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Maricopa County Superior Court Case CV2025-002634: public docket details, parties, minute entries, documents, and official source links for Sun City Grand Community Association Inc.

Case Number

CV2025-002634

County

Maricopa

Caption

Not captured

Filed

1/22/2025

Case Type

Civil

Judge

Mata, Julie

Location

Downtown

Official Court Record

Official Court Record

Parties

Minute Entries

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

02/27/2025 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

02/21/2025

Docket Code 022
Form V000A
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JENNIFER RYAN-TOUHILL
A. Meza

Deputy

THOMAS J GUSICH
JONATHAN A DESSAULES

v.

SUN CITY GRAND COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION INC
LAUREN ELLIOTT STINE

JUDGE RYAN-TOUHILL

MINUTE ENTRY

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s February 20, 2025, Motion to Exceed Page Limit for
Application for a Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support Thereof.

IT IS ORDERED granting the Motion, all in accordance with the formal written Order
Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Exceed Page Limit for Application for a Preliminary Injunction and
Memorandum in Support Thereof signed by the Court on February 21, 2025, and filed (entered)
by the Clerk on February 21, 2025.

Please note: The Court has signed a paper copy of the order which was originally provided
electronically. After the order has been scanned and docketed by the Clerk of Court, copies of this
order will be available through the ECR online at www.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov or through the
Public Access Terminals at the Clerk of Court’s offices located throughout Maricopa County.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

03/12/2025 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

03/07/2025

Docket Code 056
Form V000A
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JENNIFER RYAN-TOUHILL
C. Lockhart

Deputy

THOMAS J GUSICH
JONATHAN A DESSAULES

v.

SUN CITY GRAND COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION INC
LAUREN ELLIOTT STINE

DANIEL G ROBERTS
DAVID ERIC WOOD
JUDGE RYAN-TOUHILL

MINUTE ENTRY

East Court Building – Courtroom 414

10:20 a.m. This is the time set for a Return Order to Show Cause Hearing regarding
Plaintiff’s Application for an Order to Show Cause, filed February 20, 2025. Plaintiff, Thomas J.
Gusich, who is present, is represented by counsel, David Eric Wood on behalf of counsel of record
Jonathan A. Dessaules. Defendant, Sun City Grand Community Association, Inc., is represented
by counsel, Lauren Elliott Stine and Daniel G. Roberts. All appearances are virtual.

A record of the proceedings is made digitally in lieu of a court reporter.

The Court notes that the parties were properly served notice.

Argument is presented to the Court.

For the reasons set forth on the record,

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

03/07/2025

Docket Code 056
Form V000A
Page 2

IT IS ORDERED setting an Evidentiary Hearing on Plaintiff’s Application for an Order
to Show Cause, filed February 20, 2025 for May 22, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. (time allotted: 2 hours)
in this Division before:

The Honorable Jennifer Ryan-Touhill
Maricopa County Superior Court
East Court Building
101 W. Jefferson
4th Floor, Courtroom 414
Phoenix, AZ 85003
Phone: 602-372-0920

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall exchange with each other, and file
with the Court, a list of witnesses and exhibits no later than May 15, 2025.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the parties shall submit exhibits for the Evidentiary
Hearing to the Clerk in accordance with the directions provided below.

10:40 a.m. Matter concludes.

EXHIBIT REQUIREMENTS

IT IS ORDERED that the parties submit any proposed hearing exhibits as follows:

1. Submit Hearing Exhibits through Case Center. This division is using Case Center (also
known as Case Lines), a statewide electronic exhibit portal. Attorneys must submit exhibits
through Case Center; Self-Represented Litigants can request to opt-out of Case Center by
contacting
the
judge’s
division
at
[email protected]
and
[email protected] or (602) 372-0920. Unless otherwise ordered,
Exhibits must be submitted at least 5 business days before the hearing as provided below.

2. Opting Out of Case Center (Self-Represented Litigants only). A Self-Represented
Litigant may opt out of Case Center no less than 10 calendar days before the
trial/evidentiary hearing (or within 24 hours of being served with notice if the party is
served less than 10 calendar days before the evidentiary hearing). The Self-Represented
Litigant must email the other Self-Represented Litigants or counsel and the assigned
judicial division to notify the court that they are opting out and to request instructions for
submitting exhibits. Self-Represented Litigants must comply with the deadline for

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

03/07/2025

Docket Code 056
Form V000A
Page 3

submitting Exhibits. Each party must make sure the Court has the party’s valid current
email address. If you do not have an email address, you can obtain a free one through
accounts.google.com.
Each
party
must
register
for
Case
Center
at
www.azcourts.gov/digitalevidence. The website has links to training resources that will
guide you through uploading exhibits and navigating Case Center. The Clerk of Court will
email each party (or their attorney of record) a case-specific Case Center link that the party
will use to upload exhibits. For assistance with Case Center invitations only, email the
Clerk of Court at [email protected]. The email subject line should
include the case number. The body of the email should include the parties’ names, the
assigned judge’s name, and explain that the sender is requesting help with a Case Center
invitation.

3. Exhibit Format. Case Center accepts most digital formats (including photographs, PDFs,
Word files, audio files, and video files). Case Center automatically numbers the exhibits.
Plaintiff/Petitioner’s exhibits have an A- prefix (Exhibit A1, A2, etc.) and
Defendant/Respondent’s exhibits have a B- prefix (Exhibit B1, B2, etc.). During the
hearing, the parties must refer to exhibits using the Case Center exhibit numbers. For
assistance with Case Center, contact AOC Support Services at (602) 452-3519 (option 5)
or [email protected], Monday – Friday 7 AM – 6 PM, excluding State holidays.

4. Exhibit Upload Assistance.  Scanners are available at each of the regional court Law
Library Resource Centers. Each scanner has an attached computer and instructions on how
to upload exhibits into Case Center.

5. Exchange Exhibits. At least 5 business days (not including weekends) before the
hearing, you must give the other party copies of all exhibits you submitted for use at the
hearing.

6. Physical Exhibits. The Courtroom Clerk will handle marking physical exhibits for Self-
Represented Litigants who opt out of Case Center. Attorneys who submit physical exhibits
must create a placeholder in Case Center and include “Physical Exhibit” in the name of the
exhibit prior to submitting the physical exhibit(s) to the judge’s division. The collection
of physical exhibits must have a Physical Exhibit Case Coversheet that includes the
following: (1) the name of the party submitting the exhibit(s); (2) the case number; (3) the
date of hearing; and (4) the exhibit number(s) and description(s). In addition, each
individual exhibit must have an Exhibit Coversheet printed on color paper indicating the
physical exhibit’s exhibit number in Case Center. For Self-Represented Litigants, if any
individual exhibit is a document that is longer than ten (10) pages, each page of the exhibit
should be numbered. Division staff will provide the exhibits to the Courtroom Clerk for

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

03/07/2025

Docket Code 056
Form V000A
Page 4

marking. The Courtroom Clerk will mark physical exhibit(s) with the same exhibit number
used in Case Center.

7. Devices and WiFi. If needed, hearing participants may request to use a court-provided
devices to view and present exhibits during an evidentiary hearing. All requests for access
to a court-provided device must be submitted to the division via email 5 calendar days
before the Hearing. Hearing participants can connect to the court’s free MCPUBLIC WiFi
for up to 90 minutes. For evidentiary hearings/trials longer than 90 minutes, WiFi users,
the parties may request access to MCSponsored WiFi which will allow access to WiFi
without the need to reconnect after 90 minutes by emailing the assigned division 10
calendar days in advance of any Hearing. Self-Represented Litigant access will be valid
for 60 days; lawyer and nonlawyer representative access will be valid for 365 days.
8. Remote Witnesses. Any party who calls a witness who is appearing remotely (i.e., by
telephone or videoconference) should either (1) provide the witness with a copy of all
exhibits or (2) ensure that the remote witness has an electronic device available that allows
them to view exhibits displayed on a screen through either Case Center or Teams.
9. Exhibit Presentation During Hearings. Unless indicated otherwise in any hearing-
specific court minute entry or order, offerors may, but are not required to, use Case Center
to present (e.g., show to the court, a witness, or the jury) evidence during a Hearing.
Options for presentation of evidence include but are not limited to the following: (1) use
of paper copies of the exhibits that have been uploaded to Case Center; (2) use of evidence
presentation software and/or PDF viewers to display PDFs of exhibits that have been
uploaded to Case Center; (3) screen sharing of Case Center through Court Connect
(Teams); and (4) use of Case Center “Presentation” mode to share exhibits. Parties are
strongly encouraged to download PDFs of their Case Center exhibits and/or have paper
copies available in the event there are technological difficulties in the courtroom.
10. Additional resources. For Case Center related training and questions, the parties may
wish to visit the Thomson Reuters Case Center Home Page at

https://answers.legalprof.thomsonreuters.com/casecenter-us/search. For technical issues
with Case Center, parties may contact AOC Support Services Monday – Friday from 7:00
AM – 6:00 PM, excluding State holidays, at (602) 452-3519, 1-800-720-7743 (toll free),
or [email protected]. The parties may also wish to review A.O. 2024-080 at
ao2024-080-re-use-of-case-center-in-the-civil-department.pdf
(maricopa.gov)
for
additional information regarding Case Center.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

03/07/2025

Docket Code 056
Form V000A
Page 5

NOTE: All court proceedings are recorded by audio and video method and not by a court
reporter. Pursuant to Local Rule 2.22, if a party desires a court reporter for any proceeding in
which a court reporter is not mandated by Arizona Supreme Court Rule 30, the party must submit
a written request to the assigned judicial officer at least ten (10) judicial days in advance of the
hearing, and must pay the authorized fee to the Clerk of the Court at least two (2) judicial days
before the proceeding. The fee is $140 for a half-day and $280 for a full day.

NOTE: The proceedings will take place in the Superior Court’s “e courtroom.” A record
of the proceedings will be made digitally in lieu of a court reporter. Should you want an unofficial
copy of the proceedings, the parties or counsel may request a videotape or CD of the proceedings
for a $30.00 charge.

The Arizona Constitution requires the Arizona Commission on Judicial
Performance Review to conduct performance evaluations of superior court judges. The
Commission is asking for your help to evaluate Maricopa County Superior Court judges
currently undergoing performance review. After your hearing, if the judge you are in front
of is undergoing review, a survey will either be given to you by court staff or will be
emailed to you and you can take the survey online. The survey is conducted by the Docking
Institute of Public Affairs at Fort Hays State University and is anonymous and confidential.
Your participation in the review process is important! More information on Judicial
Performance Review can be found at azjudges.info.

La Constitución de Arizona exige que la Comisión de la Evaluación del Desempeño
Judicial realice evaluaciones de desempeño de los jueces de los tribunales superiores. La
comisión pide su ayuda para evaluar a los jueces del Tribunal Superior del Condado de
Maricopa a quienes actualmente se les está evaluando su desempeño. Después de su
audiencia, si el juez frente a usted está siendo revisado, el personal de la corte le entregará
una encuesta o se le enviará por correo electrónico y usted puede realizar la encuesta en
línea. La encuesta es realizada por el Docking Institute of Public Affairs de la Fort Hays
State University y se mantiene anónima y confidencial. ¡Su participación en el proceso de
la evaluación es importante! Para obtener más información sobre la evaluación del
desempeño judicial, diríjase a azjudges.info.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

05/19/2025 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

05/15/2025

Docket Code 094
Form V000A
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JENNIFER RYAN-TOUHILL
T. Williams

Deputy

THOMAS J GUSICH
JONATHAN A DESSAULES

v.

SUN CITY GRAND COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION INC
LAUREN ELLIOTT STINE

JUDGE RYAN-TOUHILL

MINUTE ENTRY

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint,
filed April 9, 2025, Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Dismiss, filed April 25, 2025, and
Defendant’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, filed
May 8, 2025.

Oral argument having been requested,

IT IS ORDERED setting Oral Argument regarding the parties Motion, Response, and
Reply, on May 22, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. (time allotted: 2 hours) in this Division. Counsel and the
parties, if representing themselves, shall appear in person before:

The Honorable Jennifer Ryan-Touhill
Maricopa County Superior Court
East Court Building
101 W. Jefferson
4th Floor, Courtroom 414
Phoenix, AZ 85003

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

05/15/2025

Docket Code 094
Form V000A
Page 2

Phone: 602-372-0920

Oral argument shall be limited to 2 hours with the time divided equally between the sides.

NOTE: All court proceedings are recorded digitally and not by a court reporter. Pursuant
to Local Rule 2.22, if a party desires a court reporter for any proceeding in which a court reporter
is not mandated by Arizona Supreme Court Rule 30, the party must submit a written request to the
assigned judicial officer at least ten (10) judicial days in advance of the hearing and must pay the
authorized fee to the Clerk of the Court at least two (2) judicial days before the proceeding. The
fee is $140 for a half-day and $280 for a full day.

The Arizona Constitution requires the Arizona Commission on Judicial
Performance Review to conduct performance evaluations of superior court judges. The
Commission is asking for your help to evaluate Maricopa County Superior Court judges
currently undergoing performance review. After your hearing, if the judge you are in front
of is undergoing review, a survey will either be given to you by court staff or will be
emailed to you and you can take the survey online. The survey is conducted by the Docking
Institute of Public Affairs at Fort Hays State University and is anonymous and confidential.
Your participation in the review process is important! More information on Judicial
Performance Review can be found at azjudges.info.

La Constitución de Arizona exige que la Comisión de la Evaluación del Desempeño
Judicial realice evaluaciones de desempeño de los jueces de los tribunales superiores. La comisión
pide su ayuda para evaluar a los jueces del Tribunal Superior del Condado de Maricopa a quienes
actualmente se les está evaluando su desempeño. Después de su audiencia, si el juez frente a usted
está siendo revisado, el personal de la corte le entregará una encuesta o se le enviará por correo
electrónico y usted puede realizar la encuesta en línea. La encuesta es realizada por el Docking
Institute of Public Affairs de la Fort Hays State University y se mantiene anónima y confidencial.
¡Su participación en el proceso de la evaluación es importante! Para obtener más información
sobre la evaluación del desempeño judicial, diríjase a azjudges.info.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

05/28/2025 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

05/22/2025

Docket Code 083
Form V000A
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JENNIFER RYAN-TOUHILL
C. Lacey

Deputy

THOMAS J GUSICH
JONATHAN A DESSAULES

v.

SUN CITY GRAND COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION INC
LAUREN ELLIOTT STINE

DAVID ERIC WOOD
CURTIS S EKMARK
DANIEL G ROBERTS
JUDGE RYAN-TOUHILL

MINUTE ENTRY

Prior to the commencement of the hearing, Plaintiff’s exhibits 1 through 22 and
Defendant’s exhibits 1 through 23 are submitted electronically.

East Court Building - Courtroom 414

10:05 a.m. This is the time set for an Evidentiary Hearing. Plaintiff, Thomas J. Gusich,
who is present, is represented by counsel, Jonathan A. Dessaules, David E. Wood, and Curtis S.
Ekmark. Defendant, Sun City Grand Community Association, is represented by counsel, Lauren
E. Stine, Daniel G. Roberts, and Jack Contrera.

A record of the proceedings is made digitally in lieu of a court reporter.

Discussion is held regarding Nancy M. Collins’ Motion to Quash Witness Subpoena, filed
May 19, 2025.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

05/22/2025

Docket Code 083
Form V000A
Page 2

Counsel agree on the record to release Nancy M. Collins as a witness in this matter.
Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED granting the Motion and releasing Nancy M. Collins from her subpoena.

The Rule of Exclusion of Witnesses is invoked.

10:10 a.m. The Court and counsel confer in chambers. Court stands at recess.

10:13 a.m. Court reconvenes with respective parties and counsel present.

A record of the proceedings is made digitally in lieu of a court reporter.

The Court provides a summary of the bench conference. The Court and counsel discussed
possible ethical concerns regarding Mr. Wood’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing while
representing Plaintiff.

Discussion is held regarding pretrial disclosure and the potential requirement for a
custodian of records. The parties, as officers of the court, stipulate to Defendant’s electronic
delivery of records regarding the petition and accompanying emails.

The Court declines to discuss or decide admissibility beyond foundation for record
disclosure.

For reasons stated on the record,

IT IS ORDERED continuing this Evidentiary Hearing to July 24, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. (2
hours allotted) in this Division.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting Oral Argument on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, filed April 9, 2025, on June 24, 2025 at 10:00 a.m. (1 hour
allotted) in this Division. Counsel and the parties, if representing themselves, shall appear in
person before:

The Honorable Jennifer Ryan-Touhill
Maricopa County Superior Court
East Court Building
101 W. Jefferson
4th Floor, Courtroom 414

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

05/22/2025

Docket Code 083
Form V000A
Page 3

Phoenix, AZ 85003
Phone: 602-372-0920

Oral argument shall be limited to 1 hour with the time divided equally between the sides.

The Court advises the parties that its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss is likely to issue well
in advance of the Evidentiary Hearing date.

10:48 a.m. Matter concludes.

NOTE: All court proceedings are recorded digitally and not by a court reporter. Pursuant
to Local Rule 2.22, if a party desires a court reporter for any proceeding in which a court reporter
is not mandated by Arizona Supreme Court Rule 30, the party must submit a written request to the
assigned judicial officer at least ten (10) judicial days in advance of the hearing, and must pay the
authorized fee to the Clerk of the Court at least two (2) judicial days before the proceeding. The
fee is $140 for a half-day and $280 for a full day.

JPR NOTICE

The Arizona Constitution requires the Arizona Commission on Judicial Performance
Review to conduct performance evaluations of superior court judges. The Commission is asking
for your help to evaluate Maricopa County Superior Court judges currently undergoing
performance review. After your hearing, if the judge you are in front of is undergoing review, a
survey will either be given to you by court staff or will be emailed to you and you can take the
survey online. The survey is conducted by the Docking Institute of Public Affairs at Fort Hays
State University and is anonymous and confidential. Your participation in the review process is
important! More information on Judicial Performance Review can be found at azjudges.info.

La Constitución de Arizona exige que la Comisión de la Evaluación del Desempeño
Judicial realice evaluaciones de desempeño de los jueces de los tribunales superiores. La comisión
pide su ayuda para evaluar a los jueces del Tribunal Superior del Condado de Maricopa a quienes
actualmente se les está evaluando su desempeño. Después de su audiencia, si el juez frente a usted
está siendo revisado, el personal de la corte le entregará una encuesta o se le enviará por correo
electrónico y usted puede realizar la encuesta en línea. La encuesta es realizada por el Docking
Institute of Public Affairs de la Fort Hays State University y se mantiene anónima y confidencial.
¡Su participación en el proceso de la evaluación es importante! Para obtener más información
sobre la evaluación del desempeño judicial, diríjase a azjudges.info.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

07/01/2025 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

06/24/2025

Docket Code 020
Form V000A
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JENNIFER RYAN-TOUHILL
A. Larimer

Deputy

THOMAS J GUSICH
JONATHAN A DESSAULES

v.

SUN CITY GRAND COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION INC
LAUREN ELLIOTT STINE

DAVID ERIC WOOD
JUDGE RYAN-TOUHILL

MINUTE ENTRY

East Court Building – Courtroom 414

10:00 a.m. This is the time set for an Oral Argument on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, filed April 9, 2025, and Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint,
filed February 20, 2025. Plaintiff Thomas J. Gusich is present, and represented by counsel, David
Eric Wood, and counsel, Joseph Halow, on behalf of counsel, Jonathan A. Dessaules. Defendant
Sun City Grand Community Association, Inc., is represented by counsel, Lauren Elliott Stine, and
counsel, Jack Contrera.

A record of the proceedings is made digitally in lieu of a court reporter.

The Court has received and reviewed the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint, and Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.

Arguments are presented.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

06/24/2025

Docket Code 020
Form V000A
Page 2

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED taking this matter under advisement.

10:58 a.m. Matter concludes.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

07/11/2025 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

07/09/2025

Docket Code 926
Form V000A
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JENNIFER RYAN-TOUHILL
C. Lockhart

Deputy

THOMAS J GUSICH
JONATHAN A DESSAULES

v.

SUN CITY GRAND COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION INC
LAUREN ELLIOTT STINE

DANIEL G ROBERTS
JUDGE RYAN-TOUHILL

RULING

Before the Court is Defendant’s April 9, 2025, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint (MTD), Plaintiff’s April 25, 2025, Response to Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant’s
May 8, 2025, Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. For
this Ruling, the Court has considered the filings and arguments presented by Defendant, the
applicable authority and law, and the relevant record of the case.

Preliminarily, the Court owes the parties an apology. The Court previously set the parties’
evidentiary hearing for May 22, 2025, and simply forgot that the Court consolidated the MTD with
the evidentiary hearing. The Court cannot recall why it decided to consolidate the hearings—they
serve two different purposes and time spent on one (e.g., calling witnesses) would have limited
time to address the other (e.g., present oral argument). Regardless, the parties and Court reset the
oral argument for June 24, 2025.1

1 The evidentiary hearing is continued to July 24, 2025.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

07/09/2025

Docket Code 926
Form V000A
Page 2

The parties presented oral argument. The Court now rules.

A motion to dismiss is not a procedure by which the Court will resolve disputes over facts
or the merits of the parties’ case; instead, the narrow question before this Court is whether
Plaintiff’s alleged facts are sufficient to allowing Plaintiff to prevail. Coleman v. City of Mesa,
230 Ariz. 352, 356, ¶ 8 (2012). After consideration of Plaintiff’s allegations and assuming the
truth therein, this Court finds that Defendant is entitled to dismissal “as a matter of law, on any
interpretation of the facts.” Id.; Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 224 ¶
4 (1998).

Claims
On January 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit against Sun City Grand Community Association,
an HOA. Per Plaintiff, who was elected to the HOA Board of Directors in April 2024, other
members of the Board did not want Plaintiff to serve and “began attempts to implement a code of
conduct that would allow the Majority to police, discipline, and publicly criticize the activities,
speech, and conduct of other directors.” Complaint, p. 3, ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleged the Board adopted
standards “to sideline and silence” Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 14. These standards, called the Grand
Standards, purportedly “allow a majority of the Board to punish and publicly berate minority
members” for acting contrary to what the majority wants. Id., p. 4, ¶ 18.
Plaintiff accused the HOA of disparagement, defamation, and painting Plaintiff in a false
light. The majority then emailed the community at large to discuss the Board’s concerns over
Plaintiff. Per Plaintiff, the majority has also sought to intimidate other Board members who
refused “to participate in the campaign against” Plaintiff. Id., p. 6, ¶ 24. Plaintiff accused
Defendant HOA of continued public disparaging Plaintiff, both in community meetings and in
email communications and, at times, violated disclosure by providing community members with
information disclosed during confidential meetings. Any support received by Plaintiff resulted in
either admonishment from the Board or initiation of disciplinary proceedings.
Currently, Plaintiff is excluded from meetings, participating in Board decisions, and
otherwise acting as a duly elected member of the HOA Board of Directors. Plaintiff seeks
declaratory relief, claims breach of contract, and wants an injunction against Defendant. Plaintiff
amended his complaint on February 20, 2025, alleging that the majority of the Board published a
post on Nextdoor app, seeking Plaintiff’s recall from office. Plaintiff also alleged the Board
created a website to recall Plaintiff but “has not yet been launched[.]” First Amended Complaint,
p. 8, ¶ 36. Finally, Plaintiff claimed that the Board excluded him from a meeting on February 8,
2025. Plaintiff now seeks declaratory relief regarding the Grand Standards (code of conduct) along
with the recall election, and sues for breach of contract (indemnification).
Defendant HOA has not filed an answer but instead filed a motion to dismiss.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

07/09/2025

Docket Code 926
Form V000A
Page 3

Jurisdiction, Standing Generally
The superior court has jurisdiction over requests for declaratory relief A.R.S. § 12-1831
(courts “shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further
relief is or could be claimed.”). Harm is irreparable when it is “not remediable by damages.”
Shoen v. Shoen, 167 Ariz. 58, 63 (App. 1992). An underlying claim for declaratory relief cannot
result in money damages—if money may remediate the problem, the harm is not irreparable.
A.R.S. § 12-1831 et seq.
Plaintiff requests relief under Arizona’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, A.R.S.§§ 12-
1831 to -1846 (UDJA). The act provides that “[a]ny person. . . whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute. . . may have determined any question of construction or validity
arising under the [statute] and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
thereunder.” A.R.S § 12-1832. If rights are affected by a statute, a plaintiff “need not demonstrate
past injury or prejudice so long as the relief sought is not advisory.” Ariz. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Inc. v.
State, 252 Ariz. 219, 224 ¶ 16 (2022)(citation omitted). “Although a declaratory judgment action
is remedial and should be ‘liberally construed and administered,’ a plaintiff must have ‘an actual
or real interest in the matter for determination.’” Id. (citation omitted).

A plaintiff establishes standing by alleging “a distinct and palpable injury.” Sears v. Hull,
192 Ariz. 65, 69 ¶ 16 (1998). “[A] generalized harm shared by all or by a large class of people is
generally insufficient.” Mills v. Ariz. Bd. Of Technical Registration, 253 Ariz. 415, 423 ¶ 24
(2022); Ariz. Creditors Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 257 Ariz. 406, 410, ¶ 11 (App. 2024). Plaintiff is
not required to be injured before the Court may address the claims. “The key inquiry in the absence
of actual injury is whether an actual controversy exists between the parties.” Mills 253 Ariz. at
424 ¶ 29. Vague allegations of harm are insufficient to confer standing.

Homeowner’s Associations
In Arizona, homeowner associations are subject to limitations under state law and common
law principles. Interpretation of CC&Rs and amendments are questions of law. Powell v.
Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553 (2006). Terms of the documents are not disputed facts that require a
trial—the inquiry into the documents is objective, not subjective. Gross v. Shores at Rainbow Lake
Community Ass’n, 258 Ariz. 265, ¶ 15 (App. 2024). When an HOA violates Arizona law, a member
can sue for declaratory relief and damages, among other causes of action. Moreover, the law
requires an HOA to act reasonably. Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass’n v. Kitchukov, 216 Ariz.
195 (App. 2007). In Tierra Ranchos, the court adopted the Restatement (Third) of Property:
Servitudes § 6.13 (2000), which blended both a reasonableness and business judgment rule, which
requires the owner to establish the HOA acted unreasonably. Id., ¶¶ 25-27.

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Defendant Sun City Grand (HOA), a non-profit entity, “is a planned community located in
Surprise, Arizona[,]” managed by a board of directors (Board), and of which Defendant is a former
member of the Board. The HOA is governed through their CC&Rs and bylaws, while the Board
manages the HOA.
Defendant was elected to the Board on April 1, 2024. MTD, p. 4, ¶ 4. The HOA removed
Defendant from his position on or around February 24, 2025. Defendant sued.

Analysis

Plaintiff disputes the validity of his removal from the Board. Defendant, arguing Plaintiff
was properly removed, contends Plaintiff has no standing to sue for declaratory relief. Further,
Defendant argues Plaintiff’s request for indemnification is unsupported by the CC&Rs, bylaws,
and case law.

In November 2024, members of the HOA initiated a petition for Plaintiff’s removal. On
February 7, 2025, the HOA received the petition. On February 10, 2025, the HOA notified
members of a special meeting set for February 24, 2025. On February 12, 2025, the HOA again
notified members of the special meeting. On February 24, 2025, at the special meeting, members
voted to remove Plaintiff.

The Court first addresses the special meeting held on February 24, 2025. Article II, Section
2.4 states:
Special Membership Meeting. The President may call a special membership
meeting. In addition, it shall be the duty of the President to call a special meeting
if so directed by resolution of the Board or upon a petition signed by Members
holding at least 10% of the voting power of the Association. In the case of a
special meeting held for the purpose of removing directors a meeting shall be called
and held as provided in section 3.5 and Arizona law.
First Amended Complaint (FAC), Ex. 2, p. 1. Section 2.4 provides three ways an HOA may hold
a special meeting: one, the president decides to do so; two, the Board passes a resolution for a
special meeting; or three, 10% or more of the HOA members submit a petition. The first option—
hold a meeting because the president says so—is discretionary. The other two options are
mandatory. Consequently, nothing prevented the special meeting held on February 24, 2025. The
HOA could have held the meeting simply because the President wanted to do so, regardless of the
Board’s February 8, 2025, vote to hold a meeting or receipt of a petition. FAC, Ex. 9.

If a special meeting is held to remove a board member, that is controlled by Section 3.5
and Arizona law. Article III (A), Section 3.5 states:

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Removal of Director and Vacancies. Any director may be removed, with or without
cause, by a majority vote of those Members voting on the matter at a meeting of
the Members in accordance with Arizona law. Any director whose removal is
sought shall be given notice prior to any meeting called and noticed in accordance
with Arizona law for that purpose or prior to any recall vote. [ ]
FAC, Ex. 2, p. 4. Turning to Arizona law, the Court finds a few mechanisms by which a board
member may be removed from a board of directors. A.R.S. § 10-3808(A) states, “A director may
be removed from office pursuant to any procedure provided in the articles of incorporation or
bylaws.” A.R.S § 10-3809(A) states, “A designated director may be removed by an amendment
to the articles of incorporation or bylaws deleting or changing the designation.” A.R.S. § 10-3810
allows for removal of a director by the court under certain circumstances. Finally, A.R.S. § 33-
1813 contains provisions for removal of a director:
A. Notwithstanding any provision of the declaration or bylaws to the contrary, all
of the following apply to a meeting at which a member of the board of directors. . .
is proposed to be removed from the board of directors:
1. The members of the association who are eligible to vote at the time of the meeting
may remove any member of the board of directors. . . by a majority vote of those
voting on the matter at a meeting of the members.
2. The meeting of the members shall be called pursuant to this section and action
may be taken only if a quorum is present.
3. The members of the association may remove any member of the board of
directors with or without cause[.]
4. For purposes of calling for removal of a member of the board of directors. . . [on
receipt of a petition, the board shall call a special meeting].
Thus, depending upon circumstances, a board member may be removed from office through
various means. Additionally, one statute does not override or conflict with another statute simply
because multiple statutes provide a path to relief.

Plaintiff argues A.R.S. § 33-1813 explicitly governs removal of an HOA board member;
Title 10 is inapplicable. Not so. Plaintiff himself acknowledges the interplay of Title 10 and Title
33 when relying upon A.R.S. § 10-3304 to challenge the HOA’s actions. (Any member can
challenge corporate action if the corporation lacked the power to act.) An HOA is a non-profit
corporation, created pursuant to a declaration, which has the power to manage the association.

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A.R.S. § 33-1802(1). By its very definition an HOA is a non-profit corporation and, as such, is
also controlled by Title 10.

Plaintiff reads Title 33 too narrowly—the cited provision controls the process by which a
director is removed after receipt of a proposal for removal, i.e., a petition. Under Plaintiff’s
analysis, a board member could only be removed if the HOA received “a petition that calls for
removal of a member of the board. . . .” A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(b). Not so. A director may be
removed under Title 10.
Plaintiff neglects to consider the first sentence of A.R.S. § 33-1813(A) in its entirety: this
statute governs removal by petition, not removal by other means. What the statute clarifies is that
an HOA cannot, for example, refuse to call a special meeting upon receipt of a petition, cannot
hold a meeting on the petition without a quorum, or allow ineligible people to vote on the petition
simply because the HOA’s declarations or bylaws allow it. It does not eliminate other processes
for removal of a director. Plaintiff provides this Court with no authority to the contrary.
Here, Title 10 does not conflict with Title 33 and relevant case law recognizes the interplay
of the statutes. For example, in McNally, the court stated, “As a member of the Board, Arizona
law requires McNally to participate in managing the affairs of the Association. A.R.S. § 10-
3801(B)[.]” McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 13 (App. 2016)
The court also stated, “For example, the Association could have sought to remove McNally from
the Board by filing a judicial removal action. See A.R.S. § 10-3810(A)[.]” McNally v. Sun Lakes
Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 20. In a footnote, the court noted that the board could
have removed McNally under A.R.S. § 10-3808(A) if there was no conflict with the association’s
bylaws. In other words, McNally is replete with references to Title 10 while, at the same time,
referencing Title 33.
Defendant’s bylaws do not contain language that only allows for removal of a board
member through a recall election. The applicable bylaws are more generous and do not conflict
with Arizona law: as long as a majority of members vote at a meeting for which proper notice was
issued, a director may be removed. Defendant followed their own bylaws by allowing member
vote on Plaintiff’s removal from the HOA after providing notice to the membership.
In response to the MTD, Plaintiff failed to substantively address McNally. At oral
argument, Plaintiff stated the McNally court’s focus was upon the board’s actions, not the
membership. Plaintiff further argued any reference to A.R.S. § 10-3808 was dicta and not
controlling. The Court agrees, in part. Yes, the McNally court focused upon the board of directors.
But that, too, is this Court’s focus in this portion of the Ruling. Stated differently, this Court agrees
with McNally that the board of directors must follow Arizona law in addressing a recalcitrant board
member and not use self-help remedies for which the law is silent or directly contradictory. In the

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present case, the Board did properly follow Arizona law when the Board called a special meeting
and allowed membership to vote on whether to retain or remove Plaintiff.
Starting on page 9 of Plaintiff’s response, the Court finds the majority of Plaintiff's
argument focuses upon the inadequate and flawed recall petition. The Court now addresses these
arguments.
Assuming Plaintiff is correct insofar as the petition was deficient (it was not), Plaintiff then
assumes the only method for removal of a board member is through a petition.2 The Court has
already found to the contrary. (The bylaws clearly allow the President to call a special meeting
because s/he wants to, and the bylaws mandate a special meeting when either the board votes for
such meeting or membership submits a petition.) The bylaws, declarations, and Arizona law do
not define what constitutes a “petition.” Instead, the law focuses upon how many votes are needed
on the petition to mandate board action (i.e., a special meeting). Contrast this with A.R.S. § 41-
4062, for example, which requires a petition in writing “on a form approved by the department”
for a hearing. See, also, A.R.S. § 32-2199.01, which similarly requires a petition in writing “on a
form approved by the department[.]” A.R.S. § 33-1813 does not contain any similar language.
Moreover, neither the CC&Rs or the bylaws contain any definition of “petition.” Article I, Section
1.3 of the bylaws states, “The words used in these Bylaws shall be given their normal, commonly
understood definitions.” FAC, Ex. 2, p. 1. According to Dictionary.com, a petition is “a formally
drawn request, often bearing the names of a number of those making the request, that is addressed
to a person or group of persons in authority or power, soliciting some favor, right, mercy, or other
benefit.”
Members of the HOA submitted a petition. That is not in dispute even though Plaintiff
asserted, “There was no petition.” Response, p. 10, ¶ 3. The law has no requirements for a petition
and the “request” of the membership sent to the Board meets the Dictionary.com definition.
Plaintiff then argues that Defendant impermissibly attached extrinsic evidence to the MTD, the
“petition” existed “purely in the minds of the board members reading emails[,]” and the HOA
improperly considered emails as signatures. Id. at ¶¶ 3 and 4. Next, Plaintiff provides his own
interpretation of what constitutes a “petition” and the purpose of the document. But Plaintiff
provides no authority for his interpretations. If the Arizona Legislature wanted to define “petition”
for A.R.S. § 33-1813, they could have done so. They did not and the Court is left to look at a
common definition.
What Plaintiff appears to dispute is whether the petition (in whatever undefined format)
met the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(b). That is a dispute not resolved through the

2 Again, Plaintiff failed to provide this Court with any case law or other authority that supports his argument that Title
33 trumps Title 10.

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MTD. But the Court need not consider the sufficiency of the signatures (e.g., ten percent of eligible
voters), because the membership could vote to remove Plaintiff consistent with the bylaws and
Title 10. Plaintiff received notice of the special meeting set for February 24, 2025. The
membership likewise received notice of the special meeting. At the meeting, the majority of the
voting members voted to recall Plaintiff and remove him from the Board.
The Court agrees with Defendant that no justiciable controversy exists for declaratory relief
sought by Plaintiff in Count Two. What Plaintiff has asked this Court to do is find that Defendant
failed to circulate a proper petition, failed to attach proper signatures to a petition (e.g., emails sent
as responses), and any vote removing Plaintiff from the Board is invalid. The Court will not do
so. One, any opinion issued by this Court on what is the proper format for a “petition” would be
advisory, which is prohibited by law. Two, what constitutes a proper signature for the petition is
not defined in Title 33, and Title 33 simply says “signs” without indicating if an electronic
signature is acceptable.3 That, too, would be an advisory opinion. Three, the Court finds that the
Board called a special meeting consistent with their bylaws, took a vote of the membership, and,
resultantly, Plaintiff lost his position on the Board. The Court further finds that Defendant is
entitled to dismissal of Count Two “as a matter of law, on any interpretation of the facts.” Id.; Fid.
Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 224 ¶ 4 (1998).
In Count One, Plaintiff requests declaratory relief finding that the “Grand Standards” (code
of conduct) are invalid, unenforceable, and unreasonable. If the Grand Standards are enforceable,
then Plaintiff requests the Court find that the Board violated the provisions, including improperly
excluding Plaintiff from executive meetings.
On April 11, 2024, the Board of Directors of the HOA adopted The Grand Standards of
Behavior for Board Directors. FAC, Ex. 3. The document clearly states, “. . . the Board of
Directors has adopted for itself the following standards of behavior . . . .” Id. The Grand Standards
apply to the Board only.
Returning to the UDJA, the Court finds that Plaintiff no longer has an actual or real interest
in enforceability and validity of the Grand Standards because Plaintiff is not subject to the code of
conduct. As of February 24, 2025, Plaintiff was no longer a member of the Board. Consequently,
the Grand Standards do not affect him. “As a matter of judicial restraint, Arizona courts will not
‘issue advisory opinions, address moot cases, or deal with issues that have not been fully developed
by true adversaries.’” Workman v. Verde Wellness Center, Inc., 240 Ariz. 597, 60., ¶ 17 (App.
2016)(citation omitted). “[A] case becomes moot if an event occurs that ends the underlying
controversy and transforms the litigation into ‘an abstract question which does not arise upon

3 The Court further declines to analyze whether the electronic signatures are valid under A.R.S. § 44-7007 because
whether the members intended to sign electronically is a question of fact.

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existing facts or rights.’” Id, quoting Contempo-Tempe Mobile Home Owners Ass’n v. Steinert,
144 Ariz. 227, 229 (App. 1985). In the present case, the Board (and community) had already
initiated proceedings to remove Plaintiff from the Board; the resultant vote was not taken in
retaliation for a lawsuit but, instead, began in November 2024, when Plaintiff filed suit in January
2025. Plaintiff does not have standing.
The Court is unpersuaded that Plaintiff has standing to challenge the Grand Standards
because Plaintiff is a member of the HOA. A.R.S. § 10-3304(B)(2) allows a member to enjoin an
act, not seek declaratory relief. If the Legislature intended to allow a member to seek declaratory
relief under this statute, they would have said so. They did not.
Perhaps Plaintiff is concerned that if he were reelected to the Board he would then be
subject to the Grand Standards and wants to prophylactically enjoin the Board from enforcement
of the code of conduct against him. (The past instances of alleged retaliation under the Grand
Standards is moot.) Plaintiff clearly states he looks to future enforcement: “The Grand Standards
enforcement proceedings against Tom, which challenges decisions he either has made or will make
that the majority finds or will find offensive. . . .” Response, p. 7, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). Regardless,
this Court has no legal authority by which in can consider what may happen in the future because,
as recognized by Plaintiff, “The Grand Standards compel the Board to initiate the enforcement
process against any Director[.]” FAC, p. 4, ¶ 21. See, also, “By the Grand Standards’ design, only
minority members can be found in violation of the” code of conduct. Id. at ¶ 33. Because Plaintiff
is not a director and is not a minority member of the Board, he has no standing. Moreover, what
may or may not happen in the future does not give this Court a justiciable controversy. This Court
will not issue an advisory opinion. For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to
dismissal of Count One “as a matter of law, on any interpretation of the facts.” Id.; Fid. Sec. Life
Ins. Co. v. State Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 224 ¶ 4 (1998).
The Court now considers Count Three, breach of contract. Problematically, Plaintiff relies
upon a provision of the bylaws that does not mean what Plaintiff thinks it means.
Article IV, Section 6.5 states:
Indemnification. Subject to any limitations imposed by applicable law, the
Association shall indemnify every director and committee member against all
expenses, including attorney fees, incurred by them in connection with any action,
suit, or other proceeding [ ] to which he or she may be a party by reason of being
or having been a director or committee member of the Association.
The directors and committee members shall not be liable for any mistake of
judgment, negligent or otherwise, expect for their own individual willful
misfeasance, malfeasance, misconduct, or bad faith.

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. . .
The Association shall indemnify and forever hold each such director and committee
member harmless from any and all liability to others on account of any such
contract, commitment or action.
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiff believes this section of the bylaws entitles Plaintiff to seek attorney’s
fees and costs for his own lawsuit against the HOA, regardless of the merits of Plaintiff's claims
and the outcome of the litigation. This is simply wrong.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant breached their agreement for indemnification. Both parties
must prove the parties had a contract, a party breached the contract, and a party suffered damages.
Graham v. Asbury, 112 Ariz. 184, 185 (1975). The duty to indemnify is determined from the
agreement. MT Builders, L.L.C. v. Fisher Roofing, Inc., 219 Ariz. 297 (App.. 2008). Section 6.5
is clear: the HOA is responsible for fees and costs for a director who is or may be liable to others
for actions taken on behalf of the community. Nothing in Section 6.5 guarantees the HOA will
fund a lawsuit against itself by a former board member.

Plainly, indemnification is to insure another from liability for loss or damage. INA Ins. Co.
of North America v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 150 Ariz. 248 (App. 1986). “Indemnification against
liability applies once liability for a cause of action is established; the indemnitee is not required to
make actual payment.” Id. 150 Ariz. at 253 (emphasis added). A.R.S. § 10-851(A)(1) allows
indemnification against liability, not advancement of fees and costs when a director (either current
or former) files suit. A.R.S. § 10-3852(A) requires a corporation to indemnify a director who
prevailed “in the defense of any proceeding to which the director was a party because the director
is or was a director of the corporation[.]” Again, indemnification is reactionary, not proactive, as
evidenced by the word “defense.” Similarly, A.R.S. § 10-3851 (A)(1) allows for indemnification
against liability.

Here, Plaintiff initiated the lawsuit. Plaintiff seeks damages; Plaintiff is not on the
receiving end of a lawsuit, accusing him of wrongdoing in his official capacity as a former director
on the Board. Plaintiff has not incurred a loss or damages resulting from any lawsuit from “others”
and there is no basis to shift loss (fees) from Plaintiff to Defendant. No duty to defend exists here;
the Court agrees with Defendant that under Plaintiff’s argument, a board member could hire an
attorney to file suit against the association and require—at the earliest stage of litigation—the
association to pay fees and costs. To clarify, Plaintiff and Defendant did not have a contract for
Defendant to indemnify Plaintiff in a case that Plaintiff initiated, does not involve third parties,
and for which no duty to defend exists. Because there was no contract for indemnification
proposed by Plaintiff, there is no breach. For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant is

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entitled to dismissal of Count Three “as a matter of law, on any interpretation of the facts.” Id.;
Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. State Dep’t of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 224 ¶ 4 (1998).

For the reasons stated in this Ruling,

IT IS ORDERED granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED allowing Defendant to seek reimbursement of attorney’s
fees and costs incurred in defending itself. Defendant shall file the appropriate paperwork, along
with a proposed judgment, within fifteen business days of the filing date of this Ruling or the
request is waived.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED vacating the evidentiary hearing set for July 24, 2025, at
10:00 a.m.

Clerk of the Superior Court

*** Electronically Filed ***

09/26/2025 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

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09/23/2025

Docket Code 901
Form V000A
Page 1

CLERK OF THE COURT
HONORABLE JENNIFER RYAN-TOUHILL
C. Lockhart

Deputy

THOMAS J GUSICH
JONATHAN A DESSAULES

v.

SUN CITY GRAND COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION INC
LAUREN ELLIOTT STINE

CURTIS S EKMARK
DANIEL G ROBERTS
JUDGE RYAN-TOUHILL
DOCKET CV TX

RULING

Before the Court is Defendant’s August 1, 2025, Application for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs,
Plaintiff’s August 20, 2025, Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Application for Attorneys’
Fees, and Defendant's September 4, 2025, Reply in Support of Defendant’s Application for
Attorney’ Fees. Good cause appearing,

IT IS ORDERED awarding Defendant $355.85 in taxable costs.

Analysis

On January 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Sun City Grand Community
(Defendant or HOA) and an amended complaint on February 20, 2025. In a prior Ruling, the
Court summarized Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant did not file an answer but instead moved to
dismiss, which this Court granted. The Court now decides attorneys’ fees after considering the
parties’ pleadings, attachments, legal authority, and the facts of the case.

Defendant moves for attorneys’ fees under Section 15.9 of the CC&Rs, A.R.S. § 33-
1813(A)(4)(f), and A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and -341.01.

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Section 15.9 is under Article XV, “General Provisions,” and states:
Attorneys’ Fees. In the event of an action instituted to enforce any of the provisions
contained in the Governing Documents, the prevailing party is such action shall be
entitled to recover from the other party thereto as part of the judgment, attorneys’
fees and costs, including administrative and lien fees, of such suit. In the event the
Association is a prevailing party in such action, the amount of such attorneys’ fees
and costs shall be a Benefited Assessment1 with respect to the Lot(s) involved in
the action.
Response to Plaintiff’s Application for a Preliminary Injunction, Ex. 1, p. 42. A.R.S. § 33-
1813(A)(4)(f) states, “if a civil action is filed regarding the removal of a board member, the
prevailing party in the civil action shall be awarded its reasonable attorney fees and costs.” Finally,
A.R.S. § 12-341.01 allows the court to award reasonable attorney fees to the successful party.
Associated Inem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 569 (1985).

The Court finds Defendant is entitled to fees. The Court will determine what is reasonable.

Defendant requests fees totaling $353,388.00.2 The amount requested is supported by the
declaration of their attorneys, Lauren Elliot Stine and Curtis S. Ekmark. Plaintiff opposes, arguing
the fees are unreasonable, excessive, and unwarranted.

The Court turns to our China Doll case, which provides useful language. Schweiger v.
China Doll Restaurant, Inc., 138 Ariz. 183 (App. 1983). First, the appellate court noted “that the
award of fees is one way to discourage the filing of frivolous or meritless claims.” Id. at 186. The
court then addressed, as a “beginning point,” the actual fee charged by the attorney. Id. at 187.
However, the court “is not bound by the agreement between the parties.” Id. at 188. Noting the
trial court’s discretion, the appellate court reiterated that not only might the hourly rate be
unreasonable, “the amount of hours claimed may also be unreasonable.” Id. Beyond the
referenced language, this Court considers the following factors: (1) the qualities of the attorney;
(2) the work itself, including difficulty and importance; (3) the work performed; and (4) the result.
Id. at 187. In reaching the decision in this Ruling, the Court notes it has the inherent right to award
Defendant some, but not all, of the requested fees. Lee v. ING Investment Mgmt., LLC, 240 Ariz.
158, 161, ¶ 13 (App. 2016).

1 Separately defined in Section 9.8; not applicable here.
2 Quarles & Brady billed $295,140.00, CHDB billed $24,205.50, and Ekmark billed $34,042.50.

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Attorney Qualifications

The Court finds that Defendants’ attorneys are qualified; Plaintiff does not argue that the
attorneys lack qualifications but, instead, that the hourly rates are excessive. Defendant’s lead
counsel, Ms. Stine, has practiced law for 18 years and is a partner at Quarles & Brady, a national
law firm. Co-counsel, Mr. Roberts, has practiced law for 9 years and also charged the same rate
charged by Ms. Stine.

Counsel’s affidavit states that Mr. Roberts worked with Ms. Stine “on the Association’s
strategy,” drafting and revising briefs, legal research, trial preparation, etc., along with “other tasks
related to assisting me in defending the Association.” Declaration of Lauren Elliot Stine [ ], p. 3,
¶ 5. Setting aside the hourly rate for a moment, the Court questions why Mr. Roberts, a partner at
the firm, was necessary to “assist” the lead attorney, including performing legal research, which
could have been done by an associate or paralegal. Moreover, Mr. Roberts’ work on the case
exceeded that of Ms. Stine by roughly $46k.

Ms. Stine’s affidavit states that an associate at the firm—Mr. Contrera—also worked on
the case. Mr. Contrera graduated from law school in 2024, and charges $455.00 per hour. Mr.
Contrera only billed approximately $9k less than the lead attorney, Ms. Stine. Finally, the firm’s
paralegal, Carla Walters, bills at $385.00 per hour, and charged $16,670.50 in fees.

Prior to Quarles & Brady working on the case, Defendant hired (or retained) Curtis Ekmark
for representation. Mr. Ekmark worked at CHDB and then opened his own firm. Mr. Ekmark
worked on the case for four months, including collaborating with litigation counsel. Mr. Ekmark
has practiced law for 33 years and charges $495.00 per hour. Also with Mr. Ekmark’s firm,
Courtney Pecor worked on the case. Mr. Ekmark’s affidavit contains no information on Ms.
Pecor’s education or years of practice; Ms. Pecor charges $470.00 per hour. Mr. Ekmark’s affidavit
does not address the monthly retainer the HOA allegedly pays to him.3

The Court finds no dispute over the quality of the attorneys or paralegal; the dispute is over
the hourly rate, which the Court will address, later, along with the work performed.

The Case Itself

The case involved a dispute between Plaintiff, who was removed from the HOA Board of
Directors, and the HOA. Plaintiff requested relief from the Court, including, essentially,
reinstating him on the Board, voiding conduct standards applicable to board members only, cease

3 In Reply, Mr. Ekmark asserted he does not receive a monthly retainer.

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excluding Plaintiff from meetings, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court does not find that the
dispute was either overly difficult or, for that matter, of importance to anyone besides the parties.
Plaintiff, to an extent, assists Defendant in his response by arguing, “The truth and record reflect
that Tom lodged novel legal issues without precedent, two of which the Association did not
successfully defeat on the merits.” Response, p. 2, ¶ 2. Despite Plaintiff’s concession on this issue,
the Court remains unpersuaded.

The purported novel issue dealt with whether email signatures or responses to email
solicitations counted as signatures for purpose of a recall election. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 33-1813.
The parties’ dispute over the recall effort encompasses a large part of fees incurred before Plaintiff
filed suit and the beginning of the case, before Defendant then relied upon the CC&Rs and Title
10 to justify its actions. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Court did not decide the merits of
either party’s argument regarding the initial process for a recall election, because this Court found:
Plaintiff also neglects to consider the first sentence of A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)
in its entirety: this statute governs removal by petition, not removal by other means.
What the statute clarifies is that an HOA cannot, for example, refuse to call a special
meeting upon receipt of a petition, cannot hold a meeting on the petition without a
quorum, or allow ineligible people to vote on the petition simply because the
HOA’s declarations or bylaws allow it. It does not eliminate other processes for
removal of a director. Plaintiff provides this Court with no authority to the contrary.
Here, Title 10 does not conflict with Title 33 and relevant case law
recognizes the interplay of the statutes. For example, in McNally, the court stated,
“As a member of the Board, Arizona law requires McNally to participate in
managing the affairs of the Association. A.R.S. § 10-3801(B)[.]” McNally v. Sun
Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 13 (App.. 2016) The court also
stated, “For example, the Association could have sought to remove McNally from
the Board by filing a judicial removal actions. See A.R.S. § 10-3810(A)[.]”
McNally v. Sun Lakes Homeowners Ass’n #1, Inc., 241 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 20 (App..
2016)(quotation omitted). In a footnote, the court noted that the board could have
removed McNally under A.R.S. § 10-3808(A) if there was no conflict with the
association’s bylaws. In other words, McNally is replete with references to Title 10
while, at the same time, referencing Title 33.
Defendant’s bylaws do not contain language that only allows for removal
of a board member through a recall election. The applicable bylaws are more
generous and do not conflict with Arizona law: as long as a majority of members
vote at a meeting for which proper notice was issued, a director may be removed.

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

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09/23/2025

Docket Code 901
Form V000A
Page 5

Defendant followed their own bylaws by allowing member vote on Plaintiff’s
removal from the HOA after providing notice to the membership.
Ruling, filed 07/11/2025, p. 6, ¶¶ 3-5. The Court further found:
What Plaintiff appears to dispute is whether the petition (in whatever
undefined format) met the requirements of A.R.S. § 33-1813(A)(4)(b). That is a
dispute not resolved through the MTD. But the Court need not consider the
sufficiency of the signatures (e.g., ten percent of eligible voters), because the
membership could vote to remove Plaintiff consistent with the bylaws and Title 10.
Id. at pp. 7-8, ¶¶ 5, 1. Regarding both the recall election (i.e., petitions) and the Sun City Grand
Standards, the Court declined to enter an advisory opinion. While the Court does not find these
disputed issues were “novel,” the Court agrees that it declined to substantively address the merits
of Plaintiff’s claims referenced above. Likewise, the Court does not agree that the issues presented
were “highly complex,” as claimed by Defendant’s counsel. Reply, p. 2, ¶ 4. The Court has no
opinion on whether Plaintiff’s suit caused an “existential threat” to the HOA.

The Result

The result achieved is obvious: Defendant prevailed because the Court dismissed the case.
But Defendant’s achievement was not clean or straightforward—the Court agrees with Plaintiff
that Defendant originally proceeded under A.R.S. § 33-1813 and later presented argument under
Title 10 and reliance upon the CC&Rs (bylaws). Title 10, along with the bylaws, provided
Defendant with the necessary authority to remove Plaintiff from the board. “We know of no public
policy that allows attorneys to churn cases to generate fees beyond those reasonably necessary to
successfully terminate the case.” ABC Supply, Inc., v. Edwards, 191 Ariz. 48, 53 (App. 1996).
Defendant is not entitled to all of the fees requested; the Court now analyzes the hourly rate and
then will consider the work performed.

Hourly Rates

The Court will not hold anyone in suspense: the rates are too high. The Court is
unpersuaded by Defendant’s argument that the rates are reasonable because that is what the client
agreed to pay. “Either a fixed or contingent fee, proper when contracted for, may later turn out to
be excessive.” Matter of Swartz, 141 Ariz. 266, 273 (1984).

Every three years the Arizona State Bar publishes their Economics of Law Practice in
Arizona. The most recent edition is from 2022; after research, the Court cannot locate a more
recent version. The publication contains all sorts of useful information, including the “typical”
rates charged per hour, based upon experience. Relevant is the following:

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

09/23/2025

Docket Code 901
Form V000A
Page 6

 Only 3% of attorneys practicing 5 years or less charge $400/hour or more. The vast
majority of attorneys with 5 years or less experience charge between $250-274/hour.
o Mr. Contrera has practiced law less than one year yet charged $455/hour.
 12.2% of attorneys practicing between 5-9 years charge $400/hour or more. The vast
majority of attorneys within this level charge between $275-299/hour.
o Mr. Roberts has practiced law for 9 years yet charged $620/hour.
 16.8% of attorneys practicing between 10-19 years charge $400/hour or more. This is the
highest percentage. 12.1% of the attorneys charge between $300-324/hour.
o Ms. Stine has practiced law for 18 years and charged a “reduced” rate of $620/hour.
 37.0% of attorneys practicing 30 years or longer charge $400/hour or more. This is the
highest percentage. 10.2% of attorneys charge between $375-399/hour.
o Mr. Ekmark has practiced law for 32 years and charged $495/hour.
 The Court has no information supporting Courtney Pecor’s hourly rate. She charged the
client $470/hour. 4
 Quarles & Brady has 13 offices throughout the United States and roughly 520 attorneys.5
o The average hourly billing rate at firms with 100 or more attorneys is $422.00.
o The median hourly billing rate at firms with 100 or more attorneys is $388.00.
 Ekmark Pecor Law has two attorneys.6
o The average hourly billing rate at firms with 2-3 attorneys is $337.00.
o The median hourly billing rate at firms with 2-3 attorneys is $329.00.
See State Bar of Arizona, Economics of Law Practice in Arizona, June 2022, pp. 45, 49.

When determining what is a reasonable hourly rate, this Court has discretion. Like our
federal counterparts, this Court would look to the market rates in the same community “for similar
work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Schwarz v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 73 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 1995)(internal citation omitted). Defendant
has the burden of proving the rates charged are reasonable: “To inform and assist the court in the
exercise of discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to procedure satisfactory evidence—in
addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing
in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and
reputation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008)(internal citation
omitted). See also Talking Rock Land, LLC v. Inscription Canyon Ranch, LP, 257 Ariz. 267, ¶ 10
(App. 2024)(“Under Ethical Rule 1.5, one factor to consider when determining the reasonableness

4 As stated, the Court has no information showing when Ms. Pecor graduated law school or how long she has practiced
law, including in the specific area for this suit.
5 www.quarles.com
6www.ekmarkpecorlaw.com

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

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Docket Code 901
Form V000A
Page 7

of a fee is the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. Ariz. R. Sup. Ct.
42, ER 1.5(a)(3).”)

Defendant provided the Court with no evidence beyond the attorneys’ own affidavits to
support the high hourly rates charged here. That is insufficient. However, Plaintiff provided the
Court with an affidavit from Kevin Harper, an Arizona attorney with Harper Hall PLC. Response,
Ex. E. Mr. Harper has practiced law for 27 years, “with substantial experience in homeowners
association disputes[,]” and charges $400/hour. Id. Mr. Harper attested that another attorney in
his same firm with the same years of practice also charges $400/hour. Similarly, Mr. Wood, one
of Plaintiff’s attorneys, has practiced law for 24 years and charges $385/hour. Plaintiff’s attorneys’
law firm billed an associate (2024 graduate) at $225/hour. The rates sought by Defendant’s counsel
are not consistent with prevailing market rates in Arizona and Defendant has not presented this
Court with competent evidence that supports the requested fees. See, e.g., McDowell Mountain
Ranch Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., v. Simons, 216 Ariz. 266, 270 (App. 2007); Elson Dev. Co. v. Ariz. Sav.
& Loan Ass’n, 99 Ariz. 217, 223 (1965).

IT IS ORDERED reducing the hourly rate for attorneys as follows:
 Mr. Contrera $250.00.
 Mr. Roberts $400.00.
 Ms. Stine $400.00.
 Ms. Pecor $250.00.

The Court will not reduce Mr. Ekmark’s hourly rate. The Court finds the rates, above,
along with the rates from Mr. Ekmark, reasonable.

The Work Performed

The Court first addresses billing by Mr. Ekmark. Mr. Ekmark provide the Court with an
affidavit. Application, Ex. B. Mr. Ekmark stated he first worked on the case when employed with
CHDB Law. CHDB billed for time between October 28, 2024, and February 28, 2025, four
months. On March 1, 2025, Mr. Ekmark worked on the case under his own firm, billing for time
from March 1, 2025, to July 31, 2025, five months. For the nine months’ worth of work—while
there were other attorneys on the case—Mr. Ekmark seeks $58,248.00.

Plaintiff properly challenges most of the charges. It matters little to the Court whether
Defendant agreed to pay Mr. Ekmark to read emails Defendant sent to and from litigation
counsel—that is between the client and the firm. That does not mean, however, this Court will
pass those fees along to Plaintiff.

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Form V000A
Page 8

Mr. Ekmark’s (and Ms. Pecor’s) billings do not clearly differentiate those tasks related to
enforcing the CC&Rs and those related to enforcing a contract between the parties. For example,
on October 29, 2024, Mr. Ekmark billed the HOA for “work[ing] on board code of conduct issue.”
Was the Board trying to enforce the CC&Rs/Code of Conduct against Plaintiff? Did the Board
file suit on this? No. So what does this billing entry mean? The billing statement is replete with
similar charges, vague in nature or not tied to the litigation. Section 15.9 of the CC&Rs,
consequently, does not assist Defendant’s claim for attorneys’ fees for most of what happened prior
to the lawsuit.

Regarding excessiveness, the Court finds that Mr. Ekmark’s firm had multiple emails,
daily, about “mediation.” For example, on November 13, 2024, Mr. Ekmark billed roughly $500
to review multiple emails about mediation, excluding the $100 phone call he had with the Board
President. Then, six days later, Mr. Ekmark billed almost $250 to read another email about
mediation and draft a message to the Board President (excluding other emails regarding mediation
sent that same day). During this time, Plaintiff alleged the HOA failed to comply with Arizona
law (e.g., recall election) and improperly excluded Plaintiff from executive board meetings while
Plaintiff sat as a board member. The Court did not decide the case based upon the HOA’s actions
prior to the February 2025, removal via a properly-noticed meeting and recall election or the
board’s exclusion of Plaintiff from meetings.

A large portion of the fees charged by Mr. Ekmark’s firm from October 28, 2024, until
January 23, 2025, appear to be related to what counsel has called “Tom issues.” Clearly, the HOA
sought an out-of-court resolution to the dispute, evidenced by multiple emails regarding mediation.
But the HOA is not the one who filed suit—honorably, the HOA wanted to de-escalate the situation,
act consistently with the CC&Rs and Arizona law, and avoid court. Plaintiff did not agree, to his
detriment. That does not automatically mean, however, that Plaintiff has to pay for fees incurred
by Defendant related to the HOA’s efforts, including the efforts to recall Plaintiff and keep him
out of executive board meetings or otherwise deal with “Tom issues.” The Court will not make
Plaintiff pay fees for his legitimate dispute with the HOA (e.g., a member is entitled to records)
and because Defendant has failed to identify a legal basis tying together fees incurred prior to the
lawsuit with Plaintiff’s subsequent liability, Defendant’s request for those fees fails. The burden
is not upon the Court to identify the basis for the fees charged and the Court finds that Defendant
has not presented clarity to this Court that justifies awarding all fees incurred prior to the lawsuit.

As stated, part of the “Tom issues” included Plaintiff’s requests for documents allowed by
statute. A.R.S. § 33-1805(A) requires an HOA to make association records “reasonably available
for examination[.]” The HOA is explicitly precluded from charging a member for providing the
material but the HOA “may charge a fee for making copies of not more than fifteen cents per
page.” Id. A portion of Plaintiff’s requested documents included emails, signatures, petition(s),

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

09/23/2025

Docket Code 901
Form V000A
Page 9

or any other relevant document pertaining to Plaintiff’s recall. During that timeframe, Defendant
proceeded on a theory that the HOA could recall Plaintiff via petition/recall election under Arizona
law. No one was discussing Title 10 or the bylaws.

The Court understands and does not dispute Mr. Ekmark’s involvement at the beginning
of the lawsuit, including emailing the client (the HOA) about the lawsuit. Some of the billing is
clerical (e.g., reviewing email regarding service) and some is warranted. From January 23, 2025,
through February 2, 2025, the Court finds reasonable fees for reimbursement totaling $2,080.00.

After February 2, 2025, the Court becomes troubled by the involvement of five attorneys—
plus a paralegal—on this case. That is excessive. From February 2, 2025, through July 28, 2025,
the Court finds that Mr. Ekmark performed unnecessary, duplicative tasks. The Court has no
explanation for why Mr. Ekmark read so many emails between litigation counsel (Quarles &
Brady) and others. If the client agreed to pay for this constant monitoring, that is a decision
between the client and Mr. Ekmark. But other than a few tasks, the Court is unclear as to Mr.
Ekmark’s role in the litigation that required his firm to charge significant fees. For example, it
makes sense that Mr. Ekmark’s firm would continue to advise the community, including drafting
emails to the membership or reviewing drafted emails from others, e.g., the Board President. It
also makes sense that Mr. Ekmark might have to consult with litigation counsel about the client’s
method of communication, expectations for board members, etc. Of course, for Mr. Ekmark to
assist with these tasks, Mr. Ekmark would need a status update from litigation counsel or would
need to provide litigation counsel with advice. That could have occurred through a phone call,
which Mr. Ekmark properly billed his client. For this timeframe, the Court finds reasonable fees
for reimbursement totaling $5,294.00.

For the reasons set forth in this Ruling,

IT IS ORDERED Plaintiff shall pay Defendant’s attorneys’ fees to CHDB and Mr.
Ekmark’s firm in the total amount of $7,374.00.

The Court now turns to litigation counsel, Quarles & Brady. The firm, on Defendant’s
behalf, seeks $295k in attorneys’ fees. The Court will reduce the award.

As stated, the client is free to enter into any agreement it so chooses with legal counsel. If
the client (Defendant HOA) chose not to use their insurance coverage for litigation counsel but
instead hired a top national firm, nothing prevented the HOA from doing so. However, for
purposes of an attorneys’ fee award, this Court looks to the prevailing market rate for attorneys
similarly situated. Those are the fees the Court will order Plaintiff to pay.

The Court spent time reviewing the billing statements provided; the Court will illustrate
some fees charged to the client that are not passed on to Plaintiff. For example, the Court will not

SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY

CV 2025-002634

09/23/2025

Docket Code 901
Form V000A
Page 10

order Plaintiff to pay fees related to the requested documents to which he was statutorily entitled.
The Court will also not order Plaintiff to pay fees for time spent reviewing signatures for a recall
petition prior to the lawsuit. The Court finds these examples are obvious omissions. Less obvious,
but no less noteworthy, are charges by three attorneys in the same firm for similar (or the same)
work on an HOA case plus multiple charges for strategizing that same, duplicative work. The
Court does not refer to a draft of a motion by an associate attorney, then revised by a partner. The
Court instead refers to the plethora of charges wherein both the associate and the partner wrote,
revised, researched, rewrote, revised, and again researched the same issue(s). Additionally, the
Court found duplicative entries not only from multiple attorneys within the same firm but also by
the same attorney: on April 25, 2025, Mr. Roberts spent 0.30 to “[r]eview and analyze Plaintiffs’
response to motion to dismiss.” However, on April 30, 2025, Mr. Roberts spent 0.50 to “[r]eview
and analyze Plaintiffs’ response to motion to dismiss.” Likewise, on April 30, 2025, Mr. Contrera
spent 1.70 to “[r]eview and analyze Plaintiffs’ response to motion to dismiss and being drafting
reply brief.” Mr. Roberts also billed 0.20 to draft a notice of extension to file a reply: this is an
acceptable client charge but not one that will be passed on to Plaintiff. The Court will not require
Plaintiff to pay for Ms. Walters to “familiarize self with CaseLines in preparation for hearing (.8).”
In August 2021, our Supreme Court issued an Administrative Order for the digital submission of
exhibits and Maricopa County Superior Court has used CaseLines for at least two years. Whether
or not Ms. Walters knows how to use the program is irrelevant—the Court perceives the firm’s
need to familiarize itself with the program as a strictly clerical duty.

The above paragraph does not set out the Court’s reasoning for declining to pass along to
Plaintiff most of Defendant’s fees; the Court only provides the explanation as a courtesy to assist
the parties in understanding the Court’s reasoning and exercise of its discretion. Talking Rock
Land, LLC v. Inscription Canyon Ranch, LP, 257 Ariz. 267, ¶ 10 (App. 2024)(The Court has no
duty to provide “an express finding requirement for each disallowed entry in a fee request. No
such findings are required by contract or statute. . . . So long as the record reflects a reasonable
basis for the court’s decision in awarding fees, there is no abuse of discretion.”) Defendant may
have questions regarding why the Court has declined to award the vast majority of the fees
incurred: that is the purpose of this Ruling. Similarly, Plaintiff has a right to understand how the
Court arrived at a reasonable dollar figure in awarding Defendant attorneys' fees.

For the reasons set forth in this Ruling,

IT IS ORDERED Plaintiff shall pay Defendant’s attorneys’ fees to Quarles & Brady in
the total amount of $37,245.00.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting the Application, in part, and awarding to
Defendant their reasonable attorneys’ fees in the amount of $44,619.00 against Defendant.

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MARICOPA COUNTY

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09/23/2025

Docket Code 901
Form V000A
Page 11

Plaintiff shall pay to Defendant interest on all sums set forth in this Ruling and due and owing at
the statutory rate of 8.5% per annum until paid in full.

Because no further matters remain pending and judgment is entered under Rule 54(c),

IT IS ORDERED final judgment is entered in Defendant’s favor and the case is dismissed
in its entirety.

/s/ Jennifer Ryan-Touhill

HONORABLE JENNIFER RYAN-TOUHILL
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

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