2026-01-06 — SUNDANCE ADULT VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. BILL ELLIOTT AND MARY ELLIOTT, HUSBAND AND WIFE; ROBERT C. LAMB AND SHARON R. LAMB, HUSBAND AND WIFE, AKA ROBERT LAMB AND SHARON LAMB, HUSBAND AND WIFE; HELEN J. HORNE AND EDWARD L. HORNE, WIFE AND HUSBAND AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP; JASON JOSEPH, A SINGLE MAN; MIKE MARTIN, AN UNMARRIED MAN; KATHLEEN LAMONT, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN; LELAND PINNEY, AN UNMARRIED MAN; CAROLINA ALCALA, AN UNMARRIED WOMAN; DAVID H. OTIS AND LEANN K. OTIS, TRUSTEES OF THE DAVE AND LEANN OTIS FAMILY TRUST, DATED MARCH 27, 2008, Defendants/Appellees. ↑ top

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sundance-adult-village-v-elliott.pdf

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION TWO

SUNDANCE ADULT VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

BILL ELLIOTT AND MARY ELLIOTT, HUSBAND AND WIFE; ROBERT C.
LAMB AND SHARON R. LAMB, HUSBAND AND WIFE, AKA ROBERT LAMB
AND SHARON LAMB, HUSBAND AND WIFE; HELEN J. HORNE AND
EDWARD L. HORNE, WIFE AND HUSBAND AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP; JASON JOSEPH, A SINGLE MAN; MIKE
MARTIN, AN UNMARRIED MAN; KATHLEEN LAMONT, AN UNMARRIED
WOMAN; LELAND PINNEY, AN UNMARRIED MAN; CAROLINA ALCALA,
AN UNMARRIED WOMAN; DAVID H. OTIS AND LEANN K. OTIS, TRUSTEES
OF THE DAVE AND LEANN OTIS FAMILY TRUST, DATED MARCH 27,
2008,
Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CV 2024-0314
Filed January 6, 2026

THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f).

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2022090753
The Honorable Rodrick Coffey, Judge

AFFIRMED

SUNDANCE ADULT VILL. HOMEOWNERS ASS’N v. ELLIOTT
Decision of the Court
2
COUNSEL

Quarles & Brady LLP, Phoenix
By Lauren Elliott Stine and Kristin N. Leaptrott
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Dessaules Law Group, Phoenix
By Jonathan A. Dessaules and David E. Wood
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Vásquez and Judge Gard concurred.

K E L L Y, Judge:

¶1
Sundance
Adult
Village
Homeowners
Association
(“Sundance”) appeals from the superior court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of homeowners living within the association (“the
Residents”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2
“On appeal from a summary judgment, we view the facts in
the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered
and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor.” Modular Mining Sys., Inc. v.
Jigsaw Techs., Inc., 221 Ariz. 515, ¶ 2 (App. 2009). Sundance governs a
residential community located in Buckeye, Arizona. In addition to
residential units, the community includes a “Common Area” comprised of
common area tracts for resident use. In the particular part of the
community in question here, a wall separates the Common Area from
adjoining private property lots containing single family detached houses.
The wall straddles the relevant property lines, sitting partially on the
Common Area and partially on the Residents’ lots.
¶3
In 2022, Sundance filed a complaint seeking, among other
things, a declaration that the Residents, the owners of eight lots bordering

SUNDANCE ADULT VILL. HOMEOWNERS ASS’N v. ELLIOTT
Decision of the Court
3
the wall, “are responsible for contributing to half of the cost” of its “repair
and replacement.” The complaint specified that water damage, discovered
approximately a year prior, necessitated efforts to correct the wall. In 2023,
both parties filed competing summary judgment motions.
¶4
In 2024, after a hearing, the superior court granted the
Residents’ summary judgment motion and denied Sundance’s motion,
concluding that the latter “shall be responsible for the costs of repairing the
entire wall that separates [the Residents’] Lots from the common area,”
absent a showing that the Residents caused the damage to the wall. This
appeal
followed.

We
have
jurisdiction
pursuant
to
A.R.S.
§§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).
Discussion
¶5
Sundance argues that the superior court misinterpreted
agreements between itself and the Residents and thus erred as a matter of
law. “We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.”
Hourani v. Benson Hosp., 211 Ariz. 427, ¶ 13 (App. 2005). A motion for
summary judgment may only be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Hourani, 211 Ariz. 427, ¶ 13. We will
uphold the court’s summary judgment rulings if they are correct for any
reason. Link v. Pima County, 193 Ariz. 336, ¶ 12 (App. 1998).
¶6
The parties acknowledge that they are all subject to the
Declaration of Active Adult Homeowner Benefits and Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions for the community (“the Declaration”). Section
5.01 thereof dictates that Sundance “will be responsible for the
maintenance, repair, and replacement of the Active Adult Common Area.”
Under Section 1.17, the “Active Adult Common Area” or “Common Area”
is defined as including “all of the common area tracts owned by the Active
Adult Housing Association” as well as “all structures . . . located on the
common area tracts, and all rights, easements, and appurtenances relating
to the common area tracts owned by [Sundance].” “Living Units,” on the
other hand—which Section 1.28 of the Declaration defines in relevant part
as “each Lot upon which a Detached Dwelling Unit is or is planned to be
constructed”—are to be “maintained by the Owner of the applicable Living
Unit,” under Section 5.03.
¶7
Section 7.03 of the Declaration provides for the creation of an
“Architectural Committee,” which may “adopt, amend, and repeal rules
and regulations or design guidelines.” The Declaration establishes that

SUNDANCE ADULT VILL. HOMEOWNERS ASS’N v. ELLIOTT
Decision of the Court
4
such rules must “be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with [the
Declaration] and . . . will have the same force and effect as if they were
established in full within and were part of [the] Declaration.” However,
under Section 11.16, “If there are any discrepancies, inconsistencies, or
conflicts between the provisions of [the] Declaration and the other Active
Adult Project Documents, the provisions of [the] Declaration will prevail in
all instances.” The procedure to amend the Declaration is described in
Section 11.07, which specifies that “[a]ll amendments will be deemed
adopted only if approved at a duly called regular or special meeting by the
affirmative vote (in person or by proxy) of 75% or more of the total number
of eligible votes in the Active Adult Housing Association.”
¶8
In 2012, the Architectural Committee amended the
Architectural Design Guidelines and Association Rules (“the Guidelines”)
that had been adopted by Sundance in 2006. In pertinent part, the
Committee adopted a new Guideline I(h)(7), which states, with respect to
walls that separate a Lot from the Common Area:
Any Wall or Fence which separates a Lot and
the Sundance Adult Village Homeowners
Association
Common
Area
and
is
a
Declarant/Builder installed Fence or Wall shall
be maintained, repaired and replaced by the
Owner of the Lot or Parcel, except that
Sundance
Adult
Village
Homeowners
Association shall be responsible for the
painting, repair, and maintenance of the Wall or
Fence which is visible from the Sundance Adult
Village Homeowners Association Common
Area.

¶9
In denying Sundance’s summary judgment motion, the
superior court determined that the wall, under Section 1.17 of the
Declaration, is a “structure relating to common area tracts” such that its
maintenance and repair are Sundance’s responsibility under Section 5.01 of
the Declaration. Although the superior court acknowledged that Guideline
I(h)(7) supports Sundance’s contention that the Residents possess partial
responsibility for this repair, it concluded that this guideline “directly
conflicts” with Section 5.01 of the Declaration. Accordingly, citing Sections
7.03 and 11.16 of the Declaration, the court concluded that “Section 5.01 of
the Declaration, which makes [Sundance] responsible for repairing the wall

SUNDANCE ADULT VILL. HOMEOWNERS ASS’N v. ELLIOTT
Decision of the Court
5
prevails over the inconsistent provision of the [Architectural Committee]
Guidelines.”
¶10
Sundance argues that the superior court erred in failing to
harmonize provisions of the Declaration and the Guidelines, which it
maintains “are entirely consistent” with each other and contemplate both
parties’ “shared responsibility to repair [the] wall.” Sundance further
contends that the court misinterpreted the term “Common Area” in Section
1.17 of the Declaration because the provision “includes two series of items
that fall within the definition of Common Area”: tangible items “located
on the common area tracts” and intangible items “relating to the common
area tracts.” Sundance asserts that, because the wall is a physical structure
and therefore tangible, Sections 1.17 and 5.01 of the Guidelines require
Sundance to engage in repair and maintenance only to the extent that the
wall “is actually located on the Common Area.” On this basis, Sundance
claims it is responsible for the portion of the wall located on the Common
Area and that the Residents, pursuant to their obligation under Section 5.03
to maintain their “Living Units,” “have an obligation to repair and maintain
that portion of the Wall that is located on [Residents’] Lots.” Sundance
argues that this interpretation is both supported by other Declaration
provisions and avoids absurd results.
¶11
A declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions forms
“a contract between individual landowners and all the landowners bound
by the restrictions, as a whole,” the interpretation of which we review de
novo. Kalway v. Calabria Ranch HOA, LLC, 252 Ariz. 532, ¶¶ 9, 14 (2022).
Such declarations, including their provisions specifying whether and how
they can be amended, create vested rights on which unit owners are entitled
to rely. See Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, 184 Ariz. 326, 330 (App. 1995).
¶12
“When the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, the
trial court gives effect to it as written.” Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Hogue, 238 Ariz.
357, ¶ 40 (App. 2015); see also Powell v. Washburn, 211 Ariz. 553, ¶ 9 (2006)
(same regarding clear, unambiguous restrictive covenants). “It is not
within the province or power of the court to alter, revise, modify, extend,
rewrite or remake an agreement,” because the court’s duty “is confined to
the construction or interpretation of the one which the parties have made
for themselves.” Goodman v. Newzona Inv. Co., 101 Ariz. 470, 472 (1966). If
the parties’ intent is expressed clearly and unambiguously, “there is no
need or room for construction or interpretation and a court may not resort
thereto.” Id.

SUNDANCE ADULT VILL. HOMEOWNERS ASS’N v. ELLIOTT
Decision of the Court
6
¶13
As noted above, the superior court determined that, under
Sections 1.17 and 5.01 of the Declaration, the wall’s maintenance and repair
fall to Sundance because it is a “structure relating to common area tracts.”
Sundance is correct that this reading of Section 1.17 ignores the distinction
between the two separate clauses, one regarding structures and other
improvements “located on the common area tracts,” and the other
regarding “all rights, easements, and appurtenances relating to the
common area tracts owned by [Sundance].” Sundance asserts that—like
“rights” and “easements”—the term “appurtenances” describes only
“intangible benefits associated with the Active Adult Common Area.”
¶14
In construing a contract, we consider “a provision’s meaning
in the context of the entire contract,” Terrell v. Torres, 248 Ariz. 47, ¶ 14
(2020), giving words “their ordinary, common sense meaning,” Aztar Corp.
v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 223 Ariz. 463, ¶ 17 (App. 2010) (quoting A Tumbling-T
Ranches v. Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cnty., 220 Ariz. 202, ¶ 23 (App.
2008)). No party disputes that the wall at issue here is a structure.
Furthermore, Sundance concedes that the wall is, at least partially, located
directly “on the common area tract.” Therefore, pursuant to the ordinary
meaning of the word “on,” the wall’s placement renders it “on the common
area tract” for Section 1.17 purposes. See Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire,
L.L.C. v. A.P.S. Rent-A-Car & Leasing, Inc., 207 Ariz. 502, ¶ 58 (App. 2004)
(“In determining the ordinary meaning of a word, we may refer to an
established and widely used dictionary.” (quoting State v. Mahaney, 193
Ariz.
566,
¶
12
(App.
1999)));
On,
Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com (last visited Jan. 5, 2026) (among other
definitions, “used as a function word to indicate” either “position in contact
with and supported by the top surface of” or “the location of something”).
Accordingly, under the plain language of Section 1.17, the wall falls within
the definition of “Common Area.” See Chandler Med. Bldg. Partners v.
Chandler Dental Grp., 175 Ariz. 273, 277 (App. 1993) (“The controlling rule
of contract interpretation requires that the ordinary meaning of language
be given to words where circumstances do not show a different meaning is
applicable.”).
¶15
Consequently, the superior court did not err in concluding
that Sundance is required to repair the entire wall pursuant to its Section
5.01 responsibility concerning the “maintenance, repair, and replacement”
of the “Common Area” as defined at Section 1.17 of the Declaration. See
Hourani, 211 Ariz. 427, ¶ 13; see also Glaze v. Marcus, 151 Ariz. 538, 540 (App.
1986) (“We will affirm the trial court’s decision if it is correct for any reason,
even if that reason was not considered by the trial court.”); see also Leflet v.

SUNDANCE ADULT VILL. HOMEOWNERS ASS’N v. ELLIOTT
Decision of the Court
7
Redwood Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 226 Ariz. 297, ¶ 12 (App. 2011) (appeals court
may affirm superior court on any basis where record provides support).1
¶16
Sundance is correct that Guideline I(h)(7), as enacted by the
Architectural Committee in 2012, provides that the Residents and Sundance
possess a shared financial obligation concerning a wall that separates a Lot
and the Common Area, based on its visibility from the Common Area.
However, this provision deviates from Section 5.01’s assignment of sole
responsibility to Sundance, absent a repair “[n]ecessitated by [an]
[o]wner.”2 As such, enforcement of the guideline would effectively alter
the Declaration in violation of Section 11.07’s detailed amendment
procedure, which requires an affirmative vote of at least seventy-five
percent of Sundance eligible votes. And, as noted above, Section 11.16 of
the Declaration expressly requires that, where “any discrepancies,
inconsistencies, or conflicts” exist between the Declaration and other
documents, the Declaration trumps “in all instances.” This court will not
“alter, revise, modify, extend, rewrite or remake” the parties’ agreement by
disregarding that requirement, and we thus decline to apply the conflicting
portion of Guideline I(h)(7) under these facts. See Goodman, 101 Ariz. at 472.
¶17
Sundance contends that the Architectural Committee
possessed the authority to enact Guideline I(h)(7) and thereby alter the
maintenance and related financial obligations of Sundance and all
homeowners, including the Residents. In support, Sundance argues that
under Section 7.03 of the Declaration, the Committee is empowered to
“adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations or design guidelines.” The
Residents counter that the Committee lacks this power, as it “may only
create rules of aesthetics and procedures, not financial burdens.” They
likewise cite Section 7.03 of the Declaration, but for the opposite
proposition, asserting that the provision refers to the Architectural Rules
simply as “design guidelines.”
¶18
Sections 7.01 through 7.07 of the Declaration, which pertain to
“Architectural Control,” do not support the broad authorization asserted
by Sundance. The provisions throughout Article Seven are fundamentally

1Given our determination that the wall is a “structure” located “on
the common area tract,” we need not resolve whether it is also an
“appurtenance[] relating to the common area tracts.”
2On appeal, Sundance does not allege that the Residents’ actions
have necessitated the repairs at issue here.

SUNDANCE ADULT VILL. HOMEOWNERS ASS’N v. ELLIOTT
Decision of the Court
8
concerned with aesthetic matters and related procedures, as evidenced by
the language of Section 7.03, which gives the Committee power to “adopt,
amend, and repeal rules and regulations or design guidelines regarding the
procedures for the Architectural Committee approval and the architectural
style, nature, kind, shape, height, materials, exterior colors, surface texture,
and location of any improvement on a Living Unit.” As such, Article Seven
does not grant the Architectural Committee expansive authority to impose
new financial obligations upon homeowners that did not exist in the
original Declaration. See Terrell, 248 Ariz. 47, ¶ 14; MT Builders, L.L.C. v.
Fisher Roofing, Inc., 219 Ariz. 297, n.9 (App. 2008) (“[A] cardinal rule of
contract construction requires us to look at the agreement as a whole,
reading each part in light of all other parts.”); see also Scholten, 184 Ariz. at
330 (emphasizing “vested rights” of lot owners “who are entitled to rely on
the provisions of the Declaration of Restrictions”); Kalway, 252 Ariz. 532,
¶ 14 (even full homeowners’ association “cannot create new affirmative
obligations where the original declaration did not provide notice to the
homeowners that they might be subject to such obligations”). Accordingly,
the Architecture Committee lacked authority to modify the existing
financial burdens found in the Declaration regarding Sundance’s financial
responsibility for the repair of walls located, in whole or in part, on the
Common Area.
Attorney Fees and Costs
¶19
Both parties request an award of attorney fees and costs on
appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-341 and 12-341.01 and Section 11.19 of the
Declaration. As the prevailing party in an action instituted to enforce the
provisions of the Declaration—a contract whose Section 11.19 requires the
award of fees and costs to such a prevailing party—the Residents are
entitled to recover their attorney fees and costs upon their compliance with
Rule 21, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.
Disposition
¶20
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s
summary judgment rulings.