amount of $550.00.

3. Compliance Timeline: The Respondent must complete this reimbursement within forty (40) days of the date of the Order (December 19, 2008).

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Distribution and Service

The original Order was transmitted to the following parties:

Robert Barger, Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety (Attn: Debra Blake).

Karl Riem (Petitioner) at his Scottsdale, Arizona residence.

Rancho Antigua Condos (Respondent) via Cuellar Realty Services in Phoenix, Arizona.






Study Guide – 08F-H089009-BFS


Study Guide: Administrative Hearing Case No. 08F-H089009-BFS

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative legal proceedings between Karl Riem and Rancho Antigua Condos. It is designed to facilitate an understanding of the procedural outcomes and legal limitations inherent in default judgments within the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety.

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Part 1: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided source text.

1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this specific case?

2. What was the primary reason for the Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety to enter a Notice of Default?

3. Why was the Petitioner unable to receive any relief other than the reimbursement of his filing fee?

4. According to A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D), what happens to the allegations in a Petition when a default occurs?

5. What specific amount was the Respondent ordered to pay the Petitioner, and for what purpose?

6. Who was the Administrative Law Judge who presided over this matter and issued the order?

7. What is the deadline for the Respondent to fulfill the order for reimbursement?

8. Which two chapters of A.R.S. Title 33 were specifically mentioned as not being cited in the Petition?

9. Where is the Office of Administrative Hearings located, according to the document?

10. To whom was the original copy of the order transmitted on behalf of the Department of Fire Building and Life Safety?

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Part 2: Answer Key

1. Who are the Petitioner and the Respondent in this specific case? The Petitioner is Karl Riem and the Respondent is Rancho Antigua Condos. The case was filed under the number 08F-H089009-BFS.

2. What was the primary reason for the Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety to enter a Notice of Default? The Notice of Default was entered because the Respondent failed to submit a response to the Petition. This notice was officially entered on October 31, 2008.

3. Why was the Petitioner unable to receive any relief other than the reimbursement of his filing fee? The Petitioner did not cite any specific violations of A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16, or any specific community or condominium documents. Because no specific legal violations were alleged, the judge could not award further relief beyond the filing fee.

4. According to A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D), what happens to the allegations in a Petition when a default occurs? Under this statute, the allegations contained in the Petition can be “deemed admitted” in the event of a default. This means the facts of the petition are accepted as true because they were not contested.

5. What specific amount was the Respondent ordered to pay the Petitioner, and for what purpose? The Respondent was ordered to pay $550.00 to the Petitioner. This payment was specifically for the reimbursement of the Petitioner’s filing fee.

6. Who was the Administrative Law Judge who presided over this matter and issued the order? The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) was Lewis D. Kowal. He signed the Order of Default and Award of Filing Fee on December 19, 2008.

7. What is the deadline for the Respondent to fulfill the order for reimbursement? The Respondent is required to reimburse the Petitioner within forty days of the date of the Order. The Order was issued and signed on December 19, 2008.

8. Which two chapters of A.R.S. Title 33 were specifically mentioned as not being cited in the Petition? The document specifically notes that the Petitioner failed to cite provisions from A.R.S. Title 33, Chapters 9 or 16. These chapters generally govern community or condominium legalities.

9. Where is the Office of Administrative Hearings located, according to the document? The Office of Administrative Hearings is located at 1400 West Washington, Suite 101, Phoenix, Arizona 85007. Their listed phone number is (602) 542-9826.

10. To whom was the original copy of the order transmitted on behalf of the Department of Fire Building and Life Safety? The original was transmitted to Robert Barger, the Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety. The transmission was marked to the attention of Debra Blake.

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Part 3: Essay Format Questions

Instructions: Use the information from the source text to develop detailed responses to the following prompts.

1. The Importance of Statutory Citations: Analyze how Karl Riem’s failure to cite specific provisions of A.R.S. Title 33 or condominium documents affected the outcome of the case. Discuss why a “prevailing party” might still fail to receive substantive relief.

2. The Role of Default in Administrative Law: Explain the procedural implications of a Respondent failing to answer a Petition. Detail how the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety handles such failures and the legal assumptions made under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D).

3. Administrative Law Judge Authority: Discuss the role of Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal in this case. Evaluate his decision to grant a default judgment while simultaneously limiting the award to the filing fee.

4. Timeline and Compliance: Trace the timeline of this case from the Notice of Default to the final order. Explain the significance of the 40-day reimbursement window provided to the Respondent.

5. Service and Notification: Describe the administrative process for transmitting orders and notices as evidenced by the distribution list at the end of the document. Identify the key stakeholders involved in receiving the legal results.

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Part 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S.

Arizona Revised Statutes; the codified laws of the state of Arizona.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A presiding officer who hears and decides cases for an administrative agency, such as the Office of Administrative Hearings.

Default

A failure to perform a legal duty or respond to a legal proceeding, such as failing to submit a response to a Petition.

Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety

The state department responsible for oversight and enforcement related to fire safety, building codes, and community/condominium disputes.

Filing Fee

The administrative cost paid by a Petitioner to initiate a case; in this matter, the fee was $550.00.

Notice of Default

A formal document entered by a director or judge noting that a party has failed to respond to a legal action within the required timeframe.

A formal instruction or decision issued by a judge (in this case, Lewis D. Kowal) that mandates specific actions or determines the outcome of a case.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition (Karl Riem).

Prevailing Party

The party in a legal proceeding that is deemed successful; despite receiving limited relief, the Petitioner was named the prevailing party due to the Respondent’s default.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or legal action is filed (Rancho Antigua Condos).

Source Fidelity Note: This study guide is based entirely on excerpts from the “204670.pdf” document regarding Karl Riem vs. Rancho Antigua Condos.






Blog Post – 08F-H089009-BFS


Why “Winning” Your Case Isn’t Always a Victory: Lessons from an Administrative Default

1. Introduction: The High Cost of a Quiet Courtroom

In the pursuit of legal redress, many litigants imagine the “gold standard” of outcomes: a scenario where the opposition fails to respond, leading to an automatic victory. From a strategic perspective, however, a procedural win is often a hollow shell if it lacks a substantive foundation. The case of Karl Riem vs. Rancho Antigua Condos (No. 08F-H089009-BFS) serves as a stark reminder that even when the other side remains silent, the burden of pleading remains with the petitioner.

Processed through the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety, this case illustrates how a failure to establish a statutory nexus can turn a “win” into a net loss of time and resources. For the petitioner, the “high cost” was not just the filing fee, but the forfeiture of any meaningful relief due to a fundamental failure of pleading.

2. The Default Trap: When Silence is an Admission, but Not a Guarantee

The procedural timeline of this matter began with a significant tactical advantage for the Petitioner. On October 31, 2008, the Director of the Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety entered a Notice of Default against the Respondent, Rancho Antigua Condos, following their failure to submit a formal response to the Petition.

Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.01(D), a default allows the Administrative Tribunal to deem the factual allegations in the petition as admitted. While this technically designates the Petitioner as the “prevailing party,” a Legal Insights Strategist must recognize this as a double-edged sword. Admitting the facts does not automatically equate to proving a legal violation that warrants a specific remedy. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) is still bound by the statutory framework of the initial filing.

The final Order emphasizes this distinction:

3. The Citation Gap: Why Specificity is the Soul of Legal Relief

The primary obstacle in Riem vs. Rancho Antigua Condos was a critical “citation gap.” Despite the Respondent’s default, ALJ Lewis D. Kowal noted that the Petitioner failed to state a claim upon which substantive relief could be granted. Specifically, the Petitioner did not cite any provision of A.R.S. Title 33, Chapter 9 (the Arizona Condominium Act) or Chapter 16 (the Planned Communities Act), nor any specific governing documents of the condominium association.

In Arizona property law, these chapters function as the “constitutions” of dispute resolution. Without anchoring allegations to these statutes, a Petitioner fails to establish the necessary statutory basis for a cause of action. The OAH cannot manufacture a legal theory or invent a remedy that the Petitioner has not explicitly requested through proper statutory citation.

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4. The $550 Victory: A Breakdown of the Final Award

The final Order, issued on December 19, 2008, resulted in what can only be described as a pyrrhic victory. Although the Petitioner “won” the case, the lack of substantive legal grounding meant that the only recovery permitted was the restitution of the costs required to initiate the hearing.

Summary of the Orders issued by ALJ Lewis D. Kowal:

Notice of Default: Confirmed the Respondent’s default status based on the Director’s October 31 entry.

Prevailing Party Designation: Officially named Karl Riem as the prevailing party in the administrative matter.

Reimbursement Window: Ordered the Respondent to reimburse the Petitioner’s $550.00 filing fee within forty days of the December 19, 2008, Order.

From an analytical standpoint, the Petitioner ended the dispute in the exact financial position they occupied before the filing, minus the significant “opportunity cost” of the time invested in the litigation.

5. Conclusion: The Importance of a Solid Foundation

The Riem case serves as a masterclass in the importance of preparation and legal precision. In administrative law, the tribunal’s power is not broad; it is specific and tethered to the law. A “win” by default does not relieve a petitioner of the duty to build a solid evidentiary and legal foundation. Simply identifying a grievance is insufficient; one must bridge the gap between a perceived wrong and the specific legislative acts—such as the Arizona Condominium and Planned Communities Acts—that govern it.

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Ponder This


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Karl Riem (petitioner)

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety

Holzman, Andrew -v- Emerald Springs Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089003-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-10-28
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Andrew Holzman Counsel
Respondent Emerald Springs Homeowners Association Counsel Jason Smith

Alleged Violations

CC&R Sec. 3.16(1); CC&R Sec. 3.27

Outcome Summary

The ALJ ruled in favor of the Respondent (HOA), finding that the Board acted appropriately in approving a 5-foot pool fence despite CC&R restrictions limiting height to 4 feet. The ALJ concluded that the HOA is required to comply with the County ordinance mandating a minimum 5-foot height for pool fences, which overrides the conflicting CC&R provision.

Why this result: Petitioner failed to prevail because the CC&R provisions sought to be enforced were contrary to a County ordinance requiring higher fences for safety.

Key Issues & Findings

Violation of fence height restrictions regarding neighbor's pool fence

Petitioner alleged the HOA violated CC&Rs by approving a neighbor's plan for a pool fence at least 5 feet in height, whereas the CC&Rs restrict fence height to 4 feet. The HOA argued it must comply with a County ordinance requiring pool fences to be a minimum of 5 feet.

Orders: No action is required of the Association with respect to the Petition.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Decision Documents

08F-H089003-BFS Decision – 201322.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:42 (95.3 KB)





Briefing Doc – 08F-H089003-BFS


Administrative Law Judge Decision: Holzman v. Emerald Springs Homeowners Association

Executive Summary

The dispute in Andrew Holzman v. Emerald Springs Homeowners Association (No. 08F-H089003-BFS) centers on the conflict between private residential restrictive covenants and municipal safety ordinances. The Petitioner, Andrew Holzman, alleged that the Emerald Springs Homeowners Association (the “Association”) violated its Amended and Restated Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs) by approving a neighbor’s pool fence that exceeded height limitations.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that while the Association’s CC&Rs mandate a maximum fence height of four feet for certain areas, La Paz County ordinance requires pool safety fences to be a minimum of five feet high. The ruling concludes that an association cannot be compelled to enforce CC&Rs that conflict with the law. Consequently, the Association’s approval of the five-foot fence was upheld as a necessary compliance with county safety requirements.

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Case Overview and Parties

Location

Andrew Holzman

Petitioner

Lot 24, Emerald Springs

Emerald Springs HOA

Respondent

Phoenix/La Paz County, Arizona

Waymen & Carolyn Dekens

Involved Third Party

Lot 23, Emerald Springs (Neighbors)

The dispute arose when the owners of Lot 23 proposed extensive landscaping, including a pool with waterfalls and a safety fence. Mr. Holzman, residing on the adjacent Lot 24, challenged the approval on the grounds that the fence would obstruct his view of the Colorado River.

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Alleged Violations of CC&Rs

The Petitioner cited two specific sections of the Association’s CC&Rs as the basis for his complaint:

1. Section 3.16(1): Stipulates that fences and walls starting 130 feet from the front property line and extending toward the river may not exceed four feet in height and must be of an “open type face.”

2. Section 3.27: Mandates that back and front yard fences must not exceed four feet in height (open type), while side yard fences must not exceed six feet (constructed of wood, concrete block, or similar materials).

The core of the Petitioner’s argument was that the Association approved a fence for Lot 23 that reached at least five feet in height, thereby violating the four-foot restriction in Section 3.16(1) and the back yard provisions of Section 3.27.

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Findings of Fact

Board Approval and Meeting Discrepancies

On June 21, 2008, the Association Board met to discuss the proposed pool for Lot 23. The nature of this meeting and the subsequent approval were subjects of significant testimony:

Petitioner’s View: Mr. Holzman, attending telephonically, contended that the Board approved the construction of the pool and fence despite his concerns about view obstruction.

Association’s View: The Board President testified that the Board only approved the “concept” of the pool, conditioned on future engineering surveys and landscaping plans. They argued no formal written plans were approved during that session.

Official Record: Meeting minutes and subsequent emails from the Board Secretary (Judy Jerrels) indicated that plans were indeed “passed around” and “conditionally approved,” with the understanding that revised plans would follow.

The Conflict of Regulations

The ALJ found the following facts critical to the final determination:

County Requirements: It was undisputed that La Paz County requires pool fences to be a minimum of five feet in height.

Board Recognition: During the June 21 meeting, the Board acknowledged the County’s five-foot requirement and received a legal opinion stating that CC&Rs do not prohibit pools on community lots.

ALJ Determination: The ALJ concluded that the Board did approve a plan involving a fence of at least five feet in height to ensure compliance with the County ordinance.

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Legal Analysis and Conclusions of Law

Supremacy of Law over CC&Rs

The primary legal conclusion of the ALJ is that municipal ordinances take precedence over private restrictive covenants when the two are in direct conflict.

Compliance Necessity: The Association is legally required to comply with County ordinances. It cannot be compelled by its members to enforce CC&R provisions (the four-foot height limit) that would cause a homeowner to violate safety laws (the five-foot pool fence requirement).

Appropriateness of Action: Because the Board acted to align its approval with legal mandates, its decision was deemed appropriate.

Prevailing Party and Attorney Fees

Despite the ruling in favor of the Association, the Respondent’s request for attorney fees was denied based on the following:

Statutory Limitations: Under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, attorney fees are awardable in an “action.” However, citing Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., the ALJ noted that an administrative proceeding does not constitute an “action” for the purposes of this statute.

Lack of Governing Authority: The Association failed to cite any specific provision in its own governing documents that would allow for the recovery of fees or costs in this type of administrative proceeding.

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Final Order

The Administrative Law Judge ordered that no action is required of the Association regarding Mr. Holzman’s Petition. The decision was finalized on October 28, 2008, upholding the Association’s right to prioritize county safety ordinances over the height restrictions found in the CC&Rs.






Study Guide – 08F-H089003-BFS


Study Guide: Holzman v. Emerald Springs Homeowners Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law case between Andrew Holzman and the Emerald Springs Homeowners Association. It explores the legal conflict between community-specific Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) and municipal ordinances, specifically regarding property improvements and safety requirements.

Short-Answer Quiz

1. What was the primary legal conflict at the center of this dispute?

2. Identify the specific sections of the Emerald Springs CC&Rs that the Petitioner alleged were being violated.

3. What were the specific height and material requirements for fences as outlined in Section 3.27 of the CC&Rs?

4. Why did Andrew Holzman object to the proposed fence on Lot 23?

5. How did the Board meeting on June 21, 2008, contribute to the dispute?

6. What was the legal justification for the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruling in favor of the Homeowners Association regarding fence height?

7. Describe the conflicting testimony regarding the existence of “plans” for the pool on Lot 23.

8. What role did Judy Jerrels’ emails play in the Board’s defense?

9. On what grounds did the ALJ deny the Respondent’s request for attorney fees?

10. What are the requirements for a party to appeal this final administrative decision?

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Quiz Answer Key

Question

Answer

The conflict involved a discrepancy between the Emerald Springs CC&Rs, which limited certain fences to 4 feet in height, and a La Paz County ordinance, which mandated that pool fences be a minimum of 5 feet in height. The case questioned whether an HOA could be forced to follow its own rules when they contradict local law.

The Petitioner alleged violations of Section 3.16(1), regarding fence heights and types for properties extending toward the river, and Section 3.27, which governs the height and construction materials for back, front, and side yard fences.

Under Section 3.27, back and front yard fences were restricted to a 4-foot maximum height and required an “open type” design. Side yard fences were permitted to be up to 6 feet in height and could be constructed of wood, concrete block, or similar materials.

Holzman, residing on Lot 24, was concerned that a 5-foot fence installed by his neighbors on Lot 23 would obstruct his view of the Colorado River. He also claimed the neighbors had previously agreed to move the pool and eventually remove the fence.

During this meeting, the Board conditionally approved the concept of a pool for Lot 23. While the Petitioner argued this constituted a formal approval of a fence violating CC&Rs, the Board maintained it was a conceptual approval contingent on future engineering surveys and updated landscaping plans.

The ALJ concluded that the Association cannot be compelled to abide by CC&R provisions that are contrary to law. Because the County ordinance required a 5-foot minimum for pool safety, that law superseded the 4-foot restriction in the CC&Rs.

Holzman contended that by conditionally approving “plans,” the Board had authorized specific construction. Conversely, Board President Sherri Mehrver testified that no formal written plans or engineering surveys had been submitted yet, and the “plans” mentioned in minutes referred only to a diagram.

Jerrels’ emails from July 17, 2008, suggested that revised plans were still expected from the owners of Lot 23. This supported the Board’s argument that they had not yet given final approval to specific construction details, such as side yard fencing materials or exact height.

The ALJ ruled that an administrative proceeding is not considered an “action” under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which is the statute used to award attorney fees. Additionally, the Association failed to provide any provision within its own governing documents that allowed for such an award in this type of proceeding.

A party must commence an action to review the decision by filing a complaint within 35 days of the decision being served. Service is considered complete upon personal delivery or five days after the decision is mailed to the party’s last known address.

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Essay Questions

1. The Supremacy of Law over Private Agreements: Analyze the ALJ’s decision that Emerald Springs could not be compelled to follow CC&Rs that contradict County ordinances. Discuss the implications this has for homeowners associations when drafting and enforcing private community standards.

2. Evidentiary Interpretation of Board Minutes: Evaluate the weight given to the June 21, 2008, Board minutes. How did the phrasing “conditionally approved plans” create ambiguity, and how did the ALJ reconcile this phrasing with the testimony of Ms. Mehrver and the emails of Ms. Jerrels?

3. Property Rights and View Obstruction: Andrew Holzman’s primary grievance was the obstruction of his river view. Discuss the balance between an individual’s aesthetic enjoyment of their property and the legal necessity of safety regulations (like pool fencing) as presented in the case.

4. Administrative vs. Judicial Proceedings: Using the ALJ’s ruling on attorney fees as a baseline, compare the legal nature of an administrative hearing at the Office of Administrative Hearings to a standard civil “action.” Why does the law distinguish between the two regarding the recovery of legal costs?

5. The Role of Conditional Approval in Governance: The Board approved the “concept” of the Dekens’ pool while awaiting further surveys. Discuss the risks and benefits of HOAs granting conditional approvals before receiving finalized engineering and landscaping plans.

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Glossary of Key Terms

A.R.S. § 12-341.01: A specific Arizona Revised Statute regarding the recovery of attorney fees; the ALJ ruled this did not apply to administrative hearings.

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ): An official who presides over administrative hearings, such as Lewis D. Kowal in this matter, to adjudicate disputes involving state agency actions or regulated communities.

CC&Rs (Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions): The governing documents of a homeowners association that dictate the rules for property use, maintenance, and architectural standards within the community.

Conditional Approval: A status granted to a project or plan that is accepted in principle but requires further documentation, surveys, or modifications before final authorization.

Lot 23: The property owned by the Dekens, where the proposed pool and fence were to be installed.

Lot 24: The property owned by the Petitioner, Andrew Holzman, located adjacent to Lot 23.

Open Type Face Fencing: A style of fencing required by the Emerald Springs CC&Rs for certain areas to preserve views; contrasted with solid walls or blocks.

Ordinance: A law or regulation enacted by a municipal body, such as La Paz County, which in this case mandated specific heights for pool safety fences.

Petitioner: The party who initiates the legal proceeding or appeal; in this case, Andrew Holzman.

Respondent: The party against whom a legal petition is filed; in this case, the Emerald Springs Homeowners Association.






Blog Post – 08F-H089003-BFS


When Rules Collide: 3 Surprising Lessons from the Emerald Springs HOA Legal Battle

I. Introduction: The Battle for the View

In the world of deed-restricted communities, homeowners often pay a significant premium for aesthetic certainty. Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are designed to offer a guarantee that a neighbor’s renovation will not infringe upon a skyline or a river view. However, a fundamental tension exists between these private restrictive covenants and the police power of local government.

This conflict reached a boiling point in Holzman v. Emerald Springs Homeowners Association, a dispute that began when a homeowner sought to protect his view of the Colorado River from a neighbor’s proposed pool and safety fence. The case, heard before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), provides a sobering look at the hierarchy of legal authority and the procedural traps that can leave an association vulnerable.

II. Takeaway 1: The Supremacy of Municipal Safety Ordinances

The central dispute in Holzman involved a direct contradiction between the Emerald Springs CC&Rs and La Paz County law. Sections 3.16 and 3.27 of the community’s governing documents were explicit: fences located 130 feet from the front property line and extending toward the river were capped at four feet in height. These provisions were intended to maintain a “step-down” effect to preserve the scenic corridor.

However, the owners of Lot 23 proposed a pool, and La Paz County ordinance required all pool enclosures to be a minimum of five feet in height for public safety. The ALJ determined that when a private contract (the CC&Rs) and a government safety ordinance collide, the ordinance prevails.

This creates a profound “Catch-22” for both associations and homeowners. A buyer may invest in a property specifically for its contractually protected views, yet that property right can be effectively extinguished by a change in local safety codes. The HOA, meanwhile, finds itself in the ironic position of being legally compelled to allow—and even facilitate—a violation of its own governing contract.

III. Takeaway 2: The Power of Admissions and Informal Minutes

The Holzman case underscores the danger of informal board governance and the legal weight of internal communications. During the June 21, 2008, Board meeting, the association discussed the pool project on Lot 23. The Petitioner, Andrew Holzman, attended telephonically and was unable to see the visual aids presented.

While the Association later argued that it had only approved a “concept” and that no formal plans were submitted, evidence suggested otherwise. A July 17, 2008, email from the Association’s secretary, Judy Jerrels, proved decisive. In the email, Jerrels admitted that “plans were passed around at the meeting for the attending membership to view.” This admission undermined the Board’s defense and led the ALJ to conclude that a “conditional approval” had indeed occurred.

For HOA boards, the lesson is clear: any recognition of a project in official minutes or officer correspondence can be construed as a formal action. The distinction between a “concept” and a “plan” is often lost if the administrative record shows the Board allowed the project to move forward.

IV. Takeaway 3: Winning the Merits Does Not Guarantee Legal Fees

Perhaps the most frustrating outcome for the Emerald Springs HOA was the financial resolution. Although the Association successfully defended its decision to follow county law, and the ALJ ruled that the Petitioner was not the prevailing party, the HOA was denied the recovery of its attorney fees.

The ALJ cited a critical distinction in Arizona law regarding fee shifting. Under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, fees are generally awardable to the prevailing party in “actions” arising out of contract. However, citing Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., the ALJ noted that an administrative hearing is not an “action” for the purposes of that statute.

To avoid being left with a significant legal bill even after a victory, associations must ensure their governing documents are specifically tailored for administrative forums. To maximize the chances of fee recovery, associations should prioritize:

Explicit Provision for Administrative Forums: CC&Rs should explicitly state that the prevailing party is entitled to fees in any “legal proceeding, including administrative hearings.”

Broad Definition of “Action”: Governing documents should define “action” or “litigation” to encompass Department of Real Estate or other administrative adjudications.

Specific Statutory Citations: Ensure that any demand for fees references both contract law and the specific language of the association’s bylaws.

V. Conclusion: The Reality of Deed-Restricted Living

The Holzman v. Emerald Springs decision serves as a clinical reminder that HOA governance does not exist in a vacuum. While CC&Rs are binding private contracts that provide a sense of community control, they remain subordinate to the requirements of public safety and local government.

Ultimately, the case highlights the fragility of aesthetic protections when they meet the “police power” of the state. It forces a difficult realization for every resident of a common-interest community: If your community’s safety and your community’s aesthetics are in direct conflict, which one would you expect the law to choose? As the Emerald Springs battle demonstrates, public safety and municipal law will prevail every time.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Andrew Holzman (petitioner)
    Owner of Lot 24; appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Jason E. Smith (HOA attorney)
    Carpenter, Hazlewood, Delgado & Wood, PLC
    Represented Emerald Springs Homeowners Association
  • Sherri Mehrver (witness)
    Emerald Springs Homeowners Association
    Former Board President; testified at hearing
  • Judy Jerrels (board member)
    Emerald Springs Homeowners Association
    Secretary of the Association

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Waymen Dekens (neighbor)
    Owner of Lot 23; neighbor proposing the pool/fence
  • Carolyn Dekens (neighbor)
    Owner of Lot 23; neighbor proposing the pool/fence
  • Robert Barger (agency official)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Recipient of decision copy
  • Debra Blake (agency official)
    Department of Fire Building and Life Safety
    Recipient of decision copy; Attention line

James, Lon vs. Corte Bella Country Club Association

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H089001-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-09-25
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $500.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Lon James Counsel
Respondent Corte Bella Country Club Association Counsel Angela Potts

Alleged Violations

Section 3.14
A.R.S. § 33-1804

Outcome Summary

The Petition was dismissed. The claim regarding the Bylaws was precluded by mandatory ADR provisions in the CC&Rs. The claim regarding the open meeting statute was dismissed because an in camera review proved the closed meeting fell within valid statutory exceptions (personnel matters).

Why this result: Mandatory ADR clause in governing documents and statutory exceptions for closed meetings applied.

Key Issues & Findings

Allegation of Violation of Sec 3.14 of Bylaws

Petitioner alleged that the Board held a closed meeting to discuss and vote on a proposal to realign the Board, refusing homeowner permission to attend.

Orders: Dismissed based on requirement of Article XVII of CC&Rs that requires such disputes be resolved by alternative dispute resolution.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Bylaws Section 3.14
  • CC&Rs Article XVII

Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (open meeting)

Petitioner alleged the May 5, 2008 closed meeting violated open meeting statutes.

Orders: Dismissed; the meeting fell within statutory exceptions.

Filing fee: $0.00, Fee refunded: No

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1804

Decision Documents

08F-H089001-BFS Decision – 199085.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:23:36 (96.0 KB)





Briefing Doc – 08F-H089001-BFS


Administrative Law Judge Decision: Lon James v. Corte Bella Country Club Association

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative law decision (Case No. 08F-H089001-BFS) regarding a dispute between Lon James (Petitioner) and the Corte Bella Country Club Association (Respondent). The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent violated community bylaws and Arizona state law by holding a closed Board meeting on May 5, 2008.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Lewis D. Kowal, dismissed the petition in its entirety. The ruling was based on two primary factors:

1. Jurisdictional Preclusion: Claims regarding Bylaw violations were subject to mandatory Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as per the community’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs).

2. Statutory Compliance: An in camera review of evidence determined that the closed meeting held by the Board fell within the legal exceptions provided by A.R.S. § 33-1804, specifically regarding personnel matters and confidential information.

Case Overview and Procedural History

The Petitioner filed a petition with the Arizona Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety under A.R.S. 41-2198.01 (B). The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent held a closed meeting to vote on board realignment, refusing homeowner participation in violation of Community Bylaws (Section 3.14) and A.R.S. § 33-1804.

Case Detail

Information

Case Number

08F-H089001-BFS

Petitioner

Lon James

Respondent

Corte Bella Country Club Association

Hearing Date

September 16, 2008

Presiding Judge

Lewis D. Kowal

Final Action

Petition Dismissed

Analysis of Legal Issues and Rulings

1. Alleged Violation of Section 3.14 of Community Bylaws

The Petitioner argued that the Respondent failed to adhere to the open meeting requirements established in the community’s own bylaws.

Respondent’s Defense: The Respondent moved for dismissal of this claim, citing Article XVII of the CC&Rs, which mandates that disputes relating to the interpretation or enforcement of governing documents must be resolved via ADR.

Petitioner’s Counter-Argument: The Petitioner contended that ADR provisions only applied to the design or construction of property improvements.

Judicial Conclusion: The ALJ found that the ADR provisions should be read in the “disjunctive.” The provisions apply not only to construction improvements but also to claims arising from the “interpretation, application or enforcement” of the Respondent’s governing documents. Consequently, the claim was precluded from the administrative hearing.

2. Alleged Violation of A.R.S. § 33-1804 (Open Meeting Law)

The core of the dispute involved a meeting held on May 5, 2008, from which homeowners were excluded.

Legal Exceptions: Under A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), boards may hold closed meetings for specific reasons. The Respondent cited the following exceptions:

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(2): Pending or contemplated litigation.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(3): Personal, health, or financial information about an individual member, employee, or contractor.

A.R.S. § 33-1804(A)(4): Matters relating to job performance, compensation, or specific complaints against an individual employee or contractor.

3. Evidentiary Review and Methodology

To determine if the closed meeting was legal without disclosing confidential information to the Petitioner, the ALJ utilized an in camera review process.

Review of Documents: The Respondent submitted eleven documents under seal. The Respondent argued that presenting this evidence in open court would force the disclosure of information they were legally required to keep confidential.

Judicial Precedent: The ALJ cited Griffis v. Pinal County and Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. (2006) as guidance for performing an in camera review to balance the principles of public hearings against the necessity of preserving confidentiality.

Findings: Following the review, the ALJ informed the parties that the meeting was “properly held as a closed meeting” because the purpose fell within at least one of the statutory exceptions.

Petitioner’s Offer of Proof: The Petitioner was allowed to make an “Offer of Proof” regarding the evidence he would have presented. The ALJ noted that some of the information in the Petitioner’s own offer actually supported the conclusion that the meeting involved a personnel matter, which is a permissible reason for a closed session.

Final Determinations and Financial Rulings

Dismissal of the Petition

The ALJ issued a ruling from the bench dismissing the petition. The Petitioner was not considered the prevailing party and was therefore denied reimbursement for his filing fee.

Request for Attorneys’ Fees

In its response to the petition, the Respondent requested an award for attorneys’ fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. The ALJ denied this request based on the following:

Definition of “Action”: Citing Semple v. Tri-City Drywall, Inc., the ALJ noted that an administrative proceeding is not considered an “action” in the context of A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Governing Documents: The Respondent failed to cite any specific provision within its own governing documents that would provide for an award of fees in such a proceeding.

Final Order

The petition was dismissed. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-2198.04(A), this order constitutes the final administrative decision. While it is not subject to a request for rehearing, it may be appealed to the Superior Court within thirty-five days of service.






Study Guide – 08F-H089001-BFS


Administrative Law Study Guide: Lon James v. Corte Bella Country Club Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive review of the administrative law proceedings between Petitioner Lon James and Respondent Corte Bella Country Club Association (No. 08F-H089001-BFS). It examines the legal interpretations of association bylaws, open meeting statutes, and the procedural mechanisms used by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to resolve disputes within a country club association.

Section 1: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions in two to three sentences based on the provided source context.

1. What primary allegation did the Petitioner make regarding the board meeting held on May 5, 2008?

2. On what grounds did the Administrative Law Judge preclude the claim regarding the violation of Section 3.14 of the Bylaws?

3. How did the Respondent’s interpretation of Article XVII of the CC&Rs differ from the Petitioner’s interpretation?

4. What was the Respondent’s justification for requesting an “in camera review” of specific documents?

5. Which Arizona Supreme Court case did the ALJ use as guidance for conducting an in camera review, and what was that case about?

6. According to A.R.S. § 33-1804(A), what are the three specific exceptions cited by the Respondent for holding a closed meeting?

7. What is an “Offer of Proof,” and how did the Petitioner’s offer impact the ALJ’s decision?

8. Why did the ALJ determine that the Respondent was not entitled to an award for attorney’s fees?

9. What is the finality status of the Order issued by ALJ Lewis D. Kowal, and is it subject to a rehearing?

10. What are the specific requirements and timelines for a party wishing to appeal this final administrative decision?

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Section 2: Answer Key

1. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondent held a closed Board Meeting to discuss and vote on a proposal to realign the Board. He argued that refusing homeowners permission to attend or participate violated Community Bylaws 3.14 and A.R.S. § 33-1804.

2. The ALJ precluded this claim because Article XVII of the Association’s Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) requires such disputes to be resolved by alternative dispute resolution (ADR). This mandatory provision barred the claim from being adjudicated in the current administrative hearing.

3. The Petitioner argued that the ADR provisions in Article XVII only related to the design or construction of property improvements. The Respondent argued the provisions should be read disjunctively, applying to any claims relating to the interpretation, application, or enforcement of the governing documents.

4. The Respondent asserted that the evidence justifying the closed meeting was inextricably intertwined with confidential information that could not be disclosed publicly. They requested an in camera review so the ALJ could verify the meeting’s legality without exposing protected data.

5. The ALJ cited Griffis v. Pinal County and Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. (2006). In that case, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for an in camera review to determine if personal emails on a government system were considered public records.

6. The exceptions included: (2) pending or contemplated litigation; (3) personal, health, or financial information about an individual member, employee, or contractor; and (4) matters relating to job performance, compensation, or specific complaints against an individual employee.

7. An Offer of Proof is a summary of testimonial and documentary evidence a party would have presented; in this case, the Petitioner’s offer actually supported the conclusion that the meeting fell under a personnel matter exception. It did not change the ALJ’s finding that the closed meeting was held in accordance with the law.

8. The ALJ ruled that an administrative proceeding is not an “action” under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, which is necessary for attorney’s fees to be awardable. Furthermore, the Respondent failed to cite any provision in its own governing documents that provided for such an award in this type of proceeding.

9. The Order is the final administrative decision and is not subject to a request for rehearing under A.R.S. § 41-2198.04(A). It is considered enforceable through contempt of court proceedings.

10. A party may appeal by filing a complaint within thirty-five days of the date the decision was served. Service is considered complete upon personal delivery or five days after the final decision is mailed to the party’s last known address.

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Section 3: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the case details to provide in-depth analysis for the following prompts.

1. Mandatory Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): Analyze the significance of the ALJ’s decision to dismiss the Bylaw violation claim based on the CC&Rs. Discuss how the interpretation of “disjunctive” language in governing documents can impact a member’s right to an administrative hearing versus mandatory mediation or arbitration.

2. Transparency vs. Confidentiality: Evaluate the tension between the “open meeting” requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1804 and the exceptions allowed for board meetings. Discuss whether the in camera review process is an effective compromise for protecting individual privacy while ensuring association accountability.

3. The Role of Judicial Precedent in Administrative Law: Examine how the ALJ utilized Griffis v. Pinal County to justify procedural steps in this case. Why is it important for administrative law judges to look to Supreme Court decisions regarding public records when handling private association disputes?

4. Statutory Interpretation of “Action”: Contrast the legal definitions of an “administrative proceeding” and an “action” as they relate to the recovery of attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. What are the implications for litigants who prevail in one forum versus the other?

5. Burden of Proof and the “Offer of Proof”: Discuss the procedural purpose of an Offer of Proof in a hearing. Analyze the irony in this case where the Petitioner’s own offer of proof reinforced the Respondent’s legal standing regarding the “personnel matter” exception.

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Section 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.R.S. § 33-1804

The Arizona Revised Statute governing the requirement for open meetings within certain associations, including specific legal exceptions.

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)

A process, such as mediation or arbitration, required by governing documents to resolve disputes outside of traditional court or administrative hearings.

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that outline the rules and regulations of a planned community or association.

In Camera Review

A private review of sensitive or confidential documents by a judge in their chambers (or “in chambers”) to determine their relevance or admissibility without disclosing them to the opposing party or the public.

Offer of Proof

A presentation made to the judge for the record when a party is not permitted to introduce certain evidence or testimony, describing what that evidence would have shown.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a petition or legal claim in an administrative hearing (in this case, Lon James).

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or legal claim is filed (in this case, Corte Bella Country Club Association).

Under Seal

Records or documents that are kept confidential and are not available for public inspection, often used during an in camera review.

Prevailing Party

The party in a legal proceeding that wins the case; here, the ALJ determined the Petitioner was not the prevailing party and thus not entitled to fee reimbursement.

Disjunctive

A grammatical or legal term indicating that items in a list (often separated by “or”) should be considered separately or as alternatives rather than collectively.






Blog Post – 08F-H089001-BFS


Behind Closed Doors: What a Recent Arizona HOA Ruling Reveals About Your Rights as a Homeowner

Most homeowners buy into a community under the comforting illusion that their dues purchase a front-row seat to the governance of their neighborhood. There is a common expectation that transparency is the default setting and that “open meeting” laws provide an unbreakable shield against secret governance.

In the arena of HOA law, however, transparency is often the first casualty of a well-drafted executive session. The case of Lon James vs. Corte Bella Country Club Association serves as a sobering cautionary tale of a “legal lockout.” When James challenged a closed-door meeting held to “realign the board,” he discovered that the legal framework governing HOAs often prioritizes board confidentiality over homeowner participation, leaving residents on the outside looking in.

This ruling highlights four critical takeaways that reveal just how tilted the playing field can be when a homeowner dares to challenge the association’s inner workings.

Takeaway 1: The “Open Meeting” Law Has Serious Loopholes

While A.R.S. § 33-1804 generally mandates that board meetings remain open to all members, the law provides broad exceptions that act as a legal shield for boards. In the Corte Bella case, the board met privately to discuss a proposal to “realign the board.” To a homeowner, a structural change in leadership sounds like a matter of public interest. To the law, however, it is frequently a protected personnel matter.

The ultimate irony in this case? The Petitioner’s own “Offer of Proof”—the evidence he intended to use to win—actually backfired. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) noted that James’s own testimony unintentionally supported the HOA’s claim that the meeting was legally closed as a personnel matter. It is a high-value lesson for any litigant: sometimes your own evidence proves the board’s right to exclude you.

Takeaway 2: The Judge Can See Evidence You Can’t (The In Camera Review)

One of the most significant tactical disadvantages a homeowner faces is the “In Camera Review.” To determine if the board’s secrecy was justified, the judge reviewed 11 sealed documents privately. James was never allowed to see the very evidence being used to dismiss his case.

This “secret” review is not an automatic right for associations; it is a hard-fought legal maneuver. In fact, the ALJ initially refused the HOA’s request for the review. It was only after a persuasive oral argument that the judge pivoted, balancing public hearing principles against the board’s need for confidentiality. Using the precedent of Griffis v. Pinal County, the court confirmed that a judge can review documents behind a “black box” to determine if they fall under public record exceptions. For the homeowner, this means fighting an opponent when the most critical evidence is invisible to you.

Takeaway 3: Your Right to Sue May Be Precluded by Your Own CC&Rs

Before you ever get to argue the merits of your case, you must survive the trapdoors buried in your own governing documents. In this case, James’s claim regarding a violation of Section 3.14 of the Bylaws was dismissed before it even reached the hearing stage.

The HOA successfully argued that Article XVII of the CC&Rs mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The judge applied a “disjunctive” reading of the law—meaning that because the document used the word “or,” the ADR requirement wasn’t restricted to hammers-and-nails construction issues. Instead, it applied to any claim relating to the interpretation or application of the governing documents. This is a common “ADR trap”: if your CC&Rs are written this way, your path to a standard administrative hearing is effectively blocked.

Action Item: Review your CC&Rs specifically for “disjunctive” language in your ADR or arbitration clauses. If the clause applies to construction or interpretation, you may be signing away your right to a public day in court.

Takeaway 4: Winning Doesn’t Mean Your Legal Bills Are Paid

In the administrative arena, victory often feels like a hollow financial win. In the Corte Bella ruling, even though the HOA successfully defended its actions and saw the petition dismissed, the judge denied their request for attorney’s fees.

The reasoning is a technicality that every homeowner should memorize: an administrative proceeding is not considered an “action” under Arizona law. Therefore, the statutes that typically allow a winner to recover fees in a contract-related lawsuit simply do not apply. This creates an administrative dead-end where both sides typically bear their own costs regardless of the outcome, making these battles a “lose-lose” for the bank accounts of both the individual and the community at large.

Conclusion: The Price of Participation

The Corte Bella ruling reinforces the substantial power HOA boards wield. By utilizing statutory exceptions, securing private judicial reviews, and leaning on mandatory ADR clauses, boards can effectively shield their most critical decisions from member oversight.

This leaves us with a difficult reality regarding the price of participation. If the most significant board decisions—those involving board realignment, litigation, and personnel—are legally permitted to occur behind closed doors, how can homeowners truly ensure accountability? Understanding these legal boundaries isn’t just about winning a case; it’s about recognizing the steep climb required to see what’s happening behind the curtain.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Lon James (Petitioner)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Angela Potts (Respondent Attorney)
    Ekmark & Ekmart, LLC
    Esq.

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (Administrative Law Judge)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on mailing/service list
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on mailing/service list

Kayser, William W. -v- Barclay Place Homeowners Association

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H088006-BFS
Agency DFBLS
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-05-30
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome partial
Filing Fees Refunded $2,000.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner William W. Kayser Counsel
Respondent Barclay Place Homeowners Association Counsel Heather A. Fazio

Alleged Violations

Bylaws Article VII, Section 8(d)
A.R.S. § 33-1805
A.R.S. § 33-1805
Bylaws Article III, Section 3

Outcome Summary

Petitioner prevailed on claims regarding failure to conduct outside audits, failure to provide records timely, and failure to provide proper meeting notice. Petitioner lost on claims regarding assessment notices and meeting quorums. Respondent ordered to provide records and refund full filing fee.

Key Issues & Findings

Failure to accomplish annual audit of 2006

Petitioner alleged the Association failed to conduct annual audits. The ALJ found the Association violated the Bylaws requiring an annual audit by an outside firm, although it complied with statutory monthly compilation requirements.

Orders: Association ordered to comply with Bylaws regarding audits.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1810
  • Bylaws Article VII, Section 8(d)

Failure to retain and provide Association records

Petitioner requested various financial records and minutes. The Association failed to provide them within the statutory 10-day timeframe and failed to maintain complete records as required by Bylaws.

Orders: Association ordered to provide all existing requested documents at no expense to Petitioner.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • A.R.S. § 33-1805
  • Bylaws Article VII, Section 2(a)
  • Bylaws Article X

Failure to give 30 day notice of assessment

Petitioner alleged failure to receive notice of assessment increases. Respondent provided evidence that notices were sent.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_lose

Cited:

  • CC&Rs Article IV, Section 3
  • CC&Rs Article IV, Section 6

Failure to provide proper notice for special meeting

Petitioner challenged the notice for the Nov 23, 2007 meeting. ALJ found posting at mailboxes did not satisfy Bylaw notice requirements for a special meeting of members.

Orders: Association ordered to comply with notice provisions.

Filing fee: $500.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: petitioner_win

Cited:

  • Bylaws Article III, Section 3

Decision Documents

08F-H088006-BFS Decision – 191832.pdf

Uploaded 2026-02-11T05:32:19 (113.1 KB)





Briefing Doc – 08F-H088006-BFS


Briefing Document: Kayser v. Barclay Place Homeowners Association (No. 08F-H088006-BFS)

Executive Summary

This briefing document summarizes the administrative law decision regarding a dispute between William W. Kayser (Petitioner) and the Barclay Place Homeowners Association (Respondent). The case centered on allegations of financial mismanagement, failure to provide corporate records, and violations of meeting notice and quorum procedures.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that while the Petitioner did not prevail on every specific count, he succeeded on the “most substantial issues.” Specifically, the Association was found in violation of its Bylaws for failing to conduct an annual audit by an outside public accounting firm and failing to maintain and provide complete corporate records within the statutory timeframe. Consequently, the Petitioner was deemed the prevailing party and awarded a reimbursement of his $2,000.00 filing fee. The Association was ordered to provide all requested documents and comply with governing documents and state statutes moving forward.

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Procedural Context and Scope

The hearing was conducted on May 12, 2008, under the jurisdiction of the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings. The scope of the hearing was limited by the effective date of A.R.S. § 41-2198.01 et seq., the enabling legislation for this administrative process.

Excluded Items: Claims regarding real estate conveyances prior to the statute’s effective date and bank statements lacking specific dates were ruled outside the scope of the hearing.

Timeframe of Focus: The analysis was limited to acts occurring on or after September 21, 2006, as well as specific events in 2007 and 2008.

Burden of Proof: The Petitioner bore the burden of proving violations by a “preponderance of the evidence,” defined as evidence showing the fact is more probable than not.

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Analysis of Key Themes and Findings

1. Financial Accountability and Auditing Requirements

The dispute involved a distinction between internal financial management and formal auditing requirements mandated by the Association’s governing documents.

Current Practice: R & R Management Company, which manages the Association’s records, performs monthly financial compilations. Testimony indicated that a certified public accountant reviews these records monthly.

The Violation: The ALJ found that while the Association complied with A.R.S. § 33-1810 regarding monthly financial compilations, it violated Bylaws, Article VII, Section 8 (d). This provision requires an annual audit to be performed by an outside public accounting firm.

Admission: The management company admitted that while they follow internal processes, they do not have annual audits performed by an independent public accounting firm.

2. Record Retention and Member Access

A central theme of the petition was the Association’s failure to provide documents requested by the Petitioner in a timely and complete manner.

Legal Requirement

Finding

Response Time

A.R.S. § 33-1805 requires records be provided within 10 business days.

Violation: Evidence established documents were not provided within the 10-day window.

Record Maintenance

Bylaws Article VII & X require a complete record of Association acts and corporate affairs.

Violation: The Association failed to maintain complete records. A Board member testified that previous documents were boxed up and could not be located.

Annual Statements

Bylaws Article VII, Section 2(a) requires a statement at annual meetings.

No Violation: Testimony established that statements were provided at the 2006 and 2007 annual meetings.

3. Governance: Meetings, Notices, and Assessments

The Petitioner challenged the validity of assessment increases and the legality of a specific meeting held on November 23, 2007.

Assessment Increases: The Association’s Board has the authority to increase annual assessments by up to 5% without a vote from the membership. The ALJ found the 2007 and 2008 increases were within this 5% limit; therefore, no membership vote was required.

The November 23, 2007 Meeting: This meeting was a “rescheduled” meeting due to a lack of quorum at a November 12 meeting.

Nature of the Meeting: The ALJ determined this was a “special meeting of members.”

Notice Violation: The Association posted notice at mailboxes. The ALJ ruled that mailbox postings do not satisfy the notice requirements for a special meeting of members as defined in Bylaws, Article III, Section 3.

Quorum: Despite the notice issue, the action taken (the assessment increase) was valid because it was accomplished by a quorum of the Board of Directors, which did not require a member vote for a sub-5% increase.

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Conclusion of Law and Final Order

The ALJ reached the following conclusions regarding the prevailing party and required remedies:

Determination of Prevailing Party

Although the Association prevailed on several individual counts (such as the 30-day notice of assessment and the 5% cap on increases), the Petitioner was designated the prevailing party. The ALJ cited the Petitioner’s success on “substantial issues,” specifically:

1. The failure to perform mandatory independent annual audits.

2. The failure to provide access to records within the statutory 10-day timeframe.

3. The failure to maintain complete corporate records.

Mandatory Relief

Under A.R.S. § 41-2198.02, the Association was ordered to:

Document Production: Provide, at no expense to the Petitioner, copies of all previously requested documents within 10 days of the order.

Reimbursement: Pay the Petitioner $2,000.00 to reimburse his filing fee within 40 days.

Statutory Compliance: Comply with all provisions of the CC&Rs, Bylaws, and state statutes previously found to be in violation.

Civil Penalties and Administrative Limits

The ALJ declined to impose civil penalties, stating they were not warranted by the particular facts of the case. Furthermore, the ALJ noted that specific directives requested by the Petitioner regarding how the Association should act in the future were outside the scope of the ALJ’s authority.






Study Guide – 08F-H088006-BFS


Study Guide: Administrative Law Case No. 08F-H088006-BFS

This study guide examines the administrative law proceedings and ultimate decision regarding the dispute between William W. Kayser and the Barclay Place Homeowners Association. The document focuses on the legal standards, findings of fact, and conclusions of law presented during the May 2008 hearing.

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Part 1: Short-Answer Quiz

Instructions: Answer the following questions using 2-3 sentences based on the information provided in the source text.

1. What was the primary conflict regarding the Association’s 2006 annual audit?

2. Why were Items 1 and 2 of the original Petition ruled to be outside the scope of the hearing?

3. What did the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conclude regarding the HOA’s obligation to provide documents within a specific timeframe?

4. How did the management company, R & R Management, define its responsibility toward non-financial Association records?

5. What was the finding regarding the 30-day notice of annual assessments for 2006 and 2007?

6. Explain the dispute regarding the meeting held on November 23, 2007, at Robb & Stucky.

7. Under what conditions can the Association’s Board of Directors increase annual assessments without a vote from the general membership?

8. Why did the ALJ determine that the posting of meeting notices at mailboxes was legally insufficient for the November 23 meeting?

9. What was the legal definition of “preponderance of the evidence” used to decide this case?

10. Despite not prevailing on every item in his petition, why was William Kayser designated the “prevailing party”?

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Part 2: Answer Key

1. While the Association conducted monthly financial reviews, the Petitioner argued that the By-Laws required an audit by an outside public accounting firm. The ALJ found that the Association violated Article VII, Section 8(d) of the By-Laws by failing to secure this external audit.

2. These items pertained to a real estate conveyance that took place before the effective date of the enabling legislation (A.R.S. § 41-2198.01 et seq.). Consequently, the ALJ did not have the statutory authority to address those specific historical claims.

3. The ALJ ruled that the Association violated A.R.S. § 33-1805 by failing to provide certain requested financial documents within ten business days. It was established that unapproved copies were eventually provided, but the delay exceeded the legal requirement.

4. R & R Management stated it was contractually obligated to maintain financial records but was not required to keep a complete set of records for all other Association activities. They provided other documents to homeowners only as a “courtesy” rather than a contractual duty.

5. The ALJ found that the Petitioner failed to prove a violation of the notice requirements. Evidence from R & R Management’s records indicated that notice was sent, and the ALJ concluded the Association had indeed provided the required 30-day notice for those years.

6. The Petitioner claimed he saw a meeting notice that later disappeared and that there was no record of a meeting at the venue; however, a Board member testified the meeting did occur with a quorum present. The ALJ eventually concluded it was a “special meeting of members” rather than an annual or regular meeting.

7. The Board of Directors has the authority to set an assessment increase as long as the amount does not exceed 5% of the previous assessment. If the increase is within this 5% threshold, no vote of the Association members is required.

8. The ALJ found that while mailboxes were used for posting, this method did not satisfy the specific notice requirements for a “special meeting of members” as dictated by Article III, Section 3 of the By-Laws. The judge noted that special meetings have stricter procedural notice standards.

9. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, as cited in the case, it is evidence that is of “greater weight or more convincing” than the opposing evidence. It effectively means the facts sought to be proved are “more probable than not.”

10. The ALJ determined that Kayser prevailed on the “most substantial issues,” including the requirement for an annual audit and the failure of the Association to maintain and provide complete records. Because these issues were central to the dispute, he was entitled to a reimbursement of his $2,000 filing fee.

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Part 3: Essay Questions

Instructions: Use the case details to develop comprehensive responses to the following prompts.

1. Statutory vs. Internal Governance: Analyze the differences between the Association’s violations of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) and violations of its own By-Laws and CC&Rs. How did the ALJ distinguish between these different legal authorities in his decision?

2. The Role of Management Companies: Discuss the complexities of Association record-keeping as evidenced by the testimony of R & R Management and the “lost boxes” mentioned by the Board of Directors. What are the potential legal risks when an HOA delegates record-keeping to a third party?

3. Quorum and Notice Procedures: Evaluate the procedural confusion surrounding the November 2007 meetings. Contrast the requirements for a “regular meeting,” a “special meeting,” and a “Board of Directors meeting” as they apply to member rights and Association authority.

4. Burden of Proof in Administrative Hearings: Examine the Petitioner’s burden to prove allegations by a “preponderance of the evidence.” Which claims did the Petitioner fail to prove, and what specific evidence (or lack thereof) led to those failures?

5. Administrative Remedies and Limitations: Discuss the limits of the ALJ’s authority regarding the relief requested by the Petitioner. Why were specific directions and civil penalties denied despite the findings of certain violations?

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Part 4: Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

A.A.C.

Arizona Administrative Code; the rules governing administrative proceedings.

A.R.S.

Arizona Revised Statutes; the state laws cited as the basis for many of the legal obligations in the case.

Administrative Law Judge; the official presiding over the hearing and issuing the decision.

Annual Audit

A formal examination of the Association’s financial records, required by the By-Laws to be performed by an outside public accounting firm.

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions; the primary governing documents that define the rights and obligations of Community members and the Association.

Enabling Legislation

The specific statutes (A.R.S. § 41-2198.01 et seq.) that grant the Office of Administrative Hearings the power to hear HOA disputes.

Financial Compilation

The monthly process of organizing financial records, performed by R & R Management, which the ALJ distinguished from a formal annual audit.

Petitioner

The party who files the petition or complaint; in this case, William W. Kayser.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The legal standard of proof in civil and administrative cases, meaning the evidence is more convincing than the opposition’s.

Prevailing Party

The participant in a legal proceeding who “wins” on the most substantial issues and may be entitled to fee reimbursements.

Quorum

The minimum number of members or directors required to be present at a meeting to make the proceedings and decisions valid.

Respondent

The party against whom a petition or complaint is filed; in this case, Barclay Place Homeowners Association.

Special Meeting

A meeting called for a specific purpose that is not part of the regular meeting schedule, often requiring more formal notice to members.

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End of Study Guide






Blog Post – 08F-H088006-BFS


The $2,000 Paper Trail: 5 Surprising Lessons from One Homeowner’s Fight Against His HOA

Living in a Homeowners Association (HOA) often feels like navigating a shadow government where transparency is treated as a nuisance rather than a mandate. For many, the governing documents are a dense thicket of “shalls” and “musts” that only seem to apply to the residents, while the Board operates behind a veil of opacity.

The case of William Kayser vs. Barclay Place Homeowners Association serves as a definitive David-vs-Goliath narrative, proving that a single homeowner armed with the law can force an association into compliance. When Mr. Kayser challenged his HOA before the Arizona Office of Administrative Hearings, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Lewis D. Kowal issued a decision that pulled back the curtain on the hidden legal obligations of these organizations. Here are five surprising lessons from that $2,000 legal victory—lessons that every homeowner should memorize.

1. “Lost in Boxes” is Not a Legal Defense

One of the most persistent excuses used to dodge transparency is the claim that records have simply vanished during leadership transitions. In this case, Board member Jack Van Royen testified that a previous Association president had “boxed up documents” and the current leadership was unable to locate them.

As a matter of corporate governance, this is an unacceptable breach of fiduciary continuity. An HOA is a legal entity with a statutory mandate to maintain a historical record of its operations, regardless of who occupies the Board seats. Leadership changes do not reset the clock on these obligations. It was only after the legal pressure of a hearing that the Association suddenly promised to make a “concerted effort” to find the missing files—a clear admission that accountability only arrives when a judge is watching.

2. When an “Audit” Isn’t Actually an Audit

There is a massive distinction between internal financial “compilations” and a true independent audit. Kevin Young of R&R Management testified that his firm prepared monthly financial records and that a CPA, Andrew Carr, reviewed them. However, Young’s testimony was riddled with contradictions regarding whether Carr was an “in-house” accountant or a truly independent third party.

ALJ Kowal’s ruling sharpened the focus on Bylaws, Article VII, Section 8(d), which requires an annual audit to be performed by an “outside public accounting firm.” The Association’s attempt to blur the lines by presenting management-led compilations as a substitute for professional oversight was a failure of transparency. For homeowners, the lesson is clear: internal reviews by the very people managing the money are not a substitute for the procedural safeguards of an external audit.

3. The 10-Day Clock for Transparency

Under A.R.S. § 33-1805, Arizona associations have a strict 10-business-day window to provide requested documents to members. In this case, Mr. Kayser’s requests for bank statements and corporate records were met with delays and excuses.

Perhaps the most common stall tactic used by HOAs is the claim that financial records cannot be shared because they are “unapproved” by the Board. ALJ Kowal effectively dismantled this defense. The statutory right to inspect records is not contingent upon the Board’s final “stamp of approval.” Transparency laws are designed to grant members access to the raw data of their community’s operations, not just the sanitized versions the Board chooses to release.

4. Mailbox Postings Don’t Equal Legal Notice

A central dispute in this case involved a November 23, 2007 meeting where the Board acted to increase assessments. The Association claimed they satisfied notice requirements by posting announcements at the community mailboxes 48 hours in advance.

ALJ Kowal ruled this was legally insufficient. Because a previous meeting lacked a quorum, the November 23 gathering was classified as a “special meeting of members” under Bylaws, Article III, Section 3. This classification carries specific notice requirements that a mere mailbox posting cannot satisfy. Furthermore, the “scavenger hunt” nature of this meeting was highlighted by the fact that it was held at a Robb & Stucky conference room in Scottsdale, yet Mr. Kayser testified that the store had no record of the meeting and he saw no evidence of it occurring when he arrived. Strict adherence to notice procedures is a protection for the members, not a suggestion for the Board.

5. You Don’t Have to Win Every Count to Win the Case

The most significant takeaway for any homeowner considering legal action is the definition of a “prevailing party.” Numerically, Mr. Kayser lost a majority of his claims. For instance, the ALJ found the Association did not violate CC&R Article IV, Section 3 because the assessment increase remained under the 5% threshold that would have required a member vote.

However, ALJ Kowal ruled that winning on “substantial issues”—specifically the failure to conduct an outside audit and the failure to provide record access—outweighed the losses on minor technicalities. This is a critical distinction: you don’t need a perfect scorecard to hold your HOA accountable.

The court ordered the Association to reimburse that $2,000 fee within 40 days. This serves as a powerful deterrent against HOA non-compliance, proving that a Board’s refusal to follow its own Bylaws can be an expensive mistake.

Conclusion: The Power of Accountability

The Kayser vs. Barclay Place case proves that Bylaws and State Statutes are the bedrock of community governance, not mere “best practices” to be ignored when convenient. When a Board fails in its fiduciary duty to maintain records or follow notice procedures, it isn’t just a clerical error—it is a violation of the law.

Real accountability begins when homeowners demand the transparency they are legally owed. Your governing documents are your greatest weapon in ensuring your Association serves its members rather than its own interests.

Final Ponder Point: If you asked for your community’s last external audit tomorrow, would your board provide a report or an excuse?


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • William W. Kayser (Petitioner)
    Barclay Place Community
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Heather A. Fazio (Respondent Attorney)
    Doyle, Berman, Murdy, P.C.
  • Kevin Young (Property Manager/Witness)
    R & R Management Company
    Testified regarding financial records and association management
  • Denise Lehn (Accountant)
    R & R Management Company
    Oversees financials for the Association
  • Andrew Carr (CPA)
    Reviews and audits financial records monthly
  • Jack Van Royen (Board Member/Witness)
    Barclay Place Homeowners Association Board
  • Bonnie Braun (Board Member)
    Barclay Place Homeowners Association Board
    Present at Nov 23, 2007 meeting
  • Pamela Nicita (Board Member)
    Barclay Place Homeowners Association Board
    Present at Nov 23, 2007 meeting

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
  • Robert Barger (Agency Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on mailing distribution
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on mailing distribution

Grossman, Jerry A. vs. Gainey Ranch Community Association (ROOT)

Case Summary

Case ID 08F-H078011-BFS
Agency Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
Tribunal OAH
Decision Date 2008-05-13
Administrative Law Judge Lewis D. Kowal
Outcome no
Filing Fees Refunded $550.00
Civil Penalties $0.00

Parties & Counsel

Petitioner Jerry A. Grossman Counsel
Respondent Gainey Ranch Community Association Counsel Burton C. Cohen

Alleged Violations

Article IV, Section 2(a)

Outcome Summary

The Administrative Law Judge consolidated the homeowner's petition and the HOA's petition. The Judge ruled in favor of the HOA, finding the homeowner violated the CC&Rs by painting without approval. The homeowner was ordered to remediate the paint and reimburse the HOA's $550 filing fee.

Why this result: Homeowner failed to prove HOA violated guidelines; HOA proved Homeowner violated CC&Rs by making unapproved exterior changes.

Key Issues & Findings

Unauthorized Exterior Change (Painting)

Homeowner painted home 'Sterling Place' and front door dark brown without prior approval. Homeowner argued the color was approved for stucco generally. HOA argued approval was required specifically for the home and the color was not approved for house exteriors.

Orders: Homeowner must paint exterior with an approved color and restore front door to stained light or medium oak within 60 days.

Filing fee: $550.00, Fee refunded: Yes

Disposition: respondent_win

Cited:

  • Article IV, Section 2(a)
  • Guideline Section 4, Article 1, Section 2

Decision Documents

08F-H078011-BFS Decision – 190735.pdf

Uploaded 2026-01-25T15:21:24 (86.9 KB)





Briefing Doc – 08F-H078011-BFS


Administrative Law Judge Decision: Grossman v. Gainey Ranch Community Association

Executive Summary

This document synthesizes the findings and legal conclusions of a consolidated administrative hearing (No. 08F-H078011-BFS and No. 08F-H078012-BFS) regarding a dispute between Jerry A. Grossman (“Mr. Grossman”) and the Gainey Ranch Community Association (“Association”).

The central conflict involved Mr. Grossman repainting the exterior of his home and front door without obtaining prior approval from the Association’s Architectural Committee. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that Mr. Grossman violated the Association’s Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The ruling requires Mr. Grossman to restore his front door to its original stained oak finish, repaint his home in an approved color, and reimburse the Association for its filing fees.

Case Background and Hierarchy

The dispute arose within “The Greens,” a residential community located within the larger Gainey Ranch development. The case highlights a specific organizational hierarchy regarding architectural control:

Sub-Association: The Greens has its own Board of Directors and Architectural Committee.

Master Association: The Gainey Ranch Community Association maintains its own Board and Architectural Committee.

Superior Authority: The Association’s Board and Architectural Committee hold superior authority over those of The Greens.

Core Legal Provisions

The Association’s authority to regulate property aesthetics is derived from the Certificate of Amendment and Restatement of Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, Restrictions, Assessment, Charges, Servitudes, Liens Reservations and Easements for Gainey Ranch (CC&Rs).

Article IV, Section 2(a)

The CC&Rs state that no changes or alterations that affect the exterior appearance of any property from its natural or improved state (as of the date the tract Declaration was first recorded) shall be made without prior approval from the Association’s Architectural Committee. This includes:

• Building walls and fences.

• Residences and other structures.

• Exterior color schemes.

Analysis of the Dispute

Exterior House Color

In late 2007, Mr. Grossman repainted his home, changing the color from pink to “Sterling Place.”

Factor

Detail

Grossman’s Argument

Believed “Sterling Place” was an approved color for stucco and therefore did not require prior approval.

Association’s Position

“Sterling Place” was approved only for interior walls and entryways, not for the exterior of residences.

Evidence

The Greens’ Board of Directors had attempted to get “Sterling Place” approved for buildings by the Master Association but was unsuccessful.

Finding

Mr. Grossman failed to seek prior approval as required by the CC&Rs.

Front Door Alteration

Mr. Grossman painted his front door dark brown, a change from the builder-original state.

Original Condition: Evidence from the Association’s Executive Director indicated that homes in The Greens were originally constructed with stained doors of light or medium oak.

Grossman’s Defense: Claimed unawareness of any provision addressing front doors and noted that other homes in the community featured different materials (cherry wood, metal, or different paint colors).

Legal Determination: The ALJ found that the front door is part of the “exterior appearance” of the home. Under Article IV, Section 2(a) of the CC&Rs, the door must remain as it existed when built unless a change is specifically approved by the Association’s Architectural Committee.

Sub-Association Interaction

The Greens’ Board of Directors noted that while “Sterling Place” fell within colors used in the community and they supported Mr. Grossman’s choice, they officially admonished him for failing to seek the necessary approval from the superior Gainey Ranch Architectural Committee.

Legal Conclusions

The case was decided based on a “preponderance of the evidence,” meaning the evidence showed the facts sought to be proved were more probable than not.

1. Burden of Proof: Mr. Grossman failed to prove the Association violated its guidelines. The Association successfully proved Mr. Grossman violated the CC&Rs.

2. Authority: The Association possesses the clear authority to approve or deny paint colors for exteriors, walls, and fences.

3. Violation: Painting the home and door without prior application and approval constituted a direct violation of Article IV, Section 2(a) of the CC&Rs.

Final Order and Remediation

The ALJ issued the following orders to resolve the matter:

Home Exterior: Within 60 days of the Order (dated May 13, 2008), Mr. Grossman must repaint the exterior of his home with a color approved by the Association’s Architectural Committee.

Front Door: Within 60 days of the Order, Mr. Grossman must restore the front door to a light or medium oak stain.

Financial Reimbursement: Within 40 days of the Order, Mr. Grossman must reimburse the Association for its $550.00 filing fee.

Finality: This decision is the final administrative decision and is enforceable through contempt of court proceedings.






Study Guide – 08F-H078011-BFS


Study Guide: Grossman v. Gainey Ranch Community Association

This study guide provides a comprehensive overview of the administrative legal dispute between Jerry A. Grossman and the Gainey Ranch Community Association. It examines the enforcement of community covenants, the hierarchy of homeowner association authority, and the legal standards applied in administrative hearings.

Quiz: Short-Answer Questions

1. What was the primary cause of the consolidated legal matter between Jerry Grossman and the Gainey Ranch Community Association?

2. According to the Association’s CC&Rs, what specific actions require prior approval from the Architectural Committee?

3. How does the hierarchy of authority function between the “Greens” community and the Gainey Ranch Community Association?

4. Why did Jerry Grossman believe that using the color “Sterling Place” for his home’s exterior was permissible without prior approval?

5. What was the testimony provided by Fred Thielen regarding the standard appearance of front doors in the Greens community?

6. What was the stance of the Greens’ Board of Directors regarding Mr. Grossman’s choice of the color “Sterling Place”?

7. How does the document define the “preponderance of the evidence” legal standard?

8. Why was Mr. Grossman’s claim of selective enforcement and harassment excluded from the scope of the administrative hearing?

9. What was the final ruling regarding the front door of Mr. Grossman’s residence?

10. What financial penalties and deadlines were imposed on Mr. Grossman by the Administrative Law Judge’s order?

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Answer Key

1. The conflict arose from a consolidated matter where Mr. Grossman challenged the Association’s attempt to force him to repaint his home, while the Association alleged Mr. Grossman violated governing documents by painting his house and front door without prior approval using unapproved colors.

2. Article IV, Section (2)(a) of the CC&Rs states that no changes or alterations to the exterior appearance of any property from its natural or improved state, including building walls, fences, and exterior color schemes, may be made without prior Architectural Committee approval.

3. While the “Greens” community has its own Board of Directors and Architectural Committee, the Gainey Ranch Community Association’s Board and Architectural Committee maintain superior authority over the local “Greens” entities.

4. Mr. Grossman testified that because “Sterling Place” was an approved color for stucco walls and entrance walls within the community, he assumed it was also an approved color for the exterior of his home and therefore did not require a new application.

5. Fred Thielen, the Association’s Executive Director, testified that the front doors in the Greens were originally built as stained doors of light or medium oak; consequently, Mr. Grossman’s decision to paint his door dark brown was an unapproved change of appearance.

6. The Greens’ Board of Directors noted that “Sterling Place” was approved for entrance walls but not house exteriors; however, they initially supported Mr. Grossman because the color fell within the community’s palette, while still admonishing him for failing to seek Association approval.

7. Citing Black’s Law Dictionary, the document defines “preponderance of the evidence” as evidence that is of greater weight or more convincing than the opposition, showing that the fact to be proved is more probable than not.

8. The Administrative Law Judge determined that harassment is not a valid defense for the violation in question. Furthermore, the issue was not specifically raised in Mr. Grossman’s original Petition, placing it outside the scope of the hearing.

9. The Administrative Law Judge ordered Mr. Grossman to restore the front door of his home to its original state, specifically requiring it to be stained light or medium oak, rather than the dark brown paint he had applied.

10. Mr. Grossman was ordered to repaint his home in an approved color and restore his door within 60 days of the order. Additionally, he was required to reimburse the Association for its $550.00 filing fee within 40 days.

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Essay Questions for Review

1. The Conflict of Authority: Analyze the legal and practical implications of the hierarchical relationship between a master association and a sub-association (the “Greens”). How did the Greens’ Board’s support of Mr. Grossman fail to provide him a legal defense against the master association’s requirements?

2. Interpretation of Architectural Guidelines: Discuss the difference between “approved colors” and “approved applications.” Why is it critical for homeowners to understand that approval for a color on one surface (e.g., a perimeter wall) does not automatically translate to approval for another surface (e.g., a home exterior)?

3. The Importance of “Original State” in CC&Rs: Examine the role of the “natural or improved state” as a baseline for community standards. How does this standard protect the aesthetic integrity of a community, and what are the potential drawbacks for individual homeowners?

4. The Preponderance of Evidence in Administrative Law: Evaluate the burden of proof placed on both the Petitioner and the Respondent in this case. How did the Association successfully meet its burden while Mr. Grossman failed to meet his?

5. Due Process and Procedural Boundaries: Reflect on the judge’s decision to exclude claims of harassment and selective enforcement from the hearing. How do procedural limitations impact the ability of a homeowner to defend their actions in an administrative setting?

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Glossary of Key Terms

Definition

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)

A judge who presides over hearings and adjudicates disputes involving government agencies and administrative regulations.

Architectural Committee

A designated body within a community association responsible for reviewing and approving changes to the exterior appearance of properties.

Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions; the governing documents that dictate the rules and limitations for property owners within a specific development.

Consolidated Matter

A legal situation where two or more separate cases involving similar parties or issues are combined into a single proceeding.

Filing Fee

A required payment made to a court or administrative body to initiate a legal petition or claim.

Preponderance of the Evidence

The standard of proof in most civil and administrative cases, requiring that a claim be more likely true than not.

Petitioner

The party who initiates a legal action or petition by filing a complaint or request for a hearing.

Respondent

The party against whom a legal action is brought or a petition is filed.

Stained Oak

A specific wood finish (light or medium) identified as the original standard for front doors in the Greens community.

Sterling Place

The specific paint color used by Mr. Grossman that was approved for interior/entrance walls but not for home exteriors.

Stucco

A type of exterior finish for walls; in this case, the material for which the color “Sterling Place” was partially approved.

Tract Declaration

A legal document recorded to define the original state and restrictions of a specific plot of land or development.






Blog Post – 08F-H078011-BFS


The Price of a Pink House: 4 Surprising Lessons from a $550 Paint Dispute

For many of us, the desire to personalize our home is a fundamental part of the American Dream. We see a dated exterior and imagine a fresh, modern palette that reflects our personal style. However, in the world of common-interest developments, that creative impulse often hits a legal brick wall.

In my years of consulting for community associations, I have seen many well-intentioned homeowners fall into the “renovation trap.” The case of Jerry A. Grossman vs. Gainey Ranch Community Association is a masterclass in this conflict. What started as a homeowner’s desire to move away from his home’s original pink exterior and update his front door resulted in a formal administrative hearing, a mandatory order to undo the work, and a significant financial hit.

Your Neighborhood Board Might Not Have the Final Say

One of the most common legal landmines I see in real estate is the “nested board” trap. Mr. Grossman lived in “The Greens,” a sub-community within the larger Gainey Ranch development. When he decided to repaint, he found support from his local neighborhood board. However, the local board’s blessing was ultimately meaningless.

The legal reality is that most master associations maintain “Superior Authority.” In this case, while the Greens’ Board supported Mr. Grossman, they also explicitly admonished him for not seeking approval from the master association first. They knew what Mr. Grossman ignored: the local board’s power is subordinate to the Master Architectural Committee. As a homeowner, you cannot assume a “yes” from your immediate neighbors is a “yes” from the entity that actually holds the deed restrictions.

“Approved Colors” are Highly Context-Specific

The heart of this dispute involved a color called “Sterling Place.” To a layman, the logic seems sound: if the color is already visible in the community, it must be allowed. To the Association, however, “approved” is a relative term.

Mr. Grossman argued that because “Sterling Place” was used on various stucco entryway walls and interior surfaces within the community, it was naturally an “approved” color for his stucco house. He likely felt emboldened by a specific nuance in the guidelines: if a homeowner repaints with an already approved color, prior approval is not necessary.

The Association’s ruling, however, clarified the “Smoking Gun” in this case. The Greens’ Board had previously attempted to get “Sterling Place” approved for use on residential buildings and were unsuccessful. The color was authorized only for interior walls and specific entryways, never for the “exterior side” of the homes. The lesson here is granular: just because a color exists on a perimeter wall doesn’t mean it’s authorized for your front shutters.

The Front Door is Not Your Canvas

We often think of our front door as the ultimate statement of individuality, but in an HOA, it is often treated as a historical artifact. Mr. Grossman painted his door a solid “dark brown,” noting that other homes in the area featured various materials like metal or cherry wood. He argued he was unaware of any specific regulations governing doors.

The Association relied on the “Natural State” clause found in many CC&Rs. According to the testimony of Executive Director Fred Thielen, the original builder intended for the homes in The Greens to feature stained wood doors. Specifically, the standard was “stained light or medium oak.” By applying paint—regardless of the color—Mr. Grossman violated the requirement to maintain the home as it existed when first built.

The High Cost of Asking for Forgiveness Instead of Permission

Mr. Grossman’s most expensive mistake was his belief that approval was unnecessary because he was “improving” the property. He traded a pink house for a color he preferred, assuming the Association would see the value. Instead, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an order that serves as a sobering reminder of the costs of non-compliance.

The final Order placed a heavy logistical and financial burden on the homeowner:

Mandatory Repainting: Grossman was ordered to repaint the entire exterior of his home with an officially approved color within 60 days.

Restoration: He was required to strip the dark brown paint and restore the front door to its original light or medium oak stain.

Reimbursement: He was ordered to pay the Association $550.00 to cover their filing fees.

Conclusion: The “Natural State” Dilemma

The Grossman case is a definitive victory for community uniformity over individual expression. It highlights the “Natural State” dilemma: most CC&Rs mandate that a property be maintained in the state it existed on the date the tract declaration was first recorded.

This case leaves every homeowner in a managed community with a difficult question to weigh. If your governing documents mandate a return to the aesthetic of decades past—even if that aesthetic is a “pink house”—are you truly the master of your domain? In the eyes of the law, the answer is clear: you are a steward of the builder’s original vision, and any deviation requires a paper trail of permission.


Case Participants

Petitioner Side

  • Jerry A. Grossman (petitioner)
    Homeowner (Lot 142 of the Greens)
    Appeared on his own behalf

Respondent Side

  • Burton C. Cohen (attorney)
    Burton C. Cohen, P.C.
    Attorney for Gainey Ranch Community Association
  • Fred Thielen (witness)
    Gainey Ranch Community Association
    Executive Director and member of the Architectural Committee
  • Patrick Collins (witness)
    Gainey Ranch Community Association
    Current Board Member; previously member of Greens' Board and Architectural Committee

Neutral Parties

  • Lewis D. Kowal (ALJ)
    Office of Administrative Hearings
    Administrative Law Judge
  • Robert Barger (Director)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on service list
  • Debra Blake (Agency Staff)
    Department of Fire, Building and Life Safety
    Listed on service list