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Maricopa County Superior Court Case LC2024-000143: public docket details, parties, minute entries, documents, and official source links for Palm Valley Community Association.

Case Number

LC2024-000143

County

Maricopa

Caption

Not captured

Filed

4/19/2024

Case Type

Lower Court Appeals

Judge

LaFave, Julie

Location

Downtown

Official Court Record

Official Court Record

Parties

Minute Entries

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

05/14/2024 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

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05/13/2024

Docket Code 504
Form L000
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CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH P. MIKITISH
N. Johnson

Deputy

PALM VALLEY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION TREVOR L ASH

v.

CYNTHIA A MCALISTER (001)
MARK A MCALISTER (001)
WILLIAM R RICHARDSON

COMM. LAFAVE
JUDGE MIKITISH
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
WHITE TANK JUSTICE COURT

CIVIL

RECORD APPEAL ASSIGNMENT - ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

White Tank Justice Court Case No. CC2015095536RC

The parties’ memoranda having been filed in the above-mentioned appeal, and oral argument
having been requested,

IT IS ORDERED assigning this appeal on May 13, 2024 to the Honorable Julie LaFave for
determination of the appeal based upon the transcript of the proceedings and the parties’ memoranda,
pursuant to Local Rule 9.9, Maricopa County Superior Court Local Rules of Practice, within sixty
(60) days from this date.

Oral argument is requested and this matter is referred to Comm. LaFave for determination,
pursuant to Rules of Procedure in Civil Cases.

504.CIVIL.OAR

NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a
document, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have to
deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

05/15/2024 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

05/14/2024

Docket Code 512
Form L000
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JULIE A. LAFAVE
S. Ortega

Deputy

PALM VALLEY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION TREVOR L ASH

v.

CYNTHIA A MCALISTER (001)
MARK A MCALISTER (001)
WILLIAM R RICHARDSON

COMM. LAFAVE
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
WHITE TANK JUSTICE COURT

RECORD APPEAL RULING — REVERSED & REMANDED
White Tank Justice Court Case No. CC2015-095536
Defendant/Appellant, MARK MCALISTER1, appeals from a civil judgment entered
against him in the White Tanks Justice Court. That trial court granted a Default Judgment in
favor of Plaintiff/Appellee, PALM VALLEY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, and denied
Appellant’s Motion to for Relief pursuant to Justice Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 141
(“Motion to Set Aside”). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 16 and
A.R.S. §§ 12-124, 22-261. For the following reasons, this Court reverses and remands for
further proceedings.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1 The Judgment entered in this case also lists Cynthia A. McAlister. Ms. McAlister is not a party to this appeal and
this Ruling is not applicable to any legal rights or obligations created by the Judgment or this Ruling.

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“It is better to ask for forgiveness than permission”. Grace Hopper. Perhaps in some
cases. However, when the permission is required by the Justice Court Rules of Civil Procedure
(“JCRCP”), forgiveness cannot permission’s place. This is a classic case of just that occurring.

On May 28, 2015, Appellee filed its Complaint. See Complaint. On September 10, 2015,
it filed a request for an extension to time to serve Appellant. See Rule 113(i) Motion for
Extension of Service Deadline. Appellee represented “Plaintiff is currently in the process of
evaluating the possibility of serving Defendants by publication”. Id. at 2:3-4. On September 14,
2015, the deadline for Service was extended to December 4, 2015. See Order Granting Extension
of Service of Process Deadline. While the subsequent request for extension is not contained in
the record on appeal, it appears Appellee sought and was denied a further extension. See
Calendar Events and Hearings (“Docket”) at P:6.
On December 2, 2015, Appellee Filed a Motion to Reconsider Denial of Rule 113(i)
Motion for Extension of Service Deadline and asked the trial court to further extend the service
deadline. It did not request the trial court order service by publication although it indicated
“Plaintiff is currently in the process of serving Defendants by publication”. Id. at 2:3-4. Attached
as exhibits to the request for an extension were the certificate of due diligence, dated September
17, 2015, and the Copy of Notice of service by publication conduced on November 4, 11, 18 and
25, 2015. Id.
On December 4, 2015, that deadline was again extended to December 18, 2015. See
Order Granting Extension of Service of Process Deadline. No Order was sought to permit the
actions Appellee had already taken although the JCRCP do not preclude doing so while such a
motion is pending. Appellee filed its Affidavit in Support of Service by Publication indicating it
had already served Appellant by publication as it “had no other alternative” but to do so. Id. at
2:3-6.
On January 14, 2016, Appellee filed its Application for Entry of Default and Affidavit on
Default and Entry of Default (collectively “Default”). The Default represented to the trial court
that “Since the service of a copy of the Complaint and Summons…” there had been no response
from Defendants. Id. at 2:3-6. On January 20, 2016, the trial court properly noted there was no
record of service and thus the case faced dismissal. See Corrective Action Required (Civil
Filing). On January 27, 2016, Appellee filed its Service by Publication Affidavit. There was no
motion filed for alternative service and no order granting a request for same. On February 17,
2016, Appellee again filed its Default documents.

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On May 20, 2016, Appellee filed a request for Default and accompanying request for
Judgment and Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. Plaintiff/Appellee’s Answering Brief on Appeal
(“Response”) indicates the record on appeal, which was not provided to this Court, contains the
default hearing wherein it presented all material supporting the Service by Publication. See
Calendar and Events, entry July 12, 2016, Hearing re: Default; See also Response at 6:16-24.
The Response admits the argument regarding the need for alternative service occurred only at the
default hearing:
Here, McAlister has argued that the Association did not exercise adequate due diligence in
attempting to locate him, and so should not have been able to serve him by publication.
This exact question was the subject of a default hearing, where evidence was taken as to the
efforts made by the Association locate McAlister prior to serving him by publication… an
entire hearing was dedicated to investigating the very questions McAlister has raised on
appeal.
Id. at 6:16-25.
This Court notes that had that been the hearing to determine the appropriateness of
alternative service, that hearing, and the ruling on same, would have been material. However, a
default judgment hearing is a separate proceeding and can only occur after service, and after a
defendant has been given the opportunity to respond under the governing rules. Therefore,
whatever was presented to contemporaneously obtain belated “permission” to serve as it had
already done, and a default judgment is immaterial as to do so was a violation of Appellant’s
rights under JCRCP.

A default judgment was entered against Appellant following the hearing. See Judgment,
dated July 12, 2016. Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default and Default Judgment on
November 3, 2023, alleging he was never served. That motion was denied on December 18,
2023. This timely appeal followed.
II.
GENERAL APPELLATE CONSIDERATIONS
This Court reviews the denial of a Motion to Set Aside Judgment for an abuse of
discretion. Norwest Bank (Minnesota), N.A. v. Symington, 197 Ariz. 181, 184, ¶ 11 (App. 2000).
It is “an abuse of discretion for a trial court to act arbitrarily or make decisions unsupported by
fact or law.” Id. “The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to vacate a default
judgment, and this court will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent a clear abuse of

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discretion”. BYS Inc. v. Smoudi, 228 Ariz. 573, 577(App. 2012), as amended (Mar. 13, 2012).
This court considers only Appellants’ argument that the Motion was improperly denied. Thus,
the scope of the appeal is limited to the issues raised in that Motion. See Goglia v. Bodnar, 156
Ariz. 12, 16 (App. 1987).

Under the clear abuse of discretion standard, the trial court ruling will be upheld if there
“is any reasonable evidence in the record to sustain it.” State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 341, ¶ 77
(2007) (internal quotation omitted). A “court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law
in reaching a discretionary decision or when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to
upholding the trial court’s decision, is devoid of competent evidence to support the decision.”
Michaelson v. Garr, 234 Ariz. 542, 544, ¶ 5 (App. 2014) (internal quotation omitted).
III.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

Appellant argues the Default was improperly granted as he was never served.

IV.
DISCUSSION
In Arizona, [P]roper, effective service on a defendant is a prerequisite to a court's
exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Koven v. Saberdyne Sys., Inc., 128 Ariz. 318,
321(App.1980); Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 134(App.1980) (“[T]he law is clear that a
judgment is void if the trial court did not have jurisdiction because of a lack of proper service.”);
Barlage v. Valentine, 210 Ariz. 270, 272–73(App. 2005); Sprang v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., 165
Ariz 257 (App. 1990); Master Financial, Inc. v. Woodburn, 208 Ariz. 70, 74 ¶ 19 (App. 2004).

JCRCP 113(c)(7) permits service by publication if such service complies with Arizona
Rules of Civil Procedure (“ARCP”) 4.1(l) which reads:

(1) Generally. If a party shows that the service provided by Rule 4.1(c) through 4.1(k)--
including an alternative means of service--is impracticable, the court may, on motion and
without notice to the person to be served, order that service be accomplished by publication. A
serving party may initiate the service by publication procedure described in Rule 4.1(l)(2) prior
to moving for such an order or while the motion is pending. The court may permit service by
publication, in such manner and form as the court may direct, if:

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(A) the serving party, despite reasonably diligent efforts, has been unable to determine
the person's current address; or the person to be served has intentionally avoided service of
process;

(B) service by publication is the best means practicable in the circumstances for
providing the person with notice of the action's commencement; and

(C) the motion is supported by affidavit that sets forth the serving party's reasonably
diligent efforts to serve the person.

ARCP 4.1(emphasis added).

Appellee’s efforts may well have been reasonably diligent under the rule. The affidavit
must “set [ ] forth facts indicating [the serving party] made a due diligent effort to locate an
opposing party to effect personal service.” Barlage at 273; Sprang at 261; See also Omega II Inv.
Co. v. McLeod, 153 Ariz. 341, 342 (App.1987) (finding of due diligence before service by
publication is jurisdictional prerequisite). Appellee may well have been able to begin service by
publication efforts while a motion to permit same was pending. What it had no legal authority to
do, was simply file a notice with the trial court asserting publication was proper, that it had been
done, and that it could move to a default hearing having done so. Appellee neglected to ask
permission. The result was a violation of Appellant’s rights to notice and to defend the action.

Because service by publication was never ordered by the trial court, Appellant’s Motion to
Set Aside was well founded2. See United Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Superior Court, 134 Ariz.
43, 45 (1982)(emphasis added); citing Richas v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 512, 652 P.2d 1035
(1982). Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is identical in substance to R. 141(c)

Until a defendant is served, a trial court has no jurisdiction over it. Thus, without proper
service, Appellant was not subject to a Default Judgment and the one entered by the trial court
was void as a matter of law. See Kadota at 134. The Response admits that it believed

2 This Ruling is limited to the vacating the Judgment on the grounds that service never occurred. This Court takes
no position on the merit of the arguments made in Appellant’s Memorandum regarding challenges to any efforts
made by Appellee or that those were insufficient. That argument is properly raised to the trial court. Here, the only
issue is that Appellee lacked authority to serve via publication thus there was no service in the case and no
jurisdiction by the trial court to enter the default and subsequent Judgment.

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Appellant’s whereabouts were unknown and “[T]hus, service on Defendants was effectuated by
publication…” but fails to cite the legal authority which permitted it to act without an order from
the trial court. See Response at 5:12. Appellee then concludes, with no legal support that “service
was proper in various ways” making the Default and Judgment valid.

In essence, Appellee argues it tried to serve Appellee unsuccessfully. Appellee then
argues it properly took matters into its own hands and now should be rewarded by obtaining a
judgment against a party who was never served. While a review of the record indicates Appellee
may well have prevailed on the merits of any motion for alternative service, it is equally clear
that none was filed. Litigants are entitled to all the protections of JCRCP. To uphold the
Judgement against Appellant, this Court would have to violate those protections, ordering both
that a party may serve another in any means it deems proper, and that a defendant’s right to be
first served and then provided an opportunity to respond to a default is waived when the
offending party violates the rules. That is will not do. The trial court committed an error of law
when it granted a default judgment against a party who had not been served. Because it lacked
jurisdiction to do so, the Judgment must be vacated.

Appellant further requests this Court dismiss the underlying case. This Court lacks
jurisdiction to dismiss a case filed in another jurisdiction. However, it is clear the time for
service has expired and there is no rule which would extend it at this time.

V. ORAL ARGUMENT
This matter was decided on the narrow procedural issue of service of process. Having
reviewed the record, this court finds oral argument would not have assisted it in its decision.
This Court determined the issue as a matter of law and therefore denies the request for Oral
Argument.

VI. COSTS AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL

As the apparent prevailing party, Appellant may be entitled to his taxable costs and
reasonable attorneys’ fees on appeal. Upon compliance with Rule 13, Superior Court Rules of
Appellate Procedure—Civil, this Court will consider its request for costs and fees. If Appellant
contends that this Court is required to award reasonable attorneys’ fees due to a provision of a
contract between the parties, his SCRAP-Civil Rule 13 filing must either supply the contractual

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provision requiring the award of fees or specifically identify where in the existing record that
provision can be found. See Bennett Blum, M.D., Inc. v. Cowan, 235 Ariz. 204, 206 (App.
2014). Appellants filing also “must disclose the terms of any fee agreement for the services for
which the claim is made.” Rule 54(g)(4), Ariz. R. Civ. P. See also Jerman v. O’Leary, 145 Ariz.
397, 403 (App. 1985) (“[I]t is vital to know what the agreement was between appellees and their
lawyer.”).
VI.
DISPOSITION & ORDERS
The trial court made an error of law in permitting service by publication without first
ordering same. To do so and then grant judgment against Appellant violated his rights under
JCRCP. The trial court further abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s Motion to Set Aside
Judgment. As Appellant was not properly served, the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter
Default Judgment.

Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Appellee’s request for Oral Argument.

IT IS ALSO ORDERED vacating the judgment of the White Tank Justice Court.

IT IS ALSO ORDERED that, because the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs remain
pending, this ruling is not a final decision of this Court for purposes of Ariz.R.Civ.P. 54(c) and
Sup.Ct.R. App. P.-Civil R. 12(d). At an appropriate time, this Court will consider a motion from
either party declaring these review proceedings to be concluded and issue its final order once that
issue had been briefed and determined.

IT IS ALSO ORDERED remanding this matter to the White Tank Justice Court for
further proceedings consistent with this ruling, to include dismissal of the case.

IT IS ALSO ORDERED signing this ruling as a formal order of the Court.

THE HON. JULIE A. LAFAVE

Judicial Officer of the Superior Court

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
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Form L000
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NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a
document, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have
to deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

05/28/2025 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

05/27/2025

Docket Code 513
Form L000
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JULIE A. LAFAVE
J. Eaton

Deputy

PALM VALLEY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION TREVOR L ASH

v.

CYNTHIA A MCALISTER (001)
MARK A MCALISTER (001)
WILLIAM R RICHARDSON

COMM. LAFAVE
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
WHITE TANK JUSTICE COURT

RULING

White Tank Justice Court Case No: CC2015095536RC

On May 15, 2024, this Court entered its Record Appeal Ruling (“Ruling 1”) vacating the
default judgment entered by the trial court on the grounds that Appellant Mark A. McAlister was
not properly served under Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure 4.11. This Court erroneously applied
the most current version of Rule 4.1, Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure and determined that
service by publication was improper because Appellee Palm Valley Community Association did
not first seek leave from the trial court prior to service via publication. See Ruling 1.

On May 24, 2024, Palm Valley filed its Motion for Reconsideration. It argued that the
version of Rule 4.1 in effect at the time of the litigation (2015-2016) (“old version”) did not
require leave from the court prior to service by publication, only an affidavit of same subsequent
to that action. See Motion for Rehearing. On June 11, 2024, McAlister filed his Response,
arguing that even application of the 2016 version of Rule 4.1 would not lead to proper service
under governing law, specifically Ruffino v. Lokosky, 245 Ariz. 165 (App. 2018); rev. denied
(Dec. 13, 2018). See Appellant’s Response to Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration.

1 All reference to Rule 4.1 are to this rule.

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On June 21, 2024, this Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration and, applying the
old version of Rule 4.1, found that service was proper and that the trial court had properly denied
the Motion to Set Aside Default. See Motion to Reconsider granted, June 21, 2024 (‘Ruling 2”).
Ruling 2 noted that under the old version, even if service by publication was proper without first
seeking leave, a Plaintiff was required to mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the last
known address unless “the residence of the party being served is unknown, and for that reason no
mailing was made, the affidavit shall so state”. See Ruling 2. However, Ruling 2 did not address
whether that requirement had been met by Palm Valley. Ruling 2 also declined to consider
Ruffino as it was issued after the pending litigation was filed. Id.

McAlister filed a Special Action to the Arizona Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
issued its Mandate on December 24, 2024, and remanded the matter to this Court on February 6,
2025.2 The Court of Appeals took no position on the merits of the questions presented in Ruffino
but found this Court erred in refusing to consider it. The Court of Appeals directed this Court to
consider whether service was proper under the standards set by Ruffino.

On remand, this Court has reviewed Ruffino and the record on appeal. The Complaint
was filed on May 26, 2025. Attached to same was Exhibit “A” which contained ledgers of the
alleged debt and indicated as of October 13, 2013, at least, Palm Valley believed McAlister
resided at a house on Windsor.3 See Complaint. The Summons, however, listed his mailing
address as El Nido. See Summons, dated May 28, 2015.

On September 8, 2015, Palm Valley sought an extension of time to serve McAlister. See
Rule 113(i) Motion for Extension of Service Deadlines. Palm Valley supported the request by
stating that McAlister was “unknown” at the El Nido address and that a skip trace to find other
possible addresses had not been successful. Id. It argued it was evaluating the possibility of
serving McAlister via publication. Id. The trial court granted that extension and ordered
McAlister served on or before December 14, 2015. See Order Granting Extension of Service of
Process Deadline, filed September 14, 2015. The service deadline was extended again when
Palm Valley argued it needed until December 5, 2015, to finalize service by publication. See
Order Granting Extension of Service of Process Deadline filed December 4, 2015.

On December 22, 2015, Palm Valley filed its Notice of Filing Affidavit of Publication for
Mark. A. McAlister and Cynthia A. McAlister (“Affidavit”). The affidavit stated only that
service was attempted at an address on Hubbell one time. It said no other records were successful

2 There was an administrative error in the receipt of the mandate and letter. This Court did not receive notification
of same until May 22, 2025, when counsel for the parties contacted the division to inquire about a ruling.
3 For ease of reference, privacy and because the actual physical addresses are immaterial to this review, each address
will only be identified by its coordinating street name.

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regarding other addresses from the skip trace. Id. The Affidavit neglected to attest that the
Summons and Complaint were mailed to the last known address and instead appeared to suggest
that mailing requirement was unnecessary as Palm Valley did not have a last known address for
McAlister. On February 22, 2016, the Entry of Default was filed. On July 12, 2016, the Default
Judgment was entered in the amount of $6,241.16.

On November 3, 2023, McAlister filed his Motion to Set Aside Default and Default
Judgment. (“Motion”) He argued that not only had Palm Valley not mailed the Summons and
Complaint to his last known address pursuant to Rule 4.1(k)(2), but also that it made no
reasonable efforts under Rule 4.1(l)(1) to effect personal service. The Motion alleged the
following: Palm Valley knew McAlister had moved from Hubbel in September 2008. Id. at 5:3-
5. In 2010, Palm Valley secured and recorded a judgment against him and filed an information
sheet avowing it knew McAlister lived at the Windsor address. Id. at 5:5-7. McAlister also noted
that he had a family court matter in 2015 which a cursory review would have shown him listed
with an address on Palm Lane. Id. at 5:8-13.4 He noted Palm Valley tried to serve him only once
and at the Hubbell address; seven years after he lived there and many years after he lived at
addresses known to Palm Valley. Id. at 5:13-14.

Attached to the Motion was a Declaration of McAlister listing his addresses as follows:

2002-June 2006

Windsor
June 2006-September 2008

Hubbell
September 2008-2010

Windsor
2010-approx. November 2013
El Nido
Approx. November 2013-2016
Palm Lane

As proof of Palm Valley’s knowledge of McAlister’s residences during the time periods
in his Declaration, he also attached documents that included a Judgment entered against him in
CC2009-408660 in which Palm Valley was the Plaintiff (represented by the same law firm)
listing his last known address on Windsor. See Information Sheet. He provided his change of
address from his family court documents dated November 25, 2013, which indicated he had
moved from El Nido to Palm Lane. Id. He also attached the information sheet filed with the
Judgment entered in this case on December 7, 2016. Palm Valley had listed McAlister’s address
as the Palm Lane one for purposes of collection. In essence, McAlister avowed he lived at Palm
Lane and Palm Valley knew it.

4 This argument is less compelling as while it was a public document easily obtainable, the other information was
directly in the possession of Palm Valley.

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In Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant Mark A. McAlister’s Motion to Set Aside
(“Response”), Palm Valley indicated for the first time that it had mailed demand correspondence
pre-litigation to the El Nido address. Response at 2:14-19. It did not indicate those mailings
were returned. It also stated for the first time that it attempted service at El Nido on June 6, 2015,
and was told no one by that name resided there. Id. at 2:20-23. Palm Valley next did the skip
trace it referenced in its Affidavit and stated the Hubbell, Windsor and Palm Lane addresses
were discovered. Id. at 3:1-6.

Palm Valley attempted service at Palm Lane five times between June 11, 2015, and June
20, 2015. Id. at 3:7-13. Each time, there were vehicles in the driveway and individuals could be
seen in the house but did not answer the door. Id. Neighbors said one of the residents was named
Gage McAlister. Id. This was the first time the record indicated any service attempts at the
address McAlister avowed was his.

Palm Valley then made one attempt at Hubbell. Id. Inexplicably, the only information
contained in the Affidavit was that one service attempt was made at Hubbell and that the
representation in support of service by publication was not that McAlister was evading service,
as it appears he may have been on Palm Lane, but rather that Palm Valley did not know where he
was. Id.

Palm Valley never left copies of the Summons and Complaint at any of the three
addresses it now represented it had attempted to serve, nor did it mail them to the Palm Lane
address where it believed McAlister was avoiding service. The trial court denied the Motion
without comment. See Ruling on Motion December 18, 2023.

These facts are relevant to this Court’s review of Ruffino and its application to this case.
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that because it appears Palm Valley had at least three
addresses for McAlister, and it represented as early as December 7, 2015 that Palm Lane was his
“last known”, it may well be that it failed to comply with the old version of Rule 4.1 by not
attempting to mail copies of the Summons and Complaint to that address and instead
representing in its Affidavit that it did not have any possible last known addresses. As a matter of
law then, service by publication may well have been improper under either version of the Rules.

Palm Valley had no less than three addresses it believed McAlister had been associated
with. It was able to confirm he no longer resided at the Hubbell or El Nido addresses. Palm
Valley believed McAlister was living at the Palm Lane address. It sent a process server to that
home five times. It had reason to believe he was evading service at that address. McAlister
admitted he was residing at that address during the time Palm Valley was attempting service.
The question under Ruffino is whether, in light of these facts, Palm Valley made reasonable
efforts at alternative service for McAlister. The Court finds it did not.

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In Ruffino, as here, Plaintiff made attempts to serve Defendant at three addresses. Ruffino,
245 Ariz. at 167. At the first, Lokosky [Defendant]’s mother said she did not live there. At the
second, a tenant stated that Defendant did not live there. Id. The third house appeared
unoccupied. Id. Ruffino sought permission for alternative service by posting the complaint on the
doors of the two properties which appeared occupied and mailing a copy of the summons and to
those addresses. Id. In the alternative, Ruffino sought service by publication. Id.

The court denied the motion. It stated only one attempt at each of the occupied locations
had been attempted and that was during the holidays. Id. Despite the denial, Ruffino made only
one more attempt at one address then served via publication. Id. Once done, a default judgment
was entered. Id. Defendant became aware of the judgment and filed a motion to set it aside. Id. at
168.

During the evidentiary hearing, the superior court made oral findings of fact as follows:

(1) the process server did not identify herself to Lokosky's mother when she attempted
service at the Hartford address;
(2) the process server left no documentation at the Hartford address regarding the suit;
(3) Lokosky was not evading service;
(4) Ruffino could have communicated with Lokosky about service through several online
channels;
(5) Ruffino did not use any of those channels to let Lokosky know of the suit.
After the hearing, the court granted Lokosky's motion and vacated the judgment based on
insufficient service.

Id. at 168.

In this case, there is no evidence that the process server tried to identify himself through
the door, but the record is clear he was unable to speak to anyone at the Palm Lane address. The
process server left no documentation at the Palm Lane address. However, there was evidence in
the Response that McAlister may have been evading service.

The subject matter of Ruffino involved social media/the internet. Thus, it was important
perhaps to note the ease of which communication could have been had using internet
capabilities. Here, the record does not contain any references to how the parties communicated
with one another or whether Palm Valley had current phone number or email addresses for
McAlister. There is no evidence in the record on that issue, so the Court cannot assume, as
McAlister requests, that contact via those mediums was the best method simply because most

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MARICOPA COUNTY

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Form L000
Page 6

people communicate that way these days. That may be a correct general statement, but it is not
factually supported in this record.

Under Rule 4.1(l ), service by publication may be made “only if” (1) “the serving party,
despite reasonably diligent efforts, has been unable to ascertain the person's current
address,” or (2) “the person to be served has intentionally avoided service of process,” and
(3) “service by publication is the best means practicable in the circumstances for providing
the person with notice.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(l ); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(k)(3) (“A party
may serve by publication only if the requirements of Rule 4.1(l ) ... are met....”). Further, if
the serving party knows the person's address, the serving party must mail the summons
and complaint to the person “on or before the date of first publication.” Ariz. R. Civ. P.
4.1(l )(3).

Ruffino, 245 Ariz. at 169.

In its de novo review, the three-prong analysis of Ruffino here, is slightly different than
what was presented to the trial court, although the conclusion is the same. The focus with the
trial court was under prong one. Palm Valley argues it made reasonable efforts to locate
McAlister, who argued it did not. Palm Valley did establish, although it did not argue this point
initially, that under prong two, McAlister appeared to be evading service at the Palm Lane
address. In Ruffino, the court found the opposite: that Ruffino had not established the defendant
was evading service as only two attempts at service were made, the process server did not
identify herself to defendant’s mother who answered the door the first time, and no one answered
the second time. “Without more we cannot hold Lokosky was evading service under the rule”.
Id. In this case, there was more.

There were five attempts at service at Palm Lane, an address McAlister admits residing at
during the time of the attempted service. There were people in the home each time who it
appears refused to come to the door. Neighbors said there was a person with the same last name
living there. McAlister later admitted that was his address at the time Palm Valley was
attempting service. It would be reasonable to assume McAlister was evading service. This Court
finds a de novo review of the record provide sufficient evidence Palm Valley would have met
prong two had it made that argument in its Affidavit, and did make it in its Response. The Court
must then consider whether publication was the best practical means under the circumstances for
prong three. Here it was not.

Palm Valley could have posted copies of the Summons on the Palm Lane door. It could
have mailed them to McAlister at the Palm Lane address. While Ruffino did not make
reasonable efforts to find the defendant, the fact McAlister was likely at the Palm Lane address

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Docket Code 513
Form L000
Page 7

suggests serving him by alternative means, at that address, would have been a better means of
service than publication:

Availability of alternative means of service is a factor a court must consider when
determining if publication was the best means practicable, and a plaintiff serving by
publication should be prepared to explain why alternative service would be impracticable.
… Ruffino did not mail a copy of the summons and complaint to the Hartford address on
the date of publication, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.1(l )(3), which is further evidence he did not
make a serious effort to apprise Lokosky of the suit before seeking and obtaining a default
judgment.
***

Our holding does not require a party serving by publication to search out every channel
possible to communicate with the other party before serving by publication. However,
when more practicable channels of communication are available, we hold a serving party
should first use those channels to attempt to confirm the other party's address, or move for
alternative service, before service by publication can be considered the best means
practicable under the rule. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court order vacating the
default judgment as void for lack of service.

Ruffino, 245 Ariz. at 170.

The court has considered the Ruffino factors and the old version of Rule 4.1. While
Ruffino was decided under prong one, and the facts of this case fall more squarely under prong
two, the conclusion is the same. Service by publication is not an efficient way to provide notice
of litigation. Where possible, other means of alternative service should be attempted. Palm
Valley showed no evidence, either in its Affidavit or in its Response to the Motion to Set Aside
many years later, that it attempted anything other than personal service and then publication. In
order to meet prong three, “service by publication is the best means practicable in the
circumstances for providing the person with notice” Rule 4.1, and Ruffino require more. Palm
Valley’s “jump” from personal service to publication, without some other alternative means, did
not establish service was proper.

This Court has now considered the holding of Ruffino in light, the old version of Rule
4.1, and the record in this case.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED vacating the Judgment of the White Tanks Justice Court.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

05/27/2025

Docket Code 513
Form L000
Page 8

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this matter to the White Tanks Justice Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED signing this minute entry as a formal order of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further matters remain pending between the parties
and this ruling constitutes this Court’s final decision for purposes of Ariz.R.Civ.P 54(c) and
Sup.Ct.R. App. P.-Civil R. 12(d).

THE HON. JULIE A. LAFAVE

Judicial Officer of the Superior Court

NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a
document, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have
to deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

05/29/2024 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

05/28/2024

Docket Code 023
Form L000
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JULIE A. LAFAVE
N. Johnson

Deputy

PALM VALLEY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION TREVOR L ASH

v.

CYNTHIA A MCALISTER (001)
MARK A MCALISTER (001)
WILLIAM R RICHARDSON

COMM. LAFAVE
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
WHITE TANK JUSTICE COURT

MINUTE ENTRY

White Tank Justice Court Case No. CC2015095536RC

On May 14, 2024, this Court issued its Ruling in the above referenced matter. Relying on
the text of Rule 4.1, Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, the Ruling vacated the trial court’s
Judgment. On May 24, 2024, Appellee filed its Motion for Rehearing and requested Oral
Argument (“Motion”). Appellee argues the Court made a legal error in relying upon the current
version of Rule 4.1, rather than that in effect at the time the lawsuit was filed. Appellee may be
correct in that assertion. Therefore, Appellant shall be provided the opportunity to respond prior
to any determination. However, oral argument is not necessary to determine which version of the
rule applied at the time of the Judgment.

Appellee filed a request for attorneys’ fees and costs. As the result of this Motion for
Reconsideration my alter the prevailing party on appeal, that motion will be held in abeyance until
the issue of reconsideration is resolved.

Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting the Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration.
The Court will permit briefing on this issue only.

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MARICOPA COUNTY

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Docket Code 023
Form L000
Page 2

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Appellant will have fourteen (14) days from issuance of
this Minute Entry to file any response or objection to the Motion. This court will rule on the
Motion following the expiration of that deadline. No reply will be permitted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the request for oral argument as the Motion will
be determined as a matter of law for which oral argument would not assist.

NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a
document, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have
to deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

06/24/2024 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

06/21/2024

Docket Code 512
Form L000
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JULIE A. LAFAVE
S. Motzer

Deputy

PALM VALLEY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION TREVOR L ASH

v.

CYNTHIA A MCALISTER (001)
MARK A MCALISTER (001)
WILLIAM R RICHARDSON

COMM. LAFAVE
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
WHITE TANK JUSTICE COURT

MOTION TO RECONSIDER GRANTED-RULING JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

White Tank Justice Court Case No. CC2015-095536

On May 14, 2024, this Court entered its Ruling reversing the trial court’s granting of a
default Judgment against Appellant MARK A. MCALISTER. On May 24, 2024, Appellee filed
a Motion for Rehearing (“Motion”). Appellee properly argued that the Court vacated the Ruling
based on a de novo review of Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“ARCP”) Rule 4.1(l). See Motion.

Appellee’s seeks reconsideration of the Ruling arguing this Court applied an incorrect
version of the rule. Id. While the Ruling is being vacated on the sole issue of that misapplication,
the procedural history and discussion remain salient and are incorporated herein. The case was
filed on May 28, 2015. See Complaint. At that time, ARCP Rule 4.1(l) read in relevant part as
follows:

(l) Service by Publication; Return. Where the person to be served is one whose residence
is unknown to the party seeking service but whose last known residence address was within the
state, or has avoided service of process, and service by publication is the best means practicable
under the circumstances for providing notice of the institution of the action, then service may be
made by publication in accordance with the requirements of this subpart. ..The party or officer

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Form L000
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making service shall file an affidavit showing the manner and dates of the publication and mailing,
and the circumstances warranting the utilization of the procedure authorized by this subpart,
which shall be prima facie evidence of compliance herewith. A printed copy of the publication
shall accompany the affidavit. If the residence of the party being served is unknown, and for that
reason no mailing was made, the affidavit shall so state.

As noted in the Ruling, the current version of ARCP Rule 4.1(l) requires a motion prior to
effectuating service. The earlier version did not. The record indicates Appellee complied with the
requirement to serve by publication and presented valid argument in its Motion for Default and
Affidavit of Service to satisfy the requirements in effect at the time. The trial court considered
those arguments and found service by publication was proper.

On June 11, 2024, Appellant filed his Response to Motion for Rehearing/Reconsideration
(“Response”). It argues only that there was a change in the law and provides the Court with the
basis for that change and rationale for same. See Response. In fact, this case may well be the type
that led to the very change the Response outlines. Appellant argues that under subsequent case
law, service by publication would still not have been sufficient. Id. Unfortunately, the case relied
upon also was not authored prior to the current litigation and thus is not authoritative. In addition,
the briefing provided to the trial court in the matter indicate Appellee had made diligent efforts at
service, and the trial court, in its discretion, agreed.

In 2015 when this case was filed and served, Appellee complied with the law. The Ruling
applied an erroneous later version in its decision and therefore this Court must reverse the Ruling
to comply with the law as it applied at the time.

Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting Appellee’s Motion.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED affirming the Judgment of the White Tanks Justice Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this matter to the White Tanks Justice Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Appellant’s Application for Attorneys’ Fees and
Costs as he is not the prevailing party on appeal.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Appellee file any request for Fees and Costs pursuant to
Superior Court Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 13 within ten days of this Order.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

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06/21/2024

Docket Code 512
Form L000
Page 3

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED signing this minute entry as a formal order of the Court.

NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a
document, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have to
deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

07/01/2025 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

06/30/2025

Docket Code 019
Form L000
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JULIE A. LAFAVE
J. Eaton

Deputy

PALM VALLEY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION TREVOR L ASH

v.

CYNTHIA A MCALISTER (001)
MARK A MCALISTER (001)
WILLIAM R RICHARDSON

COMM. LAFAVE
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
WHITE TANK JUSTICE COURT

MINUTE ENTRY

White Tank Justice Court Case No. CC2015095536RC

On May 28, 2025, this Court issued its final ruling on the merits of the case following the
mandate from the Court of Appeals. Pending before this Court from that time are the following
motions:

 McAlister’s Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and Declaration in
support of Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (collectively “Fee
Application”) filed June 10, 2025
 Palm Valley Community Association’s (“Palm Valley”) Motion for Rehearing (Oral
Argument Requested) filed June 13, 20251

1 This represents McAlister’s second request for Oral Argument related to a Motion for Reconsideration/Rehearing.
See also Motion for Rehearing, filed May 24, 2024. The Motion’s request for Oral Argument is not supported by
law. See SCRAP Rule 14(a)(“On motion for rehearing there shall be no oral argument unless requested by the
court”).

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 Palm Valley’s Motion to Enlarge Time to File Motion for Rehearing (“Motion”) filed
June 13, 20252
 McAlister’s Response to the Motion to Extend Time to file Motion for Reconsideration
(“Response”) filed June 18, 2025
 Palm Valley’s Reply in Support of Motion to Enlarge Time to File Motion for Rehearing
filed June 20, 20253
 Palm Valley’s Objection to Application for Attorney Fees file June 23, 2025

A cursory review of the Superior Court Rules of Appellate Procedure-Civil (“SCRAP”)
and Maricopa County Local Rules, provide the grounds for ruling on each of these pending
motions.

Palm Valley argues the Motion should be granted due to excusable neglect because
“counsel’s filing provide a general email box for delivery of documents, and counsel has no
record of receipt of the ruling at that email address or any other, or via mail or any other means.
The Plaintiff had no other means of being made aware of the Court’s ruling or what the ruling
said.” Motion at 2: 9-14. The Clerk of Court (“Clerk”) does not obtain contact information from
the party’s filings. Palm Valley’s record attorney was listed as Trevor Ash at the Oswalt Law
Firm. The Clerk provided the following additional information regarding contact information in
its possession:

The contact information was created in April 2020; once we verify the status of an attorney,
we then input that information into [Superior Court’s contact information] and until we
receive notification that the attorney has changed firms (either a Notice of Appearance, or
an updated attorney address change form), that information remains the same.

If we receive a Returned Mail or if an email was returned undeliverable, then staff will
review the docket for the latest pleading or other documents to verify where the attorney
works. We would then send an address update form to the attorney to verify, and then
maintain that form as a source document.

It appears Mr. Ash had been employed at another firm but at the time of this case, was
filing pleadings from the law firm of Maxwell & Morgan. While that contact was, as Palm Valley
argues, contained in the pleadings, that was not sufficient under the rules:

2 This represents the second request for this Court to provide time beyond that prescribed under the rules for Palm
Valley’s briefing. See Motion to Enlarge Time to File Fee Application, July 24, 2024.
3 SCRAP Rule 14 does not provide for Replies.

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Docket Code 019
Form L000
Page 3

Each attorney shall promptly advise the Clerk of the Superior Court and the Court
Administrator, separately and in writing, of that attorney’s office address, telephone
number, e-mail address, or law firm affiliation if it is different from that listed in the
current Directory of the State Bar of Arizona or is omitted from the directory. The Clerk of
the Superior Court and the Court Administrator shall promptly note that information on
the records of their offices, together with the date of receipt of that information, and they
shall not otherwise be responsible for the office address, telephone number, email address,
or law firm affiliation of any attorney.

Superior Court Local Rules-Maricopa Country Rule 2.10(a).

Rulings were sent to the email listed at the State Bar address. Palm Valley appears to have
received communication from the Court while Mr. Ash was working on the case, despite the
incorrect email provided. Palm Valley has not alleged it failed to receive rulings from the Court
until more recently. The Court will not opine as to whether they were forwarded on to him at a
new employment or how it was he continued to receive them. Mr. Ash filed pleadings in this case
until May 24, 2024.

While the firm listed on the pleadings was Maxwell & Morgan, P.C., Mr. Ash’s contact
information was not changed on the State Bar website nor was a Notice of Appearance or
Change of Firm filed with the Superior Court.4 On July 11, 2024, Garren Laymon, who appears
to also be an attorney at Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. began filing pleadings on behalf of Palm
Valley. No Notice of Appearance was filed for Mr. Laymon. There is no change of address or
notice of change of firm in the docket or in the record.

The Maricopa County Clerk of Court does not “keep track” of the movement of lawyers.
It does not open the docket for all the Minute Entry Orders sent to same nor confirm current
contact information as provided in pleadings. It follows the rules. Although it appears it does, as
a professional courtesy, try to find contact information if it becomes aware, through a return
mailing, that a ruling did not reach a party. While that is an appropriate and appreciated “extra
step” for the Clerk to engage in on behalf of the legal community and the litigants of Maricopa
County, as a matter of law, the obligation to keep the Court informed of contact information falls
to the attorney.

Even if the Clerk of Court had failed to convey the ruling on May 28, 2025, which it
clearly did not, that alone is not sufficient reason to obtain relief. See J.C. Penny v. Lane, 197
Ariz. 113, 117 (1999). Palm Valley would also had to have shown “other compelling
circumstances” for the neglect. Id. Palm Valley has cited no reason it was not monitoring the

4 The Court confirmed that as of June 26, 2025, Mr. Ash’s State Bar contact information remains at the Oswalt Law
Firm.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
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LC2024-000143-001 DT

06/30/2025

Docket Code 019
Form L000
Page 4

docket for a ruling on a case pending in Superior Court, updated proper contact information with
the Clerk, or filed a Notice of Appearance when new counsel began working on the matter.
Further, as referenced in the Response, McAlister contacted the Court (and copied Palm Valley
on the email) due to an administrative error, and both parties were informed the Ruling would be
issued shortly. Palm Valley was therefore put on notice that a Ruling was forthcoming. As a
matter of law, no excusable neglect has been alleged.

Palm Valley has not established sufficient grounds to grant the Motion. Mr. Ash had the
obligation to file new contact information with the State Bar and the Superior Court, and is
encouraged to do so at his earliest convenience. Mr. Laymon had the same obligation when he
began work on this matter. Fulfillment of either of those obligations would have corrected this
error before it occurred. Palm Valley has not shown excusable neglect in failing to file the
Motion in a timely manner.

As to the issue of Attorneys’ Fees, Palm Valley’s Objection is untimely. Palm Valley
makes clear it received McAlister’s Fee Application on June 10, 2025. It avows that was the
catalyst to contact the Court and determine a substantive ruling had already been issued. Despite
receipt of the Fee Application on June 10, 2025, Palm Valley did not file its Objection to same
until June 23, 2025. Objections to requests for attorneys’ fees must be filed within five days of
service of the request. SCRAP Rule 13(a). Palm Valley’s Objection was filed thirteen days after
the Fee Application. It is therefore untimely.

McAlister seeks leave to supplement his Fee Application to include fees generated since
the filing of his initial request. Within ten days from this Order, McAlister must file a request for
any supplemental Fees and a Proposed Form of Judgment to include all fees requested. The
request may include only fees generated since his initial filing. Palm Valley may file any
objection, limited only to Fees incurred since June 10, 2025, within five days of service of any
supplement.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED denying the request for Oral Argument.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Motion for Rehearing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED staying the request for Attorneys’ Fees until the time has
expired for any further briefing.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that for this Minute Entry only, Court staff is directed to
provide a copy of same directly to both parties via the email addresses they have provided to the

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

06/30/2025

Docket Code 019
Form L000
Page 5

division for communications. In future, rulings will be conveyed only through the Clerk of
Court as prescribed under the rule. The parties are encouraged to ensure those will be received
by filing the appropriate changes of address and/or Notices of appearance for their Superior
Court matters.

NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a
document, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have
to deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

07/15/2025 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

07/14/2025

Docket Code 049
Form L000
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JULIE A. LAFAVE
J. Eaton

Deputy

PALM VALLEY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION TREVOR L ASH

v.

CYNTHIA A MCALISTER (001)
MARK A MCALISTER (001)
WILLIAM R RICHARDSON

COMM. LAFAVE
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
WHITE TANK JUSTICE COURT

JUDGMENT SIGNED

White Tank Justice Court Case No. CC2015095536RC

The Court has reviewed Defendants/Judgment Debtors’ Cynthia A. McAlister and Mark
A. McAlister’s Declaration in Support of Supplemental Application for Award of Attorneys’
Fees and Costs and Supplemental Application for Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, both
filed July 7, 2025. Having reviewed and considered the Declaration and Supplemental
Application,

IT IS ORDERED granting the Application, all in accordance with the formal written Final
Judgment, signed by the Court on July 14, 2025 and filed (entered) by the Clerk on July 14, 2025.

No matters remain pending in connection with this appeal. This is a final order. See
Sup.Ct.R.App. P. 12(c), 12(d), 14(b), and Ariz.R.Civ.P. 54(c).

Please note: The Court has signed a paper copy of the Judgment which was originally
provided electronically. After the Judgment has been scanned and docketed by the Clerk of Court,
copies
of
this
Judgment
will
be
available
through
the
ECR
online
at
www.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

07/14/2025

Docket Code 049
Form L000
Page 2

NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a
document, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have
to deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

08/07/2024 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

08/06/2024

Docket Code 019
Form L000
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JULIE A. LAFAVE
T. DeRaddo

Deputy

PALM VALLEY COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION TREVOR L ASH

v.

CYNTHIA A MCALISTER (001)
MARK A MCALISTER (001)
WILLIAM R RICHARDSON

COMM. LAFAVE
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
WHITE TANK JUSTICE COURT

ORDER DENYING MOTION

White Tank Justice Court Case No: CC2015095536RC

On June 21, 2024, this Court granted the Motion for reconsideration and affirmed the
ruling of the trial court. See Motion to Reconsider Granted-Ruling Judgment Affirmed (“Order”).
Because the Order altered the prevailing party in the matter, Appellee was given ten (10) days to
file any request for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Superior Court Rules of Appellate
Procedure-Civil (“SCRAP) Rule 13.
The Order, and all others issued by the Lower Court Appeals, contained the following
language:
NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a
document, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will
have to deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

08/06/2024

Docket Code 019
Form L000
Page 2

On July 11, 2024, Appellee filed a Notice of Proposed Form of Judgment. The Notice is
signed on June 24, 2024, but the mailing certificate indicates it was provided to Appellant on
July 20, 2024. The accompanying Verified Statement of Costs and Notice of Taxation,
Declaration in support of Attorneys’ Fees and Application for Attorneys’ Fees (hereinafter
collectively in the singular as “Fee Application”) were also filed July 11, 2024, in Superior Court
but are signed June 28, 2024, and provided to Appellant on July 1, 2024. No conformed copies
of the above referenced documents were provided to this Court as directed.
On July 24, 2024, Appellee filed its Motion to Enlarge Time to File Fee Application
(“Motion”). The Motion indicates that Appellee directed its third-party delivery courier to file
the Fee Application on July 2, 2024, but for unknown reasons, that did not occur until July 11,
2024. The Motion argues, under Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 6(b)(1)(B), that this error
was excusable neglect and that the time for filing should be expanded. See Motion at 2:17.
Conversely, Appellee then argues Appellant should be precluded from responding due to a lack
of timeliness in filing. Id. at 2:24-25. On July 30, 2024, Appellant filed his Response to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Enlarge Time to File Fee Application. On August 2, 2024, Appellee filed its
Reply in Support of Motion to Enlarge Time to File Fee Application. The Reply is signed July
30, 2024, and indicates delivery to Appellant on August 1, 2024.
Both the Response and the Reply make further allegations against the characters of
counsel. They do not, however, provide this Court any support for an argument related to
excusable neglect. Specifically, Appellee was directed to provide conformed copies of filings to
this Court. Nothing in its filing suggests that part of the Court’s Order was complied with. Had
Appellee done so, it may have noticed earlier that the courier did not deliver a copy to chambers,
or a receipt for billing to do same, and thus likely had not filed the Fee Application. Appellee
also offers no explanation as to why it did not check the status of the Fee Application until July
22, 2024, well after any time to respond had expired. Appellee has not provided sufficient legal
argument of excusable neglect given his failure to follow other directives of the Court which
might have helped him determine the error more quickly. The Court must rely only on the filing
dates in the official docket; particularly in cases where the dates on various filings are internally
different and there is no reference to copies provided to this Court.

Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED denying the Motion to Enlarge Time.

//
//

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

LC2024-000143-001 DT

08/06/2024

Docket Code 019
Form L000
Page 3

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding the matter to the White Tank Justice Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED signing this Minute Entry as a formal Order of the Court.

NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a
document, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have
to deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.

Documents