01/14/2015 — LC2014000514 PARCEL 3 A HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, NORTH CANYON 01/14/2015 COMMISSIONER MYRA HARRIS View Minute Entry ↑ top
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- Minute Source
Michael K. Jeanes, Clerk of Court
*** Filed ***
01/16/2015 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
01/14/2015
Docket Code 512
Form L512
Page 1
CLERK OF THE COURT
COMMISSIONER MYRA HARRIS
J. Eaton
Deputy
NORTH CANYON PARCEL 3 A
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
CHAD M GALLACHER
v.
IDA TERZICH (001)
STEVE TERZICH (001)
IDA TERZICH
24491 LOS SERRANOS DRIVE
LAGUNA NIGUEL CA 92677
STEVE TERZICH
24491 LOS SERRANOS DRIVE
LAGUNA NIGUEL CA 92677
NORTH VALLEY JUSTICE COURT
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
RECORD APPEAL RULING / REMAND
Lower Court Case No. CC2012–012200.
Plaintiff-Appellant North Canyon Parcel 3 A Homeowners Association (Plaintiff) appeals
the North Valley Justice Court’s determination that reduced the requested attorneys’ fees based
on the trial court’s arbitrary limit for fees in a default case. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred.
For the reasons stated below, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initially filed a complaint against Defendants-Appellees Ida Terzich and Steve
Terzich (Defendants) on January 18, 2012, and alleged Defendants failed to pay their HOA
assessments as required by the CC&Rs. Plaintiff requested $1,961.40 plus attorneys’ fees and
costs. Plaintiff specifically requested its reasonable attorneys’ fees in the minimum amount of
$900.00. At the time the Summons and Complaint was filed, Plaintiff was represented by Mark
W. Waldron of the Waldron Law Group, PLLC. Defendants were served in California but failed
to respond, and Plaintiff filed for the entry of default. Plaintiff did not submit a final Judgment
and the trial court notified the parties of the trial court’s intent to dismiss the lawsuit because (1)
no Judgment had been entered within ten (10) months from the date of the lawsuit being filed;
and (2) neither party had filed a written motion to extend the time for an Entry of Judgment. On
December 11, 2013, the trial court dismissed the case. Notice of the pending dismissal was sent
to Plaintiff’s counsel—Potts & Waldron.
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
01/14/2015
Docket Code 512
Form L512
Page 2
On February 3, 2014, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a “Notice of Change of Firm and Change of
Address For Plaintiff’s Attorney” and indicated counsel Mark W. Waldron, Esq.—formerly of
the Waldron Law Group, PLLC.—was now with Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. A copy of this Notice
was sent to Defendants. That same day, Plaintiff’s counsel filed (1) a Motion to Reinstate Case
requesting the case be reinstated and a judgment be entered in the matter; and (2) a Notice of
Affidavit and Proof of Debt Per JCRCP 140 alleging Defendants had defaulted on the underlying
debt and owed a principal amount of $1,961.40. Counsel subtracted the attorneys’ fees incurred
for work performed on November 21, 2011, and January 4, 2012, by the previous law firm, and
requested Judgment for $1,533.40 plus interest at the rate of 12% per year pursuant to the terms
of the CC&Rs. On February 3, 2014, counsel also filed a request for an award of attorneys’ fees
of $1,190.00, and argued Defendants were responsible for all attorneys’ fees according to the
CC&Rs. Counsel attached a China Doll affidavit1 and indicated three people worked on the case:
MWW who spent 1.7 hours; BWM who spent 0.3 hours; and LMH who spent 0.4 hours. The
exhibit included the hourly billing rate for these individuals with MWW billing at $250.00 per
hour for a total of $425.00; BMW billing at $225.00 per hour for a total of $67.50; and LMH
billing for 0.4 hours at $125.00 per hour for a total of $50.00. In addition, counsel included a
charge for work done by the Waldron Law Group with an amount of $647.50. The work by
Waldron Law Group did not include any specification as to the tasks performed or the hourly
rate for the Waldron Law Group. These motions were also sent to Defendants.
On March 6, 2014, in response to Plaintiff’s February 3, 2014, motion that the case against
Defendants be reinstated, the trial court reinstated Plaintiff’s claim for unpaid HOA assessments.
The trial court mailed a copy of its ruling to Defendants at a California address on March 12, 2014.
Counsel submitted a Judgment and requested an award in the principal amount of $1,533.40; costs
of $262.00; and attorneys’ fees of $1,190.00. The trial court signed the Judgment but reduced the
attorneys’ fees to $400.00. The trial court did not give any explanation for the reduction.
On March 20, 2014, counsel for Plaintiff filed a Motion For New Trial And Motion For
Reconsideration because the trial court reduced Plaintiff’s requested attorneys’ fee award.
Counsel asserted it was an abuse of discretion to sua sponte reduce a requested attorneys’ fee
award to a predetermined threshold amount. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion and in a
Ruling on Motion dated April 15, 2014, wrote that no trial ever occurred in the case. Plaintiff
prevailed by default. The trial court also wrote that it did not read McDowell Mountain Ranch
Comm. Ass’n v. Simons, 216 Ariz. 266, 165 P.3d 667 (2007) as requiring that counsel for HOAs
automatically be awarded 100% of their requested fees; and the opinion discussed a facially
reasonable attorneys’ fee. In that Ruling on Motion, the trial court added:
In this case, the justice courts in Maricopa County have adopted a best
practice for an award of attorneys’ fees in default cases. It states in part that
generally, the amount should not exceed $400.00. In this case, the Court also
questions the appropriateness of billing 2.4 hours for three attorneys to draft and
to review very short pleadings for a collection action where the majority of the
1 The China Doll Affidavit was executed by Mark W. Waldron.
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
01/14/2015
Docket Code 512
Form L512
Page 3
language in these pleadings does not change from collection case to collection
case. In this case, the principal balance was $1,533.40 and the majority of the
legal work in this case appears to have been done by a different law firm.
Plaintiff filed a timely appeal. Defendants failed to file a responsive memorandum.2 This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to ARIZONA CONSTITUTION Art. 6, § 16, and A.R.S. § 12–124(A).
II. ISSUE: DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY REDUCING THE AMOUNT
OF REQUESTED ATTORNEYS’ FEES:
Abuse of Discretion
In determining if the trial court abused its discretion, this Court must consider the
standards for an abuse of discretion claim. The Supreme Court of Arizona stated:
In exercising its discretion, the trial court is not authorized to act arbitrarily or
inequitably, nor to make decisions unsupported by facts or sound legal policy. . . .
Neither does discretion leave a court free to misapply law or legal principle.
City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 328–329, 697 P.2d 1073, 1078–1079 (1985) (citations
omitted). Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion if it:
1) applied the incorrect substantive law or preliminary injunction standard; 2)
based its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of fact that is material to the de-
cision to grant or deny the injunction; or 3) applied an acceptable preliminary in-
junction standard in a manner that results in an abuse of discretion.
McCarthy Western Constructors v. Phoenix Resort Corp., 169 Ariz. 520, 523, 821 P.2d 181, 184
(Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted).
A court abuses its discretion when there is no evidence supporting the court’s conclusion
or the court’s reasons are untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice. Charles I.
Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 213 Ariz. 344, 141 P.3d 824 ¶ 17 (Ct. App. 2006). In
discussing discretion, the Arizona Supreme Court, in State v. Chapple, held:
Something is discretionary because it is based on an assessment of conflicting pro-
cedural, factual or equitable considerations which vary from case to case and which
can be better determined or resolved by the trial judge, who has a more immediate
grasp of all the facts of the case, an opportunity to see the parties, lawyers, and wit-
nesses, and who can better assess the impact of what occurs before him. Where a
decision is made on that basis, it is truly discretionary and we will not substitute
our judgment for that of the trial judge; we will not second-guess. Where however,
the facts or inferences from them are not in dispute and where there are few or no
conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations, the resolution of the
question is one of law or logic. Then it is our final responsibility to determine law
and policy and it becomes our duty to “look over the shoulder” of the trial judge
and, if appropriate, substitute our judgment for his or hers.
2 Failing to file a responsive memorandum is not a confession of error. SCRAP—Civ., Rule 8(a).
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
01/14/2015
Docket Code 512
Form L512
Page 4
State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 297 n.18, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 n. 18 (1983) (citation omitted).3
In this case, the facts are not in dispute and the question is one of law.
Normally, appellate courts do not adjust the attorneys’ fee award determined by the trial
court because (1) the trial court has a “superior understanding of the litigation” and (2) appellate
review of primarily factual matters is not desirable. Chase Bank of Arizona v. Acosta, 179 Ariz.
563, 574, 880 P.2d 1109, 1120 (Ct. App. 1994). “[The] trial court abuses its discretion as to
attorneys’ fees only when its view would not be taken by a reasonable man.” Moser v. Moser,
117 Ariz. 312, 315, 572 P.2d 446, 449 (Ct. App. 1977). This is generally a matter that is left to
the trial court. In commenting on the court’s responsibility for evaluating fee requests the
Arizona Court of Appeals held:
“The determination of whether the amount of attorney’s fees is reasonable is a
matter peculiarly within the discretion of a trial court, and will not be disturbed ab-
sent a showing of abuse of that discretion.” In reviewing for an abuse of discretion,
“[t]he question is not whether the judges of this court would have made an original
like ruling, but whether a judicial mind, in view of the law and circumstances, could
have made the ruling without exceeding the bounds of reason. We cannot substitute
our discretion for that of the trial judge.” In reviewing a trial court’s fee award, we
view the record in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s decision.
Solimeno v. Yonan, 224 Ariz. 74, 227 P.3d 481, ¶ 36 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted).
Before determining any award (1) the attorney must provide a China Doll affidavit detailing
the work performed, Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, Inc., 138 Ariz. 183, 673 P.2d 927 (Ct.
App. 1983) and (2) any award of attorney fees under A.R.S. 12–341.01 is subject to an analysis
about the reasons for the shifting of responsibility for fees Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner,
143 Ariz. 567, 569, 694 P.2d 1181, 1183 (1985). In Schweiger, 138 Ariz. at 188, 673 P.2d at 932
the Court of Appeals reviewed the types of services which may be included in a fee application
but cautioned if “a particular task takes an attorney an inordinate amount of time, the losing party
ought not be required to pay for that time.” Plaintiff’s counsel submitted a China Doll affidavit to
the trial court but the trial court made no specific finding that counsel spent an inordinate amount
of time on any particular task other than to state it questioned the appropriateness of billing 2.4
hours for three attorneys to draft and to review very short pleadings for a collection action. Here,
counsel submitted a combined bill that incorporated charges for work done by the predecessor
law firm as well as by the current law firm. While the same attorney was involved with both law
firms, counsel did not demonstrate how or why the current law firm should be able to collect fees
for work done by a separate law firm. Counsel also did not demonstrate why the fees charged by
the prior law firm were initially $428.00 in the “Notice Of Affidavit And Proof Of Debt Per
JCRCP 140” but listed as $647.50 in Exhibit A to the China Doll affidavit which current counsel
submitted. Current counsel requested attorneys’ fees of $1,190.00.
3 The Arizona Supreme Court noted in State v. Benson, 232 Ariz. 452, 307 P.3d 19 ¶ 66 (July 31, 2013) that a
different standard for the abuse of discretion is used in death penalty cases as the legislature enacted A.R.S. 13–756
(A) after Chapple was decided. Although the case is “red flagged” by Westlaw, nothing in the case suggests it
applies to civil matters.
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
01/14/2015
Docket Code 512
Form L512
Page 5
The China Doll affidavit lacked specificity. Although counsel requested sums for work done
by (1) BWM—$67.50; and (2) LMH—$50.00; counsel did not describe the work performed by
these two individuals. Counsel also failed to provide specifics about any work done by the
predecessor law firm. There was no billing rate for the Waldron Law Group and no indication of
the date and times worked or the tasks performed as required by Schweiger. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to award attorneys’ fees for unspecified work—particularly
where the date for the alleged work was also omitted.
The current case posed an additional problem as the case had been dismissed because
Plaintiff failed to comply with the trial court’s rules about actively prosecuting cases, JCRCP,
Rule 144(e). This failure was Plaintiff’s fault. Plaintiff was provided with notice about the trial
court’s intent to dismiss the action for failing to conclude the lawsuit within ten months and
warned that if the requirement of filing the final judgment was not met within two months from
the date of filing the notice of intent to dismiss, the trial court would dismiss Plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff did not file any Judgment and the trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff did not
provide any authority or argument demonstrating to the trial court—or this Court—why
Defendants should be compelled to compensate Plaintiff for fees incurred when Plaintiff caused
the problem.
Although the trial court exercised its discretion and reviewed counsel’s China Doll affidavit,
the trial court applied its own standard for an allowable amount for attorneys’ fees. The trial
court referenced a “best practice for an award of attorneys’ fees in default cases” that apparently
has been adopted by the justice courts. The trial court failed to identify where, how, and under
what authority the justice courts adopted a “best practice for an award of attorneys’ fees in
default cases” without considering the submitted China Doll affidavit or the amount of work that
might have been involved. While Plaintiff prevailed by default, nothing in the Justice Court
procedural rules allows the trial court to pre-set the amount of allowable attorneys’ fees in
derogation of counsel’s China Doll affidavit. Instead, the trial court should have evaluated the
requested fees in light of the work claimed.
Use of Lower Court Of Appeals Decisions
Plaintiff included a Record Appeal Rule/Remand from the Superior Court in LC2009–
000938–001 DT between Eastwood Park HOA and Judy Bloomfield as Exhibit 2 in support of
the claim for the Motion For New Trial and Motion To Amend Judgment. That ruling involves
other parties and is not legal authority. Not every legal opinion creates precedent. Unpublished
decisions issued prior to January 1, 2015, carry no such weight.4 See Walden Books Co. v. Dep't
of Revenue, 198 Ariz. 584, 12 P.3d 809, (Ct. App. 2000) stating:
We hold that ARCAP 28(c) applies to memorandum decisions from any court.
A minute entry from an unrelated 2009 Maricopa County Superior Court case has no legal or
persuasive authority. In Kriz v. Buckeye Petroleum Co., Inc., 145 Ariz. 374, 701 P.2d 1182, n. 3
4 Effective January 1, 2015, Rule 111 of the Rules of the Supreme Court will allow the citation of memorandum
decisions for persuasive value if no other opinion adequately addresses the issue before the court and the citation is
not to a depublished opinion.
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
01/14/2015
Docket Code 512
Form L512
Page 6
(1985) the Arizona Supreme Court chastised one of the litigants—Black Corporation—for its use
of a memorandum decision as authority and said: “We will give no consideration to the memo-
randum decision Black Corporation has cited.” The Arizona Court of Appeals expanded on this
holding and ruled out-of-state memorandum decisions are no more citable than in-state memo-
randum decisions and refused to grant these decisions any credence. Walden Books Co. v. Dept.
of Revenue at ¶¶ 21–23. The prohibition was extended to federal district court memorandum de-
cisions in Hourani v. Benson Hosp., 211 Ariz. 427, 122 P.3d 6 ¶ 27 (Ct. App. 2005). Persua-
sively, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., Rule 28(c) states memorandum decisions shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited in any court except for the two limited purposes described above. Although
our Supreme Court has amended Rule 111,5 the amendment is prospective in that only cases
decided after January 1, 2015, may be cited and, when cited, are only persuasive.
Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal
Although Plaintiff prevailed to the extent it demonstrated the trial court should not have
relied on a pre-determined threshold amount when awarding attorneys’ fees, Plaintiff did not
succeed in showing the trial court erred by reducing the amount of awarded attorneys’ fees. The
amount the trial court awarded Plaintiff is similar to the amount the predecessor law firm was
originally awarded.
The case included a more unusual situation as the attorney representing Plaintiff left the
Waldron Law Group and joined with Plaintiff’s current law firm—Maxwell & Morgan, P.C.
This Court does not know if Maxwell & Morgan, P.C had the authority to request fees for work
done by Waldron Law Group. If it had this authority, counsel failed to support its request for
increased fees of $647.50 as counsel did not identify the time spent, the dates worked, or the
tasks performed by the Waldron Law Group, and the trial court could exercise its discretion to
limit the fees to the amount the Waldron Law Group had previously been awarded—$428.00. If
counsel lacked the authority to request these fees, at best the total amount of attorneys’ fees
should have been the amount claimed by the current law firm and supported by its China Doll—
$425.00. The trial court’s award of $400.00 is substantially similar to these amounts.
5 The new rule states:
c) Dispositions as Precedent.
(1) Memorandum decisions of Arizona state courts are not precedential and such a decision may
be cited only:
(A) to establish claim preclusion, issue preclusion, or law of the case;
(B) to assist the appellate court in deciding whether to issue a published opinion, grant a motion
for reconsideration, or grant a petition for review; or
(C) for persuasive value, but only if it was issued on or after January 1, 2015; no opinion
adequately addresses the issue before the court; and the citation is not to a depublished opinion or
a depublished portion of an opinion.
(2) A citation must indicate if a decision is a memorandum decision.
(3) A party citing a memorandum decision must provide either a copy of the decision or a
hyperlink to the decision where it may be obtained without charge.
(4) A party has no duty to cite a memorandum decision.
Arizona R. Supreme Court, Rule 111(c).
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
01/14/2015
Docket Code 512
Form L512
Page 7
Counsel failed to demonstrate why Defendants should be responsible for any additional
attorneys’ fees when Plaintiff’s need to reinstate the lawsuit arose because Plaintiff was dilatory
and not because of any post-default conduct on Defendant’s part.
Because Plaintiff did not fully prevail, Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees on appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes the North Valley Justice Court erred by rely-
ing on a pre-set formula—or threshold amount—in determining the correct attorneys’ fee award
but did not err by exercising its discretion to reduce the requested attorneys’ fees where (1)
current counsel included charges for the predecessor law firm in their request but failed to
demonstrate any authority that allowed Maxwell & Morgan, P.C. to collect for fees that were
owed to the Waldron Law Group; and (2) the need for the current fees emanated from Plaintiff’s
failure to comply with the JCRCP. Defendants are not responsible for the fees counsel charged
for re-instating the case.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the judgment of the North Valley Justice
Court about the amount of fees awarded.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this matter to the North Valley Justice Court for
all further appropriate proceedings.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED signing this minute entry as a formal Order of the Court.
/s/ Myra Harris
THE HON. MYRA HARRIS
Judicial Officer of the Superior Court
011520150907
NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a docu-
ment, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have to
deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.
03/19/2015 — LC2014000514 PARCEL 3 A HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, NORTH CANYON 03/19/2015 COMMISSIONER MYRA HARRIS View Minute Entry ↑ top
- Source
- Minute Source
Michael K. Jeanes, Clerk of Court
*** Filed ***
03/20/2015 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
03/19/2015
Docket Code 023
Form L512
Page 1
CLERK OF THE COURT
COMMISSIONER MYRA HARRIS
J. Eaton
Deputy
NORTH CANYON PARCEL 3 A
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
CHAD M GALLACHER
v.
IDA TERZICH (001)
STEVE TERZICH (001)
IDA TERZICH
24491 LOS SERRANOS DRIVE
LAGUNA NIGUEL CA 92677
STEVE TERZICH
24491 LOS SERRANOS DRIVE
LAGUNA NIGUEL CA 92677
NORTH VALLEY JUSTICE COURT
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
MINUTE ENTRY
Lower Court Case No. CC2012–012200.
On February 19, 2015, counsel for Plaintiff North Canyon Parcel 3A, Homeowners Asso-
ciation filed a Motion for Rehearing and requested that this Court revisit its determination about
the proper amount of attorneys’ fees to have been awarded in the justice court action. The sub-
stance of this request is Plaintiff’s contention that through no fault of its own, this Court failed to
receive the entire China Doll affidavit that had earlier been submitted to the trial court. Plaintiff
contended it was apparent that this Court had not received the two pages of its prior China Doll
affidavit that detailed the work performed by the Waldron Law Group and this Court’s ruling
was based on incomplete information. Counsel for Plaintiff attached the missing documentation.
In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledged the time for requesting rehearing had passed pursu-
ant to Rule 14(a) SCRAP—Civ. but alleged counsel had good cause for the late filing because it
addressed its request at a subsequent hearing at the trial court after the matter had been remanded
to the trial court. Counsel maintained the trial court was constrained to alter this Court’s ruling
and requested that this Court revisit its earlier opinion in the interest of justice and in accordance
with SCRAP—Civ. Rule 2.
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
03/19/2015
Docket Code 023
Form L512
Page 2
This Court has reviewed its prior minute entry—dated January 14, 2015,—as well as several
of the documents created in the underlying litigation. From this Court’s prior minute entry, it ap-
pears as if this Court lacked two pages of the China Doll affidavit detailing work performed in
connection with this litigation. The first page indicated 0.3 hours or $67.50 to receive and input
file information from Red Rock Financial Services for review and evaluation on November 20,
2013. This work was performed by ONTR. The second entry on that page indicates a charge of
0.4 hours or $50.00 for LMH to review and evaluate the file from the prior law firm in order to
verify the information. This work was performed on January 30, 2014. These charges should
have been included in the awarded attorneys’ fees.
Plaintiff’s counsel also submitted a second page itemizing the work done by the Waldron
Law Group before current counsel assumed responsibility for the case. This page documented
the source for the $647.50 charge for which this Court found no basis at the time this Court
issued its prior opinion. The work listed on this page included: (1) a $65.00 charge for a FDCPA
Notification letter on November 21, 2011; (2) a $270.00 charge for a Justice Court Summons and
Complaint on January 4, 2012; (3) a $217.50 charge for a Rule 4.2 Affidavit of Out-of-State Ser-
vice on November 6, 2012; and (4) a $95.00 charge for an Application and Affidavit for Default
on November 6, 2012. This Court has reviewed these charges and finds the charges for (1) the
FDCPA letter; (2) the Summons and Complaint; and (3) the Application and Affidavit for De-
fault to be reasonable. However, this Court finds the charge for the Affidavit of Out-of-State Ser-
vice to be excessive. The Affidavit of Out-of-State Service comprised two paragraphs indicating
Defendants live in California and the Summons and Complaint were delivered to a California
process server. This simple document could not have taken more than a few minutes to draft and
review even if this Court were to assume counsel did not have a basic document to use as a form.
This Court reduces the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded for the work associated with this docu-
ment to $67.50. Accordingly, an additional $497.50 should have been included in the awarded
attorneys’ fees.
Defendants Ida and Steve Terzich have not opposed Plaintiff’s request for additional attor-
neys’ fees.
Plaintiff’s counsel also requested that this Court review its Order denying them attorneys’
fees on appeal. This Court denied attorneys’ fees not only because Plaintiff failed to prove its en-
titlement to the amount requested, but also because this Court determined Defendants should not
be compelled to compensate Plaintiff for fees caused by counsel’s failure to comply with the trial
court’s rules about actively prosecuting cases and Plaintiff’s subsequent need to reinstate the
case. Additionally, Plaintiff did not demonstrate it was entitled to all of its requested fees. This
Court affirms its prior order denying Plaintiff its attorneys’ fees on appeal.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED awarding attorneys’ fees of an additional $117.50 for
the work performed by Plaintiff’s counsel—or its law firm. The $117.50 is the total amount for
the work performed (1) on November 20, 2013, by ONTR in the amount of $67.50; and (2) on
January 30, 2014, by LMH in the amount of $50.00.
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
03/19/2015
Docket Code 023
Form L512
Page 3
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED awarding attorneys’ fees for the work performed by the
Waldron Law Group PLLC in the amount of $497.50.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED signing this minute entry as a formal Order of the Court.
/s/ Myra Harris
THE HON. MYRA HARRIS
Judicial Officer of the Superior Court
031920151602
NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a docu-
ment, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have to
deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any filings.
12/15/2014 — LC2014000514 PARCEL 3 A HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, NORTH CANYON 12/15/2014 THE HON. CRANE MCCLENNEN View Minute Entry ↑ top
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- Minute Source
Michael K. Jeanes, Clerk of Court
*** Electronically Filed ***
12/16/2014 8:00 AM
SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZONA
MARICOPA COUNTY
LC2014-000514-001 DT
12/15/2014
Docket Code 504
Form L000
Page 1
CLERK OF THE COURT
THE HON. CRANE MCCLENNEN
J. Eaton
Deputy
NORTH CANYON PARCEL 3 A
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
CHAD M GALLACHER
v.
IDA TERZICH (001)
STEVE TERZICH (001)
IDA TERZICH
24491 LOS SERRANOS DRIVE
LAGUNA NIGUEL CA 92677
STEVE TERZICH
24491 LOS SERRANOS DRIVE
LAGUNA NIGUEL CA 92677
COMM. M. HARRIS
NORTH VALLEY JUSTICE COURT
REMAND DESK-LCA-CCC
CIVIL
RECORD APPEAL ASSIGNMENT - ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Lower Court Case No. CC2012012200.
Memoranda having been filed in the above-mentioned appeal,
IT IS ORDERED assigning this appeal on December 15, 2014, to Commissioner Myra
Harris for determination of the appeal based upon the transcript of the proceedings and the parties’
memoranda, pursuant to Local Rule 9.9, Maricopa County Superior Court Local Rules of Practice,
within sixty (60) days from this date.
Oral argument is requested and this matter is referred to Commissioner Myra Harris for
determination, pursuant to Rules of Procedure in Civil Cases.
IT IS ORDERED denying request for oral argument.
504.CIVIL.OAR
NOTICE: LC cases are not under the e-file system. As a result, when a party files a docu-
ment, the system does not generate a courtesy copy for the Judge. Therefore, you will have to
deliver to the Judge a conformed courtesy copy of any new filings.
