2019-04-02 — Ironwood Commons Cmty. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Randall ↑ top

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ironwood-commons-v-randall.pdf

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
IRONWOOD COMMONS COMMUNITY
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SHANNON K. RANDALL, Defendant/Appellant.
No. 1 CA-CV 17-0381
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
TJ 2014-002225
The Honorable David W. Garbarino, Commissioner
AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN PART
COUNSEL
Dessaules Law Group, Phoenix
By Douglas C. Wigley, Jonathan A. Dessaules
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Maxwell & Morgan PC, Mesa
By B. Austin Baillio, Rebecca L. Easton, Chad M. Gallacher
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
FILED 4-4-2019

IRONWOOD v. RANDALL
Opinion of the Court

2

OPINION
Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1
Shannon K. Randall appeals the trial court’s ruling that an
affidavit of renewal filed in the superior court of the county in which a
transcript of a justice court judgment was docketed, instead of in the
superior court of the county in which the judgment was obtained, complied
with statutory renewal requirements. She also challenges the court’s award
of post-judgment attorneys’ fees and costs. For the following reasons, we
affirm the ruling that the judgment was properly renewed and the award
of costs for the subsequent garnishment proceeding. We vacate, however,
the award of attorneys’ fees and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
¶2
In 2011, the Casa Grande Justice Court (Pinal County) entered
judgment in favor of Ironwood Commons Community Homeowners
Association, Inc. (“Ironwood”) and against Randall in the amount of
$4,089.05 arising from her delinquent assessments. The judgment included
a clause purporting to award attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in collecting
the judgment. In 2014, Ironwood filed a transcript of judgment in the
Maricopa County Superior Court and two days later recorded the
judgment, also in Maricopa County.
¶3
To prevent the judgment from lapsing, Ironwood filed an
affidavit of judgment renewal in the Maricopa County Superior Court in
2016, stating that the justice court judgment “ha[d] not been recorded or
docketed in any other county.” Ironwood then filed an application for
garnishment, a post-judgment statement of costs, and an application for
post-judgment attorneys’ fees. The clerk of the court issued a writ of
garnishment, and the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees ($1,130) and costs
($510.77).
¶4
Randall moved to quash the writ of garnishment, arguing
execution on the judgment was prohibited under Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) section 12-1551(B) because the judgment was not properly

IRONWOOD v. RANDALL
Opinion of the Court

3
renewed. Randall also filed a motion to vacate the award of attorneys’ fees
and costs, asserting the award was not grounded in any statutory or
contractual provision and the justice court judgment was invalid.
Ironwood opposed both motions and also filed an application for order of
continuing lien against Randall’s non-exempt earnings, which the court
granted.
¶5
During oral argument on the motions, Randall argued the
justice court judgment expired because the affidavit of renewal should have
been filed in the Pinal County Superior Court to give her proper notice. The
trial court rejected the argument and, citing A.R.S. § 33-962(A) and
§ 12-1612(A), ruled that the “proper court” for filing a renewal affidavit was
“the court where the judgment was docketed,” which in this case was the
Maricopa County Superior Court. The court upheld its previous award of
attorneys’ fees and costs to Ironwood and this timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A.
Proper Court for Judgment Renewal
¶6
Randall contends the justice court judgment cannot be
enforced against her because it was not renewed in accordance with A.R.S.
§ 12-1612. We review issues requiring statutory interpretation de novo.
State ex rel. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz. v. Galloway, 224 Ariz. 325, 327, ¶ 7 (App.
2010). When interpreting statutes, we will “effectuate the text if it is clear
and unambiguous.” BSI Holdings, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., 244 Ariz. 17,
19, ¶ 9 (2018). “In construing a specific provision, we look to the statute as
a whole and we may also consider statutes that are in pari materia—of the
same subject or general purpose—for guidance and to give effect to all of
the provisions involved.” Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509, ¶ 7 (2017).
¶7
Subject to exceptions not applicable here, a judgment expires
unless it is timely renewed, see A.R.S. § 12-1551(B), which may be
accomplished by affidavit as provided in A.R.S. § 12-1612(A):
A judgment for the payment of money that has been entered
and docketed in the civil docket or civil order book of the
United States district court or superior court, whether
originally rendered by it or entered on a transcript of
judgment from another court, or recorded with the county
recorder, may be renewed by filing an affidavit for renewal
with the clerk of the proper court.

IRONWOOD v. RANDALL
Opinion of the Court

4
¶8
A justice court judgment “may be prepared for recording” by
filing a certified transcript of judgment with the “clerk of the superior
court.” A.R.S. § 33-962(A)(1). From the time of its filing, the transcript of
judgment is “deemed the judgment of the superior court, . . . in the control
of the superior court, and . . . carried into execution in the same manner and
with like effect as a judgment of the superior court.” Id. Pursuant to A.R.S.
§ 22-246, “real property or any interest therein” cannot be “levied upon or
sold by virtue of any [justice court] judgment” until the transcript of
judgment is first filed in the “superior court of the county where the
judgment was given.”
¶9
Relying on § 12-1612(A), Randall argues a judgment may be
renewed only if an affidavit of renewal is filed in the superior court of the
county where the “judgment was originally obtained.” Ironwood counters
that because § 12-1612(A) contemplates a justice court judgment may be
filed as a transcript with any superior court, the judgment may also be
renewed in that superior court, regardless of the originating county. Both
parties cite this court’s opinion in J.C. Penney v. Lane, 197 Ariz. 113 (App.
1999), in support of their positions.
¶10
In J.C. Penney, the Page Justice Court (Coconino County)
entered a money judgment in favor of a judgment creditor, who then
recorded the judgment with the Coconino County Recorder’s Office and
later filed it in the Coconino County Superior Court. 197 Ariz. at 114, 118,
¶¶ 2, 24. The creditor mistakenly filed a renewal affidavit in the Maricopa
County Superior Court. Id. at 114, ¶ 3. The error was not detected until
after the judgment lapsed, and the judgment creditor asked the Coconino
County Superior Court to enter the affidavit in its records and accept it as a
timely renewal of the judgment. Id. at 114, ¶ 4. The reviewing judge
granted the request, explaining there is only one superior court in Arizona
and the erroneous filing in Maricopa County was “merely a venue error.”
Id.
¶11
On appeal, we noted that the Page Justice Court judgment
was “rightly filed” in the Coconino County Superior Court, where it was
entered and docketed. Id. at 118, ¶ 24. Construing A.R.S. § 12-1612(A) with
related statutes, we explained:
The only conclusion that can be reached from reading these
provisions in the renewal of judgment statutes is that the
affidavit is to be filed with the clerk of the superior court in
the same county in which the judgment was docketed so that
it can be maintained with the other records concerning that

IRONWOOD v. RANDALL
Opinion of the Court

5
judgment. It would make no sense for the affidavit to be filed
with the clerk of the superior court in a different county who
would have no records concerning that judgment.
197 Ariz. at 118, ¶ 27. We therefore held that “if the judgment was a
Coconino County Superior Court judgment, the affidavit of renewal of the
judgment was not effective unless timely filed in the Coconino County
Superior Court rather than in the superior court located in some other
county.” Id. at 119, ¶ 33.
¶12
We rejected the argument that because the superior courts are
deemed a “single court” under our constitution, a renewal affidavit may be
filed in the superior court of any county regardless of the county’s
connection with the case or judgment. Id. at 118–19, ¶ 28 (citing Ariz. Const.
art. 6, § 13 (“The superior courts provided for in this article shall constitute
a single court, composed of all the duly elected or appointed judges in each
of the counties of the state.”)).1 We relied on Ward v. Stevens, 86 Ariz. 222
(1959), which involved a challenge to a superior court discovery order
issued by a Maricopa County Superior Court judge in a lawsuit pending in
Pinal County Superior Court. Id. at 225–26. Declaring the order a nullity,
our supreme court determined the single-court provision was added to the
constitution because voters sought to (1) establish uniform salaries among
all superior court judges and (2) clarify the power of a visiting judge, on
assignment, to hear a case pending in a different court. Id. at 229–30. The
court declined to construe the single-court provision contrary to these
avowed purposes, concluding that allowing a judge from one county to
enter orders in a case pending in a different county “would only result in
chaos and confusion and unnecessary jurisdictional conflicts among the
trial courts of the state.” Id. at 230–31. In J.C. Penney, we similarly reasoned
that allowing renewal affidavits to be filed with the clerk of any county of
the superior court, regardless of whether that county had any connection
with the judgment, would create “uncertainty and confusion.” 197 Ariz. at
119, ¶ 28.
¶13
Randall has not cited, nor has our research revealed, any
statute requiring Ironwood to file its renewal affidavit in the county where
the judgment originated. As the trial court aptly noted, the legislature’s
decision to include specific language in § 22-246 addressing when a justice
court judgment must be filed in the superior court of the same county, but

1
For the purpose of achieving administrative efficiency, voters
adopted a new Article 6 in 1960. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 13. As relevant
here, no material differences exist between the two versions.

IRONWOOD v. RANDALL
Opinion of the Court

6
not to include similar language in related statutes, makes Randall’s
interpretation of the judgment renewal statutory scheme unsupportable.
See Comm. for Pres. of Established Neighborhoods v. Riffel, 213 Ariz. 247, 249–
50, ¶ 8 (App. 2006) (“[W]e assume that when the legislature uses different
language within a statutory scheme, it does so with the intent of ascribing
different meanings and consequences to that language.”).
¶14
Randall argues nonetheless that allowing judgment creditors
to renew a judgment in any county in Arizona contradicts J.C. Penney’s
recognition that one of the purposes of the judgment renewal statutes is “to
give notice to the judgment debtor and other interested parties of the status
of the judgment.” See 197 Ariz. at 119, ¶ 29. We explained that interested
parties could monitor a judgment’s status “by checking the records of the
superior court clerk’s office in the county where the judgment was
recorded,” id. at ¶ 30, and that the judgment creditor gave “no reasonable
notice” when it failed to file the affidavit in the superior court of that
county, id. at ¶ 31.
¶15
We agree with Randall that providing notice is one of the
purposes of the judgment renewal statutes. See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz.
343, 345, ¶ 10 (2004) (“The affidavit of renewal serves to notify interested
parties of the existence and continued viability of the judgment.”). We
cannot agree, however, with Randall’s view that any specific notice was
required other than what is mandated by the plain language of those
statutes. Providing notice to interested parties is fulfilled under the
statutory scheme for judgment renewal based on the principle of
constructive notice. See Serasio v. Sears, 58 Ariz. 522, 525 (1942) (explaining
that an uncertified copy of an affidavit of renewal could not be recorded
with the county recorder because it would not provide constructive notice
that the affidavit had been filed with the clerk of the court). Nothing
requires actual notice to the judgment debtor, either as part of filing the
transcript of judgment, filing the affidavit of renewal, or recording the
judgment. See Goodwin v. Hewlett, 147 Ariz. 356, 358 (App. 1985) (explaining
that service on a judgment debtor is not required for judgment renewal).
The comment in J.C. Penney that a party should not “be required to check
the court records in all the other counties of the state to ensure the judgment
has not been renewed” is untethered to any statutory language or
secondary evidence of legislative intent. 197 Ariz. at 119, ¶30. Thus, to the
extent the J.C. Penney court suggested additional notice beyond
constructive notice is required to renew a judgment, we reject that
suggestion.

IRONWOOD v. RANDALL
Opinion of the Court

7
¶16
Unlike the situation in J.C. Penney, Ironwood filed a renewal
affidavit in the superior court where the justice court judgment was
docketed—Maricopa County Superior Court—and recorded the judgment
in Maricopa County. Interested parties therefore received constructive
notice of the judgment’s status. See Hall v. World Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 189 Ariz.
495, 500 (App. 1997) (“Constructive notice includes both information
available through recorded documents and knowledge of facts that impose
a duty to inquire.”); Villas at Hidden Lakes Condos. Ass’n v. Geupel Constr. Co.,
174 Ariz. 72, 76 (App. 1992) (“Under Arizona law, a recorded document
stating its terms and purpose imparts constructive notice.”).
¶17
Finally, Randall argues that A.R.S. § 33-962 “merely provides
an administrative procedure for creating a judgment lien on real property
in a foreign county” and should have no bearing on whether an affidavit of
renewal is filed in the “proper court” under § 12-1612(A). No language in
this or related statutes prohibited Ironwood from following the procedures
in § 33-962(A) to docket the justice court judgment in the Maricopa County
Superior Court and from then renewing that judgment, as contemplated by
§ 12-1612. See A.R.S. § 12-1612(A) (allowing a renewal affidavit, filed in the
“proper court,” to renew a judgment which “has been entered and
docketed” in the “superior court, whether originally rendered by it or
entered on a transcript of judgment from another court”) (emphasis added).
Moreover, no language in § 33-962 restricts the filing of the transcript of
judgment to a superior court in any particular county, unlike prior versions
of the statute. Compare A.R.S. § 33-962 (2019) (“The clerk of the superior
court, on presentation of a certified transcript of a judgment for more than
fifteen dollars, exclusive of costs, given by a justice or municipal court, shall
forthwith file the judgment.”) with A.R.S. § 33-962 (1992) (“The clerk of the
superior court, upon presentation of a certified transcript of a judgment for
more than fifteen dollars, exclusive of costs, given by a justice of the peace
in the county, shall forthwith file the judgment.”) (emphasis added).
¶18
In sum, our reading of the judgment renewal statutes is
consistent with the conclusion reached in J.C. Penney and thus confirms
Ironwood’s position that it was not required to file the renewal affidavit in
the superior court of the county where the justice court judgment originated
(Pinal County), but only where that judgment was correctly filed and
docketed (Maricopa County). The only arguable support in J.C. Penney for
Randall’s argument is the reference to A.R.S. § 22-246, but that section does
not apply here because Ironwood only sought to garnish Randall’s wages,
not force the sale of her real property. The trial court did not err in denying
Randall’s motion to quash the writ of garnishment.

IRONWOOD v. RANDALL
Opinion of the Court

8
B.
Post-Judgment Attorneys’ Fees
¶19
In its application for attorneys’ fees, Ironwood asserted it was
entitled to “pre-garnishment” attorneys’ fees based on the justice court
judgment, which awarded “all reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees incurred
. . . in collecting the amounts awarded herein.” The court granted
Ironwood’s request and denied Randall’s subsequent motion to vacate,
explaining that the underlying judgment allowed fees and costs. Randall
argues the court erred because no contractual or statutory basis supported
Ironwood’s request. She further contends that Ironwood’s inclusion of
“self-serving language” in the justice court judgment did not create a
substantive right to such fees.
¶20
We review the superior court’s authority to award attorneys’
fees de novo. Bennett Blum, M.D., Inc. v. Cowan, 235 Ariz. 204, 205, ¶ 5 (App.
2014). “Generally, a court may award attorneys’ fees only when authorized
by statute or by agreement of the parties.” Cook v. Grebe, 245 Ariz. 367, 369,
¶ 5 (App. 2018). “A party to a civil action cannot recover its litigation
expenses as costs without statutory authorization.” Schritter v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Ariz. 391, 392, ¶ 6 (2001).
¶21
To the extent Randall challenges the validity of the clause
awarding post-judgment attorneys’ fees and costs, she was obligated to
timely pursue that challenge in the justice court. See Marquez v. Perez, 14
Ariz. App. 451, 452 (1971) (holding that when a justice court judgment is
filed and docketed in a superior court under A.R.S. § 33-962(A), the superior
court has no authority to vacate the judgment; it must be vacated by “the
court wherein the judgment was rendered”). Nothing in this record
indicates she made a timely objection or filed an appeal. As such, we must
presume the fee clause is enforceable and could be relied on by the superior
court as proper authority for awarding fees and costs. But we express no
opinion whether a similar clause is enforceable in other contexts.
¶22
The justice court judgment, however, cannot override a
statute that provides an exclusive avenue for recovering fees in a
garnishment proceeding. See Bennett Blum, 235 Ariz. at 208, ¶ 16 (reasoning
that because “garnishment is a creature of statute, garnishment proceedings
are necessarily governed by the terms of those statues”) (quoting Patrick v.
Associated Drygoods Corp., 20 Ariz. App. 6, 9 (1973)). In Bennett Blum, this
court held that attorneys’ fees related to a garnishment for “non-earnings”
could be awarded only under A.R.S. § 12-1580(E). See id. at 209, ¶ 18. The
statute at issue here, A.R.S. § 12-1598.07, provides that in a garnishment for
earnings, “[t]he prevailing party may be awarded costs and attorney fees in

IRONWOOD v. RANDALL
Opinion of the Court

9
a reasonable amount determined by the court,” but “[a]n award of attorney
fees shall not be assessed against nor is it chargeable to the judgment debtor
unless the judgment debtor is found to have objected solely for the purpose
of delay or to harass the judgment creditor.” § 12-1598.07(E). Other than
the treatment of costs, § 12-1598.07(E) is substantially similar to
§ 12-1580(E). The language of both statutes plainly mandates that attorneys’
fees may only be awarded against a judgment debtor if the debtor “objected
solely for the purpose of delay or to harass the judgment creditor.” A.R.S.
§§ 12-1508(E), -1598.07(E).
¶23
Because A.R.S. § 12-1598.07(E) is the exclusive means by
which attorneys’ fees may be granted in a proceeding to garnish earnings,
the trial court erred by awarding Ironwood attorneys’ fees related to the
garnishment proceeding. As shown in its affidavit, Ironwood requested
attorneys’ fees for tasks related to general collection efforts, such as
“pursu[ing] [the] transcript of judgment” and preparing the judgment
renewal. But it also requested fees for tasks related to the garnishment
proceeding, such as obtaining the debtor’s employment information. See
A.R.S. § 12-1598.03(A)(4) (providing that the judgment creditor must file an
application to obtain a writ of garnishment stating, inter alia, “[t]hat the
garnishee is believed to be an employer of the judgment debtor”). Though
Ironwood argues the fees sought did not include any fees for preparation
of garnishment documents, if the fees relate to preparing for the garnishment
proceeding, they are recoverable only under A.R.S. § 12-1598.07(E).
¶24
The trial court had no authority to modify the justice court
judgment; thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’
fees and costs for collection services unrelated to the garnishment
proceeding. The court erred, however, in awarding Ironwood attorneys’
fees related to the garnishment proceeding. We therefore vacate the
superior court’s award of attorneys’ fees. Because we are unable to discern
from this record what portion of the total award is attributable to work
related to the garnishment proceeding, and therefore not recoverable, we
remand for reconsideration of the proper amount.
C.
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal
¶25
Randall and Ironwood both seek recovery of their attorneys’
fees and costs incurred on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-1598.07(E). We cannot
say that Randall’s appeal was filed for the purpose of causing delay or
harassment, and thus we deny Ironwood’s fee request, but award taxable
costs. See A.R.S. § 12-1598.07(E). Ironwood also seeks attorneys’ fees under
the declaration and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. But the declaration is not part of the

IRONWOOD v. RANDALL
Opinion of the Court

10
record and § 12-1598.07(E) provides the exclusive statutory authority for
awarding fees in a garnishment proceeding. Supra ¶ 22. Because Randall
has not prevailed on appeal, we deny her request for fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
¶26
We conclude that Ironwood could properly pursue
garnishment of Randall’s wages because it timely renewed the justice court
judgment in the Maricopa County Superior Court in accordance with
statutory requirements. Thus, we affirm (1) the trial court’s denial of
Randall’s motion to quash and (2) the cost award dated March 1, 2017. We
vacate the court’s award of attorneys’ fees and remand for reconsideration
of the amounts requested for the purpose of awarding only the fees that
were unrelated to the garnishment proceeding.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA